ABSTRACT One of the most prominent contemporary issues in the arms control domain is the regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). Today, there exist global governance procedures for AWS due to intense legal and ethical concerns, especially about those equipped with Artificial Intelligence capabilities, herein referred to as intelligent AWS (IAWS). However, there is currently no regulatory regime exclusively dedicated to the development and use of AWS beyond established International Humanitarian Law principles. By using Complexity Theory, this article argues that the absence of a regulatory regime for AWS is constrained by three structural parameters. These reflect entrenched perceptions of certain state actors, including powerful ones, on intelligent weapon autonomy, national security, and contemporary international politics. For this reason, the article additionally suggests that for the purpose of transcending regulatory deadlocks, such as the one concerning AWS, state, and non‐state actors should adopt complexity‐minded communication practices like issue reframing, incremental opinion‐shifting, and peace‐linking. These take into account and exploit existing interconnections between concepts (international security and global stability), actors (policymakers, activists, leaders, etc.), and social phenomena (arms proliferation and war). In this way, agents will be able to indirectly induce the necessary cognitive shifts for consensus to emerge.
ABSTRACT While existing scholarly literature has emphasized interpretations of ASEAN's diplomacy and its member states' relationships through realist, constructivist, and neoliberal lenses, the Thai–Cambodian border crisis is a critical case to test these theoretical approaches in interpreting ASEAN inter‐state territorial disputes. This article examines the limitations of the three approaches to the Thailand–Cambodia border clashes and proposes a Nationalist Realism alternative, testing three hypotheses framed by this theory with empirical examination. Through an analysis of the contentious border dispute, the article explores several challenges to ASEAN and offers suggestions on how to strengthen the organization's capability in promoting regional peace and stability in the context of the border crisis and other emerging regional issues.
ABSTRACT This study explores how global governance affects environmental security in three cases where environmental scarcity interacted with weak governance to produce conflict: the Darfur water crisis, the role of drought in the Syrian civil war, and the India–Pakistan water conflict over the Indus River. Using a comparative case study approach and various primary and secondary documents, as well as process tracing within each case, the study seeks to explain why the scarcity of resources leads to conflict in some cases but is not a direct cause of conflict. Most importantly, the study shows that governance quality is far more important than environmental quality in all cases. It examines how environmental scarcity acts as a “conflict amplifier” rather than as the cause of conflict. To manage these conflicts, we need early warning systems and coordinated mediation mechanisms that are complementary at the global level. These should not duplicate existing initiatives, such as the early warning work currently being conducted by UNEP.
Abstract* Cognitive empires represent a new form of imperial power: influence exercised not through territory or coercion but through the structuring of cognition itself. AI-enabled systems increasingly shape emotion and judgment from within, producing influence that scales rapidly, appears voluntary, and hardens into mass cognitive dependence. As the U.S.-China rivalry extends to cognitive control, others are becoming dependent on systems they did not design or govern. Sovereignty is falling outside state control, and the window for securing agency is narrowing. The same architectures enabling capture could serve autonomy, but not under current market and geopolitical incentives. Cognitive empire is not merely an addition to existing frameworks of power; it is the terrain on which all of them will operate. Built on capture of minds at home, what makes it historically distinctive is its invisibility: it advances through mechanisms that feel like freedom and hardens into dependence before resistance can be formed.
ABSTRACT One of the most popular approaches to public policy analysis is the Eightfold Path approach pioneered by Bardach and Patashnik. The focus is problem solving and does not divorce the scholar‐analyst from the question being addressed. This commentary assesses the utility of using the approach as a way of making sense of evidence in international studies concerning three subjects: climate change, transboundary water issues, and terrorism. We argue that the Eightfold Path is a useful tool to help international studies scholars—and particularly students—analyze serious international problems. It could eventually help turn attention to these problems, leading to a more cooperative dynamic at the international level.
ABSTRACT This study analyzes Libya's ongoing political fragmentation and conflict dynamics to inform effective US foreign policy strategies. Utilizing comprehensive historical, geopolitical, and conflict data, the research examines the causes of persistent instability, including tribal divisions, foreign interference, and resource control. Libya illustrates how a historically divided, never‐fully unified state has become an arena for internationalized intrastate conflict and great‐power rivalry, suggesting that US policy should acknowledge enduring East–West divisions within Libya and adopt pragmatic engagement strategies rather than relying on traditional nation‐state assumptions. The implications highlight the necessity for targeted diplomatic engagement that balances support for influential regional leaders while addressing underlying governance weaknesses. Recognizing Libya's strategic importance and complex internal dynamics is crucial for shaping policies that promote stability, energy security, and regional cooperation, underscoring the importance of nuanced approaches in managing multipolar conflicts in fragile states.
ABSTRACT Since the early days of the Cold War, the cohesion and effectiveness of the Western Alliance have been sustained through the work of a small group of great powers known as the Transatlantic “Quad”: France, Germany, the UK, and the United States. To this day, the four powers coordinate their policies and manage relations within the alliance through little‐known but well‐established diplomatic channels. In the post‐Cold War era, the elite group—now occasionally joined by Italy in the “Quint”—has also intensified its engagement of outside parties in crisis management, thus assuming the broader role of a regional security management institution. More publicly than before, the “Quad” and “Quint” have continued to play this crucial role in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine. Presently, the West's diminishing global position, mounting criticism from within the alliance, and internal divisions cast doubt on the format's continued viability as an instrument for policy coordination, alliance management, and engagement. Yet, as a highly adaptable informal forum it still holds the potential to play a crucial role in keeping the United States engaged in Europe, preserving the cohesion of the Western Alliance, and securing the Europeans a seat at great powers' table.
ABSTRACT Populism is often theorized as a disruptive force hostile to liberal democratic norms. This paper challenges that view by examining how populism is also embedded within institutions. Using a comparative analysis of Indonesia, Latin America, and the West, it develops a typology of governance‐based populism focused on institutional engagement, leadership style, and ideological anchoring. The findings reveal that populism is not a transient anomaly but a governing modality: routinized, absorbed, and morally staged. In the West, it corrodes liberalism from within; in Latin America, it fuses redistribution with executive dominance; and in Indonesia, it blends piety, developmentalism, and bureaucratic rationality. Populism emerges not only as a communicative style but as a framework of rule. This study reframes populism as banal, normalized through policy routines, moral leadership, and institutional practices, contributing to a post‐Western understanding of populism as a governing force in hybrid, postcolonial states.
ABSTRACT The study examines the moderating effect of governance quality on the relationship between lack of access to energy and gender inequality. Drawing on data from 35 sub‐Saharan African countries, the results obtained using fixed‐effects instrumental variables show that the worsening of gender inequality stems from a lack of access to energy. Thus, we observe the following: First, gender disparities are positively influenced by lack of access to fuel. Second, governance moderates the relationship between energy access and gender inequality. Third, the thresholds at which governance indicators mitigate the effect of limited access to energy on gender inequality are as follows: (i) 0.3870 (voice and accountability), (ii) 0.5347 (political stability), (iii) 0.2214 (government effectiveness), (iv) 0.4288 (rule of law), (v) 0.4942 (quality of regulation), and (vi) 0.0533 (fight against corruption). The calculated thresholds are economically consistent and valid in terms of their implications for economic policy.
ABSTRACT The 2022 QUAD leaders' conference in Tokyo significantly influenced the world history of economic integration. The meeting coincided with the US initiation of a new economic forum, the Indo‐Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which became effective in February 2024. This unconventional trade pact unites 14 member nations across four economic domains: commerce, supply chains, clean economy, and equitable economy. The Indo‐Pacific region is among the most populous and economically dynamic areas globally, encompassing four continents: Asia, Africa, Australia, and America. The primary concerns of the IPEF aims to address include bolstering resilience, augmenting sustainability, fostering inclusive economic growth, expanding commercial possibilities, and advancing equity and competitiveness among nations in the Indo‐Pacific area. This short guest editorial introduces the World Affairs special issue on the novel design and strategic importance of the IPEF and provides an overview of the ten article contributions it contains.
ABSTRACT In the post‐pandemic period, intensified energy price fluctuations, supply disruptions, and geopolitical tensions have tested national institutional capacities. This study examines the dynamic interaction between energy risks and government effectiveness using annual data from 25 European Union member states over 2008–2023, employing a Panel GMM‐VAR methodology. The results reveal that government effectiveness significantly reduces energy risks, while energy shocks do not directly impact institutional quality. This indicates that in economies with strong institutional frameworks, energy sector fluctuations do not undermine governance capacity but demonstrate institutional resilience as a buffer mechanism. Furthermore, government effectiveness is identified as a key determinant of economic growth, energy imports, and human capital development, whereas energy risks have short‐term stimulating effects on economic growth and foreign direct investment inflows. Overall, the findings suggest that within the European context, the relationship between energy risks and governance is unidirectional, institution‐driven, and rooted in structural stability.
ABSTRACT The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been the subject of a substantial body of scholarship, some of which has focused on its revisionist character. However, relatively few studies examine this issue in the context of the BRI's presence in the Global South. This paper addresses this gap by examining how China mobilizes the BRI in this region to advance its strategy of revising the international order. To answer our research question— How does the Belt and Road Initiative reflect China's strategy to engage the Global South in its revisionist project? —this paper adopts a qualitative approach grounded in the tenets of moral realism. We conclude that, by capitalizing on the structural grievances of the Global South and mobilizing a political discourse portraying China as a benevolent actor, Beijing seeks to use the BRI to advance its vision of international order and secure recognition as a morally legitimate global leader.
ABSTRACT Myanmar occupies a pivotal position in the strategic contest between India and China in the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indo‐Pacific. This study conceptualizes Myanmar as a pivot state, integrating balance‐of‐power theory and regional security complex theory to assess its alignment choices. Using a mixed‐methods approach, the research combines qualitative analysis with a structured expert survey examined through stepwise regression. Findings indicate that two factors significantly shape perceptions of Myanmar's future orientation: counter‐insurgency cooperation with India, which builds operational trust, and ASEAN's diplomatic engagement, which provides a multilateral buffer. Although China retains substantial economic leverage through BRI investments and energy corridors, material dependence alone does not determine alignment. The 2021 military coup has reduced Myanmar's strategic flexibility, heightening reliance on China while increasing the importance of security cooperation with India and regional diplomacy. Myanmar's alignment thus reflects the interplay of security, multilateralism, and domestic instability.
Despite robust evidence demonstrating that cash transfers reduce poverty and stimulate local economies across sub‐Saharan Africa, government adoption remains limited and tentative. This paper examines why states hesitate to institutionalize programs when research consistently shows positive impacts. Using a qualitative comparative political economy analysis of five countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania) selected for variation in program maturity, fiscal commitment, and political drivers, I identify three barriers explaining the evidence‐implementation gap: dependency narratives contradicting empirical evidence, weak political incentives for serving marginalized populations, and fears of fiscally irreversible commitments. Political economy dynamics, rather than fiscal constraints alone, drive resistance. Comparative analysis reveals distinct hesitation patterns: maintenance of limited scale despite positive evaluations, persistent donor dependence over domestic financing, and restrictive categorical eligibility excluding working‐age poor. South Africa achieved comprehensive coverage through rights‐based approaches but faces sustainability challenges. Electoral pressures catalyzed expansion in Nigeria and Zambia, while productivist ideologies constrained Tanzania's technically successful programs. Ghana's incrementalism reflects fiscal caution without ideological opposition. This study contributes a systematic framework for understanding state hesitation and provides actionable implementation strategies emphasizing narrative reframing, coalition building, and gradual fiscal transitions. Success requires aligning political incentives with technical design to establish cash transfers as routine policy tools.
Can international organizations (IOs) possess sovereignty like modern states? How can IOs obtain sovereignty? Can IOs supersede states as dominant political structures in the world system? Studies on conflicts of sovereignty in Europe conclude that the European Union lacks sovereign status and cannot supplant European states as the dominant structure for political organization. Neorealist scholars note that European sovereignty practice is already changing the institution and rules of state sovereignty, theorizing that IOs can gain sovereign status through formal agreements among modern states and ultimately may even succeed sovereign states. I study the emerging African sovereignty tradition. I employ constructivism and studies on IO authority and legitimacy, international state, and the third image of structure to develop an alternative theory: IOs can attain sovereign status when states constituting minor IOs, like the African Union (AU), claim sovereignty amidst legitimation crises in dominant IOs, such as the UN. I test the theory with the legitimation crisis in the UN Security Council. Original documentary data on UN‐AU relations show a sovereignty claim by the AU, demonstrating changes in moments of legitimation crises due to noncompliance with IO legitimation rules of inclusive representation and/or the alignment of values, norms, priorities, interests, or goals.
This paper examines India's selective participation in the Indo‐Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) through the lens of strategic autonomy and hedging theory. Specifically, we investigate the following: Why does India engage selectively with IPEF pillars rather than committing fully, and what factors explain this calibrated approach? Using a framework that identifies external geopolitical pressures, economic interdependence with China, domestic political economy constraints, and normative preferences for autonomy as key determinants, the study analyzes India's decision to join three of the four IPEF pillars while maintaining observer status in trade negotiations. Our findings reveal that India's selective engagement represents a deliberate hedging strategy designed to maximize economic benefits from US‐led regional integration while preserving policy flexibility in relations with China and protecting domestic stakeholders. This approach reflects broader tensions facing middle powers in navigating great power competition and demonstrates how strategic autonomy functions as both constraint and enabler in contemporary economic diplomacy.
The geopolitical contestation between the United States and China has brought considerable challenges to Pakistan's ability to navigate its future course of action. In particular, it has unpacked the new strategic response outlined in the 2022 National Security Policy, which emphasizes geoeconomics over geopolitics. This paper contributes to existing scholarship on Pakistan and South Asia by analyzing Pakistan's transformative response, prioritizing a balanced approach over camp politics. It investigates: (a) whether and to what extent US–China geopolitical competition brought challenges for Pakistan, and (b) why a balancing approach is needed for Pakistan. Given Pakistan's longstanding relationship with the United States and its all‐weather friendship with China, the paper argues that striking a balance between geopolitical and geoeconomic priorities can safeguard and advance Pakistan's national interests. We contend that a multi‐aligned foreign and economic policy, with no camp politics, multidirectional connectivity, and peaceful coexistence, can ensure the success of Pakistan's new strategic response.
This study conducts a comprehensive and critical examination of the interplay between development assistance and strategic geopolitical objectives in the European Union's (EU) engagement with African crises. Although the EU positions itself as a normative power committed to advancing peace, development, and human rights, its practices often reflect a tension between liberal ideals and realist calculations. Drawing on a multi-theoretical framework, including postcolonial critique, structural realism, and liberal institutionalism, the article explores how development aid functions both as a soft power instrument and a mechanism for crisis management. It analyzes the deployment of conditional aid, the securitization of development, and the instrumental use of humanitarian rhetoric to secure strategic influence, particularly in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel region. The study also interrogates the dissonance between the EU's professed commitment to equal partnership and the persistence of asymmetrical relationships rooted in postcolonial legacies. The findings of this research reveal significant inconsistencies between the EU's discourse and its foreign policy actions on the ground. These contradictions not only erode the EU's credibility as a reliable partner but also hinder the development of authentic, reciprocal EU–Africa relations. The study ultimately proposes a reimagining of these relations, centered on decolonized aid structures, the genuine empowerment of African stakeholders, and the clear separation of development cooperation from coercive strategic objectives rooted in European self-interest.
Russia's renewed engagement with Africa has often been analyzed through the lenses of military cooperation, energy deals, and security interventions. Yet, comparatively little attention has been paid to its use of scientific and environmental initiatives as instruments of soft power. This article foregrounds the case of the Great African Expedition, a fisheries research project announced at the second Russia–Africa Summit, to develop a framework for understanding “fish diplomacy” as a strategic tool of influence. I situate the expedition within long-standing histories of resource politics, knowledge production, and geopolitical competition in Africa, highlighting how ostensibly neutral scientific collaborations are entangled with broader strategic aims. Drawing on critical perspectives from international political economy and soft power theory, I argue that Russia's fisheries diplomacy is not merely symbolic but operates as a subtle entry point into African governance, economic concessions, and reputational management. In doing so, I demonstrate how fish diplomacy illuminates the complex intersections of science, power, and geopolitics, and contend that closer scrutiny of such initiatives is essential to understand the full spectrum of Russia's Africa strategy.
After the Second World War and decolonization, the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has stood as a beacon of multilateral cooperation and a testament to the strength and resilience of Southeast Asian countries in their efforts to strengthen trade and economic development. Today, ASEAN has emerged as a global financial powerhouse, guiding multilateral cooperation, and occupying a pivotal role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The ascent of China and India, particularly, has nevertheless stirred concerns in the West, as they reemerge to challenge their dominance in shaping global trade rules. The potential ensuing shift in power dynamics has prompted the United States to respond, launching in 2022 the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and attempting to establish a new order in the Indo-Pacific. This article aims to respond to the question of whether the rivalry between RCEP and the IPEF may produce adverse effects and influence geopolitical stability.
