Abstract Interpreted as a difficulty in determining relevance, the epistemological frame problem was a central source of debate within Cognitive Science during the 1980s and 1990s and has received renewed attention in recent discussions. Rather than assuming that the problem has been resolved, this paper argues that the frame problem remains a substantive challenge for contemporary Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. In recent years, several alternatives to classical cognitivism emphasizing agent-environment interaction have revisited the problem of relevance determination. This paper examines whether such approaches provide sufficiently explicit accounts of relevance under dynamic conditions. While appeals to situated cognition help constrain inferential possibilities and reduce computational load, we argue that they do not dissolve the frame problem, since expectations, goals, and accumulated knowledge reintroduce an open-ended space of relevance. The main contribution of this work is to clarify why the frame problem persists even situated character of cognition, and to show that addressing it requires more than environmental or bodily constraints, pointing instead to the explanatory demands imposed by relevance determination in dynamic contexts.
Abstract Some speakers have their linguistic agency unfairly restricted. Here I explore one way in which silencing can be countered. Instead of individual speakers, I focus on group political action, a strategy successfully employed by feminist movements. I argue that protests have the power to update our normative landscape and, in particular, to amend silencing linguistic practices. To this aim, I apply the presupposition framework introduced by Langton and West, as well as Langton’s view on blocking and counterspeech, to the analysis of feminist movements. In this framework, silencing is the result of the presence of silencing presuppositions. I then argue that some feminist slogans can be understood as blocking silencing presuppositions and therefore promoting more just linguistic practices. Importantly, collective speakers can avoid some of the problems that individual speakers face in their attempts to undo silencing.
Several epistemologists reject Conciliationism on the basis that it self-undermines. They maintain that self-undermining positions are untenable. We argue that these attacks fail to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with Conciliationism. To this end, we examine carefully what the problem can be. First, we discard three inadequate diagnoses -we argue that being self-undermining neither shows that the view is false, nor that it defeats warrant in its favour, nor that it gives incoherent or inviable advice. Second, we develop our own diagnosis, according to which the problem is that the very belief in Conciliationism constitutes a (potentially temporary) rational obstacle for endorsement of the view, which means that subjects are unable to exploit their warrant in favour of the view. Unlike extant positions, on our construal of the problem, conciliationists should not be seriously worried by it, for it is not a serious threat for the plausibility of the view.
Abstract In the practice and teaching of logic, incomplete systems are typically not regarded as proper logical systems. Their study is marginal if not absent in most courses. There seems to be a tyranny of completeness. I find this problematic as many systems are being left behind. This article aims to challenge such tyranny, which I find to be a consequence of a traditional view of logic as a discipline that studies content-independent truths. I begin by showing how this view is inherited from Hilbert’s foundational program. As an alternative, I take a pragmatist view of logic from Frege, Brandom, and Frápolli. I then argue that this view implies a Principle of Expressive Power Priority (PEP) for picking out logical systems, and I show that the tyranny is simply a generalization of a singular case of application of PEP that is correct when we are interested in systems to be run exclusively by computers. But I argue that if the systems are to be employed by knowledgeable human beings, incomplete systems are still interesting. Thus, from this pragmatist view of logic we can overcome the tyranny and rekindle interest in incomplete systems without losing sight on the import of completeness.
Abstract Ordinary thinkers don’t know every necessary truth - they are not “logically omniscient.” Furthermore, they don’t know everything that follows from their beliefs - they are not “deductively omniscient.” Stalnaker has famously argued that this is partly due to the “fragmentation” of our beliefs, which are divided into different belief-states. Elga and Rayo have developed this idea, arguing that an agent has access to different information under different conditions, such that her doxastic state is divided (“fragmented”) into different informational states. In this article, I distinguish fragmentation from an alternative approach to limited information access. According to this second approach, our limited access to information is explained by our representation-processing mechanisms - the ways in which mental representations are processed by our cognitive systems. I argue that this approach must be sharply distinguished from fragmentation: The limitations that result from our representation-processing mechanisms need not amount to a fragmented doxastic state. The distinction is especially significant given recent objections against fragmentation: Stalnaker’s and Elga and Rayo’s views still seem to attribute an implausible amount of knowledge to ordinary thinkers. I show that an account based on representation processing avoids these objections, thereby opening up a viable alternative to fragmentation.
Ordinary thinkers don't know every necessary truth-they are not "logically omniscient." Furthermore, they don't know everything that follows from their beliefs-they are not "deductively omniscient." Stalnaker has famously argued that this is partly due to the "fragmentation" of our beliefs, which are divided into different belief-states. Elga and Rayo have developed this idea, arguing that an agent has access to different information under different conditions, such that her doxastic state is divided ("fragmented") into different informational states. In this article, I distinguish fragmentation from an alternative approach to limited information access. According to this second approach, our limited access to information is explained by our representation-processing mechanisms-the ways in which mental representations are processed by our cognitive systems. I argue that this approach must be sharply distinguished from fragmentation: The limitations that result from our representation-processing mechanisms need not amount to a fragmented doxastic state. The distinction is especially significant given recent objections against fragmentation: Stalnaker's and Elga and Rayo's views still seem to attribute an implausible amount of knowledge to ordinary thinkers. I show that an account based on representation processing avoids these objections, thereby opening up a viable alternative to fragmentation.
Abstract In the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein discusses in detail the significance of the Gödelian “true but unprovable” proposition. Despite the negative reviews of early commentators, there have been recent attempts to provide a more positive assessment of these remarks. However, no consensus has emerged. Based on an analysis of Wittgenstein’s distinction between proof and prose and its connections with his views on indirect and inductive proofs, we approach this issue afresh, and provide a reading which not only brings to light these pivotal aspects, but shows how they are necessary for an accurate exegesis of the text and clarifies the relationship between Wittgenstein’s commentaries and Gödel’s incompleteness proof.
Abstract This special issue presents a snapshot of pragmatics at a moment of rapid expansion, where the field’s traditional concerns with speech acts, implicature, and reference now intersect with questions of power, social norms, and psychological agency. Moving beyond familiar textbook examples, the contributions selected here examine how language operates within contexts of public contestation, interpersonal conflict, digital communication, and even private reasoning. Several papers revisit core pragmatic concepts; others extend pragmatic tools into new domains. Together, these articles demonstrate a field both theoretically rigorous and socially attuned, revealing pragmatics as the site where fine-grained linguistic structure meets the broader dynamics of social life.
Abstract In this paper, we will provide na overview of different mechanisms involved in pejoration. Specifically, we will focus on the analysis of three different phenomena in Rioplatense Spanish. First, we will analyze the suffix -ito (‘little’ [suffix]) and how it combines with bases to form pejorative expressions, such as abogadito (‘little lawyer’) and sordito (‘little deaf’). Second, we will analyze (with the support of experimental evidence) the semantics of pejorative expressions, such as puto (‘faggot’), tortillera (‘dyke’), and estúpido (‘stupid’). Finally, we will analyze the pragmatics involved in expressive speech acts that might be used to express contempt toward someone, such as Los del manya son todos putos (‘The ones of the manya are all faggot’). We will assume that pejoration is a negative attitude that is reflected at different linguistic levels. We will defend that pejoration goes beyond the linguistic levels, it may be expressed linguistically, but it may not need to. Pejoration allows us to use neuter terms negatively, change the target of a group insult, and so on. Pejoration is a phenomenon we should consider more carefully when we are dealing with expressions that can potentially be used as a part of hate speech. Pejoration is not a semantic dimension, it is na attitude that can be reflected in our linguistic system.
Abstract The present paper explores resources provided by ontology of satisfiable objects (an ontologico-semantic framework proposed by F. Moltmann) for development of a referential analysis of performative utterances. In order to position ontology of satisfiable (including attitudinal and modal) objects among other ontological options for theories of meaning, I compare it to ontology of propositions and ontology of acts and events. Then I address the notion of performative utterances and its ontological background in Austin, as well as assertion-oriented accounts of performative utterances, contending with the initial Austinian account. I put forward the hypothesis that adoption of satisfiable objects ontology is a way to an integrative vision of truth and felicity of performative utterances. I discuss the logical form ascribed to performative utterances by Moltmann and then outline my proposal for their analysis within the framework of ontology of satisfiable objects.
Abstract I introduce what I call the Propositional Stance - the consensual claim that Frank Jackson’s Mary acquires new propositional knowledge - and discuss two prominent arguments that have been put forth in its favor. The first argument concerns the semantics of what-it-is-like sentences. The second argument concerns the epistemology of phenomenal belief. I argue that both arguments are unconvincing or lead to undesirable consequences, and then motivate non-propositional knowledge approaches to the puzzle of The Knowledge Argument.
Abstract Some facts are grounded, and some are fundamental (ungrounded). Roberto Loss has recently presented an argument (which is a counterpart of the famous Fitch's paradox of knowability) that there are no ungrounded facts. I argue that this argument is not unrestrictedly valid, and one of the central premises of Loss’s argument - distributivity of grounding (PG) - is not unrestrictedly true. Also, I offer a reason to think that all facts of the form “A is not a grounded fact” are fundamental.
Abstract Branden Fitelson (2010) proposes a strengthened version of knowledge from falsehood, according to which one may not have known that p had one not falsely believed that q. However, Federico Luzzi (2019) challenges Fitelson’s proposal. He believes that Fitelson’s account is unsuccessful because it depends on the unjustified assumption about the impossibility of knowledge from Gettierized belief. For Luzzi, Fitelson faces a dilemma: he must either accept knowledge from Gettierization and abandon his own theory about inferential knowledge from robustly false belief, or accept that knowledge from Gettierization is different from his account and deny knowledge from falsehood. He can’t have both. The goal of this paper is to dissolve that dilemma. The essay proceeds as follows. I explain Fitelson’s account and Luzzi’s objection against it. In the final section, I argue that a defeasibility theory of knowledge can help Fitelson defend himself against Luzzi’s objection and, therefore, dissolve the dilemma.
Abstract We review the book Ciencia y método en los siglos XIX y XX, edited by Juan Antonio Valor and María de Paz, published by Plaza y Valdez in 2023. This ambitious work bridges the disciplines of history, philosophy, and science to provide a richly detailed account of how scientific paradigms have evolved in response to both internal theoretical shifts and external societal pressures. Through its thirteen chapters, various authors examine not only the philosophical foundations of science but also its ethical dilemmas, societal impacts, and interdisciplinary connections. In this review, we explore some of the book's intersections between historical narrative and philosophical critique, highlighting the intricate web of cultural, technological, and intellectual factors that shape scientific inquiry.
The semantic value of a demonstrative in a given context is the object of joint attention shared by the participants in a conversation, which King refers to as the 'coordinated object.' This is at least the case when the speaker's plan to align perspectives is
Abstract It is a review of G. E. Romero, Javier Pérez-Jara and Lino Camprubí, eds., Contemporary Materialism: Its Ontology and Epistemology, Synthese Library, 447, Springer, 2022,
Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.
Differences in informativeness regarding truth-conditional and presuppositional content elicit scalar inferences. Many sentences carry not-at-issue, non-presupposed content, e.g. conventional implicatures. This raises the question whether differences in informativeness due to differences in CI content license scalar inferences as well (let us call them anti-conventional implicatures). In previous work, I have shown that certain expressions do license anti-conventional implicatures, and I accounted for the data by postulating a pragmatic principle called Maximize conventional implicatures!, which directs the speaker to use the alternative with the stronger conventional implicatures among those that are formal alternatives and are contextually relevant. Slurs pose a challenge for this view, since they do not seem to license scalar inferences. In this article, I advance an explanation of the data about slurs that is compatible with Maximize conventional implicatures! The gist of the argument hinges upon the notion of linguistic markedness. It has been argued that scalar inferences are blocked if linguistic markedness is not held fixed. I contend that slurs are sociolinguistically marked, and that this is what accounts for the fact that the use of a slur's neutral counterpart does not license the expected scalar expressive inference.
Abstract Cognitive distortions, systematic biases in thinking that lead to erroneous beliefs and emotional distress, are challenging to identify and address due to their extensive variability and context-dependent nature. This paper explores the limitations of traditional approaches, such as Beck’s cognitive model of depression, in consistently detecting these distortions across diverse therapeutic settings. This approach uses conditional statements to help reframe distorted thoughts. It is based on relevance theory, which emphasizes how context and cognitive effects play a crucial role in effective communication. By focusing on the pragmatic relationships within conditional statements, therapists may better understand and address distorted thinking patterns. This approach aligns with non-labeling strategies in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), fostering a more collaborative therapeutic process. The synthesis of conditional statements with relevance theory offers a structured framework for addressing cognitive distortions, potentially improving therapeutic interventions.
In this response to my commentators, I address several challenges to the erotetic account of knowing what things are, developed in Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach. I clarify how my view handles complex webs of inquiry, contextual variation in answers, and normative dimensions of questions involving social kinds. Drawing on cases such as "What is a gene?" and "What is marriage?", I explore how different epistemic and practical goals shape what counts as a good answer to "What is x?" questions. I also respond to worries about over-and under-generation of knowledge attributions, and the possibility of non-propositional knowledge. Finally, I consider the implications of my contextualism for truth, content, and fictional discourse, and suggest refinements to the original framework to better accommodate issues raised by my critics.
