This paper presents a conception of “the wild” as the proper object of environmental philosophy in a time of the Anthropocene. Although there are several reasons to be suspicious of notions like the “wild,” this paper advocates for thematizing the wild with Thoreau along Cavellian, post-Kantian lines. An “Anthropocene aesthetics” is presented as a program of acknowledging the wild. In line with recent methods of describing “Anthropocene patches,” this conception of the aesthetic program is informed by Rancière and Cavell as an attention to what is said and left unsaid in natural-historical descriptions. The last section presents one application of this method to a locality which I expect will serve as a memorable example.
In this paper, I situate Alphonso Lingis’s work within eco-phenomenology by showing how his ontological realism locates ethical demands directly within sensibility through a critical expansion of Levinas’s ethic of the “face” to non-human entities. Through the concepts of the elemental, the sensory levels it gives rise to, as well as the imperative, I demonstrate how Lingis views moral responsibility as scalable from an individual bird to an entire ecosystem.
For ecophenomenology to have a positive relationship with “nature,” a more phenomenologically adequate concept of nature must be found. I argue that valuable resources for a phenomenological concept of nature are to be found in the thought of John Sallis. Sallis explores how nature appears as an “elemental” dimension of experience. Sallis develops his “elemental” notion of nature by making use of a unique phenomenological method which he calls “monstrology.” With this method, Sallis uncovers how elemental nature is not itself an “innerworldly” object but is rather a structural feature of the horizon which makes all emergence possible.
This article examines Michel Serres’s The Natural Contract (TNC) as a source of inspiration for reconceptualizing the relationship between humanity, law, and Earth in the context of the current climate crisis. TNC challenges traditional social contract theories by emphasizing the interdependence of human bodies and objects of nature, framing law as a “way of thinking” that exposes an implicit contract with nature. Through a selective reading of the text, we argue that TNC offers a radical diagnostic tool for understanding the symbiotic relationship between the global Earth and “tectonic plates of humanity.” Building on Serres’s engagement with politics, modern information theory, and ancient physical skills, this article explores how (physical) education and law can facilitate a reorientation toward long-term, planetary timescales. Ultimately, we contend that TNC provides a compelling framework for reimagining climate policy, ethics, and pedagogy in an era marked by ecological tipping points and human interconnectedness.
This article develops a phenomenological account of environmental responsibility drawing on Jan Patočka’s late concept of shakenness. It argues that the ecological crisis constitutes not only a biophysical disruption but an existential rupture in worldhood, destabilizing ethical orientation, temporality, and subjectivity. Interpreted phenomenologically, environmental breakdown transforms the moral subject from an autonomous agent into a pathically affected, responsive self. By connecting Patočka’s philosophy of history, the movements of existence, and the notion of care for the soul with contemporary eco-phenomenology and care ethics, the article proposes an ethics grounded in vulnerability, attentiveness, and endurance rather than control or normative certainty.
This paper argues that ascetic vegetarianism remains sacrificial toward animality—specifically, human animality—insofar as it constitutes a modality of what Jacques Derrida has named “zoophobia.” I begin by showing that a component of carnophallogocentrism is zoophobia, a concept that accounts for the human phobia (a hatred and a fear) of human animality since, within the Western tradition, humans have generally sought to define themselves as non-animal and, therefore, as closer to divinity than to animality. I then argue that ascetic vegetarianism is a modality of zoophobia, since the arguments advanced by its proponents (such as Plutarch and Porphyry) prove unhelpful for rethinking the carnophallogocentric structure, precisely because they conceive vegetarianism as a means of purifying human life from its animal condition. Fundamentally, I argue that ascetic vegetarianism is symbolically sacrificial toward human animality, thus reinforcing the carnophallogocentric structure that justifies (real or literal) violence against non-human animals.
Kohei Saito is an eco-Marxist thinker who mobilizes the concept of metabolism to propose an alternative socio-economic trajectory for the Anthropocene. However, a systematic study of his conception of metabolism is lacking. To address this gap, I apply a framework of critical concept analysis to his major works. The analysis identifies three conceptual strata in Saito’s metabolism concept: criticism of the modern lifestyle, structural elaboration of the capitalist accumulation–alienation–externalization paradigm, and material description of the metabolic rift. These strata cohere with the problems of overcoming the Anthropocene and recovering Marx, but the fundamental question traversing Saito’s metabolism is normative: How ought the non-capitalist society organize its metabolism and habits? Rejecting social constructivism and speculative philosophy, Saito posits an original unity between humanity and nature that degrowth communism must recover from capitalist deviation. I argue that the presupposition of natural law underpinning this normative position requires further critical reflection.
In this article we discuss Forrest Clingerman’s argument for ‘emplacement’ as a framework for environmental hermeneutics alongside his fourfold schema of ecological place, aesthetic place, place of resource, and place of community. Utilizing social science methods, we analyze conceptions of nature as place through semi-structured interviews amongst six groups of UK-based Christian environmentalists. We identify themes of place as (1) love, awe and spirituality; (2) grief and rage; and (3) responsibility, redemption and hope. We discuss each of these categories in depth, arguing that our results can be used fruitfully to critique and extend Clingerman’s philosophy and theology of place.
Clingerman’s hermeneutics of place offers valuable insights for analyzing how the meaning of home is constructed. Building on this, the article develops a theoretical model of meaning-making in residential places supported by evidence from environmental psychology. It shows that home, like place, is relationally connected to nature and divinity, shaping the perceptual structure of meaning. The model integrates deep meanings embedded in routines, emotions linked to environmental attachment, and the multidimensional discourse of home. It proposes a relational ontology of home, reframing meaning-making as a process that unites forms of knowing often treated separately in the social sciences.
This article unpacks how Forrest Clingerman’s analysis of Martin Buber’s word pairs (I-It, I-You and I-I elaborated by Clingerman in Buber’s sense) enriches recognition justice with relational justice in the field of environmental hermeneutics. The major contribution of relational justice in Clingerman’s sense is that it fosters the reevaluation of responsibility as a morally justifiable response of humans (microcosm) to the Earth (macrocosm) and vice versa. In addition to preventing the degradation of I-You mutuality to I-I reciprocity, when the Other mirrors the Self, relational justice also avoids I-It hierarchical asymmetry, when the Other is objectified by the Self.
One unique feature of environmental aesthetics is its emphasis on the interactive involvement of human and non-human agents in place. If there is an aesthetic root for environmental amnesia, as Forrest Clingerman proposed, there is also a good chance for an aesthetic remedy. To find such a remedy, a rereading of the Kantian notion of disinterestedness offers a possibility to define aesthetic engagement in the context of a contemplative and respectful attitude towards nature that is motivated by sublime sentiments like humility and affectlessness. These aesthetic remedies, then, could prove themselves in reshaping perceptual and behavioral patterns concerning the environment.
The Tollgate Principles require that geoengineering projects respect “norms of environmental ethics [including] . . . respect for nature,” clearly recalling the work of the Paul Taylor. Taylor’s environmental ethics have previously been argued by Christopher Preston to “presume” against geoengineering; based on Taylor’s support of a principle of “non-interference.” However, this reading overlooks Taylor’s own exempting conditions to non-interference, particularly the “Principle of Restitutive Justice.” I argue that under certain strict conditions—particularly “self-obviation”—some geoengineering interventions may meet Taylor’s standards. If true, this shows that the inclusion of “respect for nature” in the Tollgate Principles does not rule-out geoengineering a priori.
Images do more than represent the world; they help create it—guiding aesthetic expectations, influencing behavior, and shaping the material design of landscapes. Drawing on Heidegger, post-phenomenology, and environmental ethics, this paper examines photography as a mediating force that co-authors our experience of nature. In the age of social media, this dynamic intensifies: personal identity becomes entwined with environmental experience within hybrid spaces that blur digital and physical boundaries, merging self-expression with place-making. Tracing this shift from early conservation photography to contemporary image economies, this paper advances a hermeneutic analysis of photographic world-building and calls for an ethic grounded in ecological responsibility and poetic dwelling—one that recognizes our active role in shaping environments and embraces the co-creative entanglement of self, image, and world.
This article offers a phenomenological reading of Maya Lin’s memorial installation, Ghost Forest, to argue that the Anthropocene is defined not simply by a physical breakdown but by a breakdown of Western history. On the one hand, this is because, for finite beings, the condition of having a historical world is the loss of the Earth. On the other hand, the collapse of the physical environment today confronts us with the specter of this loss, questioning the ability for history to continue. Following Lin, then, we argue that we must first process this historical crisis to address our ecological one.
