Haiti, as a country caught in the trap of underdevelopment, does not escape the phenomenon of mass migration of its population. However, while maintaining a constant progression throughout the first half of the 20th century due to the persistence and even the aggravation of the socio-economic factors of repulsion, the external migration of Haitians took on a different nature from the beginning of the 1960s, in the sense of a new migration of highly qualified people for, first of all, political reasons and, secondly, with the sharp increase in the enrolment rate in the country and the absence of economic opportunities for the active population, a migration for studies causing a major brain drain. This article reports on the logics that determine the international mobility of this category of migrants, in terms of non-return, return and remigration.
The objective of this paper is to analyze, from a systemic perspective, the consequences of Haitian independence for Blacks in the Americas, particularly in Hispanic America. The Haitian epopee, because of its epic dimension, raised many hopes and expectations. The successive victorious battles against Spain, England and France, followed by the war of liquidation of the colonial and slave order, won against Napoleon's french navy, blew a real wind of change. While the triumph of the Haitian Revolution was supposed to be a source of emancipation for Afro-descendants, in white communities, these events led to the hardening of the living conditions of Afro-descendants through policies of whitening and invisibilization. These policies, which presupposed the concealment of blacks, made Afro-descendants the most marginalized people in the Americas. This study is based on the hypothesis that Haiti's independence, although founding, had a negative impact on the condition of Afro-descendants in the Americas, to the extent that, for the white community, the Haitian experience should not serve as a model.
Far from being the product of natural constraints or autonomous economic trajectories, the regional division of Caribbean labor is the result of an imperial political engineering set up at the beginning of the 20th century. This article intends to go beyond naturalizing readings by examining the logic of accumulation that structures the Caribbean division of labor as elaborated by American capitalism. He analyzes the way in which the comparative advantages and disadvantages assigned to each territory (Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) are built over the long term, before being mobilized and reconfigured as part of imperial expansion.The approach adopted is at the same time heuristic, pedagogical and epistemological. It aims to deconstruct widely shared evidences, to bring to light the historical processes that produce them and to remind that all knowledge production is located, historically contingent and politically marked.
Executive MBA programs are designed to enhance managers’ career through effectiveness and performance. In this article, we examined how an MBA program launched in the adverse business environment of Haiti in 2017 improved the managerial success of trained executives. More precisely, the following research questions were studied: Were managers trained in the e-MBA program more successful in their career than their counterparts? Were they more likely to manage risks in adverse business environments? We used comparative and differential statistics to analyze participants’ managerial success. Three specific aspects of this success were measured: increases in management position, wages, and job satisfaction. Risk management ability was captured through the self-evaluation of managers’ ability to cope with perceived business environment risks. The results revealed a significant difference between MBA-educated managers and other managers without MBA training in terms of management career improvement, but not in other aspects of management, including the ability to manage risks in the Haitian troubled business sector. Our findings support previous research on the importance of mangers’ experience and on-the-job training. In the risky business environment of Haiti, experience appears to be the most important asset of business managers. The results contribute to better understanding MBA impacts in contexts of socioeconomic crisis and fill an existing gap on this topic in developing countries. Risk management skills were improved sharply for both comparative groups, mostly due to on-the-job training rather than MBA training. There was no difference between the two groups in terms of strategies adopted to cope with the Haitian sociopolitical crisis and security issues. The results recall Orpen’s old idea to bring in MBA training what managers really need to lead businesses in the real world.
This article analyses the deployment, in 1963, of the first Cuban medical brigade to Algeria as a foundational moment in South–South cooperation during the early years of Algerian independence. Drawing on diplomatic archives, press sources and testimonies from Cuban physicians, it shows that this mission was at once a response to a health crisis, a gesture of revolutionary solidarity, and an instrument of international assertion for Cuba. The study sheds light on the role of Algeria and Havana in the construction of a shared Third World solidarity and in the development of an autonomous diplomacy within the context of the Cold War.
This article analyses Ahmed Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba in October 1962, in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence and on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Drawing on French and U.S. diplomatic archives, press material and official speeches, it highlights the ways in which independent Algeria asserted its solidarity with the Cuban Revolution despite U.S. pressure. The study shows that this choice – perceived in Washington as an “aberration” – was part of a diplomacy grounded in revolutionary idealism, gratitude, and the pursuit of strategic autonomy within the Third World.
This article revisits the 1963 “War of the Sands” and examines Cuba’s decisive role in providing military support to newly independent Algeria. Drawing on diplomatic archives, press sources and political testimonies, it argues that the Cuban intervention – the island’s first internationalist military mission – functioned both as an act of revolutionary solidarity and as a means of projecting influence within the Third World. The episode is shown to be central to the consolidation of Algerian-Cuban relations and to the emergence of an autonomous South–South diplomacy during the Cold War.
This article analyses Ahmed Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba in October 1962, in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence and on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Drawing on French and U.S. diplomatic archives, press material and official speeches, it highlights the ways in which independent Algeria asserted its solidarity with the Cuban Revolution despite U.S. pressure. The study shows that this choice — perceived in Washington as an “aberration” — was part of a diplomacy grounded in revolutionary idealism, gratitude, and the pursuit of strategic autonomy within the Third World.
This article revisits the 1963 “War of the Sands” and examines Cuba’s decisive role in providing military support to newly independent Algeria. Drawing on diplomatic archives, press sources and political testimonies, it argues that the Cuban intervention – the island’s first internationalist military mission – functioned both as an act of revolutionary solidarity and as a means of projecting influence within the Third World. The episode is shown to be central to the consolidation of Algerian-Cuban relations and to the emergence of an autonomous South–South diplomacy during the Cold War.
This article examines Cuba’s involvement on the side of the Algerian National Liberation Front between 1959 and 1962, from its stance at the United Nations to the material and military assistance provided to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). Drawing on French and U.S. diplomatic archives, UN debates, and Cuban and Algerian sources, it argues that Havana went far beyond rhetorical support and turned the Algerian struggle into an early testing ground for its state-led internationalism. The shift from Batista’s pro-French alignment to Fidel Castro’s open backing of Algerian self-determination, the recognition of the GPRA, consistent pro-independence voting at the UN, and the dispatch of arms and wounded fighters reveal a principled choice, maintained despite U.S. pressure and the risk of damaging relations with Paris. The study highlights the diplomatic shock this reversal produced in France, as well as the way in which Algerian-Cuban convergence came to embody, in Washington’s eyes, the threat of an emerging anti-colonial and anti-imperialist front within the Third World.
