This article examines the dynamics of bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Latvia. Drawing upon established theoretical models, it identifies the key factors shaping these interactions and thereby provides a basis for projecting their probable development in the coming years within the evolving global order. Particular attention is devoted to the paradigm of interaction between great powers and small states that are not historically, politically, or geographically connected. The primary objective of this study is to assess the explanatory value of selected theoretical frameworks for analyzing a highly asymmetric and geographically distant bilateral relationship, exemplified by Sino—Latvian relations. The authors conclude that the development of relations between Latvia and China is entirely determined by the current stage of evolution of the international system and its contemporary geopolitical context, which reaffirms the validity of political realism theory.
The relevance of the study stems from the growing digital inequality among Russian regions amid the rapid development of the digital economy. Disparities in digitalization levels perpetuate existing interregional gaps and create risks of concentrating human and technological potential in a limited number of regions. The aim is to identify and quantify the dynamics and spatial structure of digital inequality in Russian regions (2011—2023), differentiating it into primary (infrastructural — internet access) and secondary (human capital and competency-based — ICT employment) levels. The methodology combines cartographic methods of quantile classification, the Gini index, kernel density estimation (KDE), and Moran’s index to verify neighborhood effects. The results indicate divergent dynamics: a steady reduction in the infrastructural gap in internet access is accompanied by an increasing concentration of human capital in ICT. Significant spatial autocorrelation is confirmed, manifested in the formation of stable clusters of leading and lagging regions. Conclusions. The key challenge for regional development is shifting towards overcoming the secondary divide, necessitating a transition from universal infrastructure policies to targeted measures that stimulate the diffusion of digital competencies and the development of human capital in peripheral regions.
Germany and Sweden have significantly increased military spending and have also sought to dramatically expand their armed forces, distinguishing themselves from several other NATO member states in this regard. A key objective of this militarisation is to enhance their contributions to NATO’s deterrence posture against Russia, thereby advancing their respective leadership aspirations within the Alliance. At the same time, cooperation has consistently outweighed competition in German-Swedish security and defence collaboration. This article examines the dynamics and evolution of this military-political partnership in the late 2020s, with particular emphasis on Sweden’s NATO accession in March 2024. Methodologically, it draws on political neorealism and theories of armed forces development. Historically, the two states’ peaks of power never coincided, sparing them large-scale conflict and creating a favourable backdrop for cooperation. In the mid-1990s, West Germany viewed Sweden’s de facto rapprochement with NATO positively. This process gained greater scale and depth amid the Euro-Atlantic confrontation with Russia that intensified after 2014. Germany pursued a strategy of gradual and consistent deterrence; in the mid-2010s, Berlin still considered formal Swedish NATO membership overly provocative, communicating this stance through the N3 + 1 format (2014—2019), which involved the Nordic EU member states. By the end of the decade, however, Germany had come to accept and actively support Sweden’s abandonment of its non-aligned status, as evidenced by the N5 + 1 platform (from 2019, encompassing all five Nordic states) and high-level bilateral contacts. The study compares both countries’ militarisation models. Germany particularly values Sweden’s reinstatement of conscription in 2017, which has substantially boosted troop numbers, especially in ground forces. It details Armed Forces cooperation in manning NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups in the Scandinavian-Baltic region, including geographic burden-sharing. Special focus is given to the risks posed by strengthened German-Swedish eFP contingents, particularly concerning potential attempts to blockade the Kaliningrad region from the east.The conclusions identify the drivers of harmonisation achieved by Berlin and Stockholm in coordinating their military-political plans and actions under NATO auspices.
The term ‘geostrategic territory’ was introduced in the Spatial Development Strategies of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2019 and 2024. However, the principles for identifying such territories remained ambiguous, with no clear priorities or differentiation criteria specified. This study aims to conduct a substantive analysis of the concept of geostrategy and its derivatives across various fields of scholarly knowledge, drawing on both international and Russian literature. Historically, in international scholarship, geostrategy was associated primarily with military geography and geopolitics. Today, geostrategic analysis encompasses not only the potential use of military force beyond national borders but also the pursuit of national interests through non-military means. In Russia, a strategic territory is defined as a region facing actual or potential external threats to its security, necessitating specific policy measures to eliminate or mitigate their consequences. The term ‘geostrategic territory’ refers to the sources of such threats — specifically, a territory’s position within a multi-scale spatial system of network structures. External challenges are closely intertwined with internal ones, including the need to overcome economic backwardness, poverty, depopulation, and related socio-economic problems. The analysis demonstrates that a geostrategic position is dynamic and historically contingent, shaped by the geostrategic characteristics of individual settlements and strategic facilities. At the same time, similar geostrategic properties may also characterise extensive macro-regions encompassing several administrative units (e. g., the Arctic or the Russian Far East). The assessment of geostrategic position is inherently discursive, depending not only on material factors but also on the civic identity of the population, including their perception of global political actors, assessment of national security threats, and attitudes toward neighbouring countries. The article concludes by proposing criteria for classifying geostrategic territories and offers a refined definition of the concept.
This paper examines the evolution of Swedish national-conservative discourse on Russia between 2014 and 2024, focusing specifically on the Sweden Democrats (SD) and their affiliated magazine Samtiden. Having become Sweden’s second-largest political party, the SD effectively broke through the political ‘cordon sanitaire’ in the Riksdag prior to the 2022 elections. Throughout this process, the concept of the “Russian menace” played a pivotal role. Employing methodologies from historical and political imagology, the study analyzes the image of Russia within SD narratives and its transformation over time, as the party strategically invokes the “Russian menace” myth for political mobilization. Prior to 2014, the Sweden Democrats did not perceive Russia as an existential threat to Sweden —a position that clearly distinguished them from other Swedish right-wing actors, particularly the conservative Moderate Party (Moderaterna). Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, however, the SD began reevaluating their stance. Before the 2018 Skripal case, both the party and its affiliated commentators largely framed Russia as a legitimate participant in the international order. Subsequently, their discourse gradually shifted toward more pronounced criticism of Russian foreign policy and political system. Since February 2022, the Sweden Democrats have actively employed the “Russian menace” narrative more intensively than any other Swedish political party. In doing so, they frequently reference arguments from historians, political scientists, and international relations scholars. These discursive developments have profoundly shaped the party’s evolving position on Sweden’s NATO membership and constitute a central pillar of its broader political messaging. Within this context, the “Russian menace” narrative has emerged as a cornerstone of the Sweden Democrats’ political agenda.
This article examines Denmark’s digital development trajectory and the strategic role of technological diplomacy in elevating ‘small states’ on the global stage, with Denmark as a prime case study. The introduction of technological diplomacy into Danish foreign policy documents is contextualised against the backdrop of accelerating political and economic digitalisation, alongside the transformative impact of cutting-edge technologies — including big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and neural networks — on the global economy and international relations. Denmark pioneered the appointment of a Technology Ambassador, the world’s first, to bolster the country’s presence at key multilateral tech fora, draw investment, and pave the way for Danish firms in global markets. The country also led in crafting an industry-specific methodological framework by embedding technology agendas into core foreign policy strategies. Denmark’s digital leadership stems from historical foundations, seamless integration of digital tools into domestic governance and economy via phased, comprehensive sector reforms (notably e-government), widespread upskilling in digital competencies, and robust network infrastructure development. The nation now stands poised for the next leap — ‘smart government’ — fueled by AI, metaverses, blockchain, and VR across public administration and business.
This article analyses the place and role of the Baltic States in the U. S. policy in the context of the transformation of transatlantic relations. The topic has received only fragmentary coverage in the academic literature, which underscores the relevance of this study. The article aims to identify the factors that have shaped the position of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in Washington’s strategy since the restoration of their independence, as well as to examine how the Baltic States have used interaction with the United States to strengthen their security and advance their national interests. Methodologically, the study relies on a comparative analysis of two principal dimensions of cooperation: the political-diplomatic and the military-political. The theoretical framework draws on alliance theory and scholarship on the foreign policy of small states, which emphasises their dual character — simultaneous dependence on great powers and the capacity to influence them. The findings demonstrate that the United States views the Baltic States as a “forward line of containment” vis-à-vis Russia, reinforcing its military presence and infrastructure in the subregion. At the same time, the Baltic States actively promote an anti-Russian agenda and seek expanded political and military support from Washington. Thus, the Baltic States are both instruments and autonomous actors within U. S. policy, a pattern consistent with theoretical interpretations of the role of small states in asymmetric alliances.
In modern conditions, boosting the energy efficiency of regional economies by reducing energy consumption by businesses and households stands as an imperative for their greening. Russia’s legal regulations establish concrete deadlines for reaching sustainable development targets. Against this backdrop, the study aims to evaluate the current energy efficiency status of Russian regions, thereby identifying prospects (by 2030) for achieving decarbonization and sustainable development goals in their economies. The author’s methodology, spanning multiple stages, centres on calculating growth rates for relevant energy efficiency indicators over 2016—2022, followed by their extrapolation to 2030. The findings indicate that few Russian regions can meet the established targets by the deadline. The reasons behind this projected shortfall are as diverse as the regions themselves. However, data analysis reveals a common trend: insufficient growth rates in reducing industrial energy intensity, energy consumption by economic entities, and atmospheric pollutant emissions across most Russian regions. This, in turn, underscores the need for regional authorities — accounting for each subject’s unique developmental specifics and features — to implement active regional policies whose tools align seamlessly with all sustainable development components. The practical value of this research lies in its preliminary energy efficiency estimates for regions, which not only spotlight emerging ‘energy’ issues but also enable authorities to adopt congruent, timely decisions based on their identification, fulfilling the immanent sustainability tasks set by national leadership.
The article explores the political context, principal reasons, and objectives behind the signing of the Nancy Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation by France and Poland in 2025, as well as its substantive provisions. The analysis is situated within two comparative frameworks: a historical one, tracing the fluctuations in Polish–French relations after 1991, and a spatial one, reflecting France’s policy under Emmanuel Macron aimed at renewing partnerships through treaties with Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The study shows that the Nancy Treaty is intended to consolidate the latest improvement in Polish–French relations, shaped by the conflict in Ukraine and by uncertainty regarding the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. The analysis of the treaty indicates that, compared with the 1991 agreement, the Franco-Polish partnership has been significantly strengthened, and both parties view each other as partners in the broader confrontation with Russia, while nonetheless refraining from offering any new security guarantees. A comparison of the Nancy Treaty with four similar agreements suggests that Poland has been brought into the group of France’s close EU partners, although it remains less aligned than Germany and, to some extent, Italy and Spain. The authors conclude that the treaty opens new opportunities for Franco-Polish cooperation, although further rapprochement will depend largely on the political will of the two countries’ leaders. The treaty may signal France’s intention to position Poland as a leading power in Eastern Europe, although a definitive assessment will only be possible once the conflict in Ukraine has been resolved.
The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of integration agreements and sanctions on Russia’s foreign trade in raw materials and industrial goods. Using international statistical data for 1995—2024 from UNCTAD, the World Bank, CEIC, UNIDO, CEPII, FAO, WTO, and GSDB, and applying a gravity model that controls for globalization effects, the study assesses the potential for stimulating Russia’s foreign trade through WTO membership and participation in trade and cooperation agreements under conditions of sanction constraints. The results of the analysis demonstrate an overall negative impact of sanctions on Russia’s trade, with large-scale restrictive measures exerting the most pronounced effect, substantially reducing trade with Western countries that imposed sanctions in 2022—2024. The influence of investment agreements on Russia’s foreign trade is found to be invariant. Although advanced (deep) trade agreements, in contrast to shallow ones, have a generally positive long-term effect on trade, they stimulate expansion in industrial goods to a greater extent than in raw materials. The positive impact of both advanced and shallow trade agreements, as well as WTO membership, on Russia’s foreign trade, particularly in industrial goods, shows a strengthening trend over time. In addition, the overall growth of international trade in 2022—2024 contributed to the expansion of Russia’s trade with WTO member countries, primarily in raw materials. Comparative analysis indicates that the reorientation of trade towards WTO members, together with the recovery of global trade, helped mitigate the negative effects of large-scale sanctions imposed by Western countries, while Russia’s advanced and shallow trade agreements played a supplementary stimulatory role in this process. These findings demonstrate the necessity of expanding Russia’s integration frameworks with ‘friendly’ countries in the context of intensifying sanctions pressure from Western states.
Under mounting demographic pressures, restrictions on recruiting foreign labour, and an economy-wide wage race, competition for workers in the tourism sector has intensified considerably. This pressure is further exacerbated by the rapid growth of domestic tourism and the incorporation of new territories into the tourism landscape. These challenges are fully characteristic of the Kaliningrad region; however, efforts to address workforce shortages have become significantly more complex since 2022, owing to the heightened structural costs associated with the region’s exclave status. The objective of this study is to identify and evaluate spatial disparities in the development of the tourism labour market in the Kaliningrad region and, on this basis, to propose measures aimed at strengthening human-resource capacity. The empirical basis of this study is drawn from statistical data from Rosstat and its regional office (Kaliningradstat) concerning tourism development in the region. In addition, the analysis uses data from the Ministry of Social Policy of the Kaliningrad region on labour force demand, as well as information from the SPARK-Interfax database on accommodation and food-service enterprises, disaggregated by municipality. General scientific, statistical, and cartographic methods were employed to process and interpret the data. The findings indicate that the spatial evolution of the regional labour market reflects a gradual eastward shift in tourism activities and increasing engagement in the near and distant suburbs of the regional centre — areas that had previously been less affected by tourism development. At the same time, this expansion is driven primarily by the growth of the food-service sector, while the involvement of the working-age population in formal employment in the accommodation sector remains limited. Enhancing human-resource potential in these areas requires adapting the vocational training system in cooperation with representatives of the tourism industry and improving mechanisms supporting labour mobility.
The article analyses the activities of German political foundations in Belarus between 2014 and 2020, using the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation as case studies. The study is grounded in the framework of neoclassical realism, which conceptualises foundations as actors capable of autonomous action while operating within the broader contours of German foreign policy. The study examines their public events, analytical publications, and interactions with Belarusian society and state institutions in the period leading up to the political crisis of 2020. The Ebert Foundation focused primarily on socio-economic reforms, emphasising what it characterised as the “obsolescence” of the Belarusian economic model, an argument that, in its view, created a basis for seeking Western support. The Adenauer Foundation, by contrast, concentrated on security issues. The study concludes that only some activities of the foundations were directed at promoting internal change within the Belarusian political regime. In practice, the geopolitical logic came to the fore, as both foundations sought to influence the regional order, most notably by promoting the notion of Belarusian ‘neutrality’, which could contribute to weakening Russia’s military and political position in the Baltic region, including with regard to the Kaliningrad region. The research did not reveal sufficient public evidence to suggest that the foundations played a decisive role in the development of organisational structures within the Belarusian opposition during the 2020 crisis. Instead, their priorities often lay in building transnational expert networks aimed at advancing pro-Western geopolitical narratives in Belarus. These findings call into question the widespread assumption that German political foundations function primarily as ‘democratisation’ actors constrained by ideological templates, suggesting instead that they operate as flexible and pragmatic actors pursuing geopolitical objectives.
Contemporary geoeconomic transformations have heightened the need for spatial analysis of the sustainability of scientific and technological development across Russian regions, particularly in light of the strategic transition from import substitution to technological sovereignty. This study examines typological differences in the level and dynamics of scientific and technological activity of Russian regions between 2012 and 2024, identifying territories that have consistently demonstrated strong performance and are therefore capable of serving as centres for national technological policy amid changing external conditions. The analysis applies hierarchical cluster methods to longitudinal data on regional scientific and technological inputs (staff, funding) and outputs (performance). The extended temporal scope enables the identification of stable regional dynamic profiles, revealing structural distinctions and long-term developmental trajectories. This approach is especially relevant today, as national scientific and technological development increasingly depends on domestic resources, capabilities and competencies. The study establishes a typology of regions, with a core group distinguished by substantial resource concentration and persistently superior performance. It is concluded that the analysis of spatial and temporal dynamics enables the identification of regions that demonstrate resilience to external shifts and have the capacity to contribute to the implementation of a long-term state strategy in science, technology and innovation.
The study focuses on the image of Russia in Finland’s historical politics in the context of the country’s accession to NATO. Its aim is to identify changes in the place attributed to Russia in the Finnish political elite’s references to Finland’s own past, shared Russian–Finnish history, and world history. To achieve this objective, the author analyses speeches by the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, on foreign policy issues delivered between 2021 and 2024: prior to the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, during Helsinki’s accession process to NATO, and after Finland obtained full membership in the Alliance. The theoretical framework of the study draws on the concept of historical politics as interpreted by Alexei Miller, as well as on the theory of historical narrative developed by Eviatar Zerubavel. The primary research method employed is discourse analysis in accordance with the approach of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The analysis reveals that Sauli Niinistö referred most actively to the past during the first year of the conflict in Ukraine and following Finland’s application for NATO membership. Since 2022, the Winter War and other episodes of Russian–Finnish confrontation have assumed a far more prominent role in historical politics than the 1975 Helsinki Accords. These references contribute to the construction of Russia’s image as an enemy and a threat in both the present and the past, and serve to mobilise public support within Finland for Ukraine. As a result, the historical narrative increasingly takes the form of a prolonged and continuous struggle between the two nations, devoid of any experience of mutually beneficial cooperation or sustained dialogue between the two countries.
This study aims to examine the current state and prospects of the territorial transformation of agricultural land use, with a view to identifying key development trajectories and potential risks associated with returning unused land to economic circulation. The analysis focuses on agricultural land use in the Leningrad region, a territory with a highly developed agricultural sector and an important part of the Baltic Sea region. The methodological approach combines an assessment of spatial changes in the territorial structure of agricultural land use with an examination of structural shifts in the distribution of farmland, arable land, and sown areas. Indicators of structural change and their growth rates were analysed at the municipal-district level between the 2006 All-Russian Agricultural Census and the 2021 microcensus. The study traces the intensity of territorial shifts in agricultural land use across three periods (1990—2006, 2006—2016, and 2016—2021) and identifies the main characteristics and directions of these transformations, including north – south and centre—periphery patterns. Particular attention is paid to the influence of urbanisation on territorial change, especially in areas bordering Saint Petersburg. The analysis also highlights spatial differentiation within the region and identifies three principal zones of unused farmland. The case of the northern, peripheral Priozersk District shows that, when supported by favourable socioeconomic and institutional conditions, agricultural land can retain its value for agribusiness despite broader structural pressures. The study concludes by outlining region-specific approaches to mitigating potential risks to agricultural land use, assuming that current transformation trends continue.
The article analyses the Baltic region as an arena of intensified Russia—West confrontation, applying the ‘grey zone’ concept understood as a domain where traditional military threats intersect with hybrid forms of influence. The authors examine the factors contributing to the escalation of tension in the region, including militarisation, economic sanctions, information pressure, and the use of proxy instruments. Particular attention is given to the geographical and legal conditions shaping strategic instability, as well as to historical precedents, most notably World War II, which, in the authors’ view, helps contextualise contemporary risks. The article outlines the methods used by NATO and the Baltic States in constructing the ‘grey zone’, including the expansion of military presence, the manipulation of legal frameworks, and the deployment of non-military instruments of pressure. The authors conclude that the Baltic region is approaching the threshold of open conflict, and Western policies are interpreted as efforts to constrain Russian influence without resorting to direct military engagement. The study employs comparative analysis, qualitative content analysis of key sources, and event analysis of the actions of EU and NATO member states to assess perceived threats and the dynamics of regional instability.
The article examines the activities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in promoting national minority rights between 1994 and 2000. The study is based on a detailed analysis of documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, which are introduced into scholarly circulation for the first time. The chronological scope is defined by the period when Ole Espersen served as Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Including the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities. The findings suggest that Russia, concerned about the situation of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States, was the main initiator of CBSS efforts to strengthen national minority rights. Although the problem of discrimination against Russian speakers in the Bal-tic States remained unresolved, the Commissioner's activities significantly contributed to the standardization of the legal and institutional framework for protecting vulnerable population groups, particularly national minorities. The authors argue that these activities also support-ed the consolidation of European human rights institutions and encouraged Russia to enhance the national legislation in this field.
In the spatial structure of modern Russia, vast coastal zones play a significant role. Their further development requires a highly detailed and localized approach (down to the level of specific coastal municipalities) that considers the natural, ecological, and socioeconomic conditions of settlement and economic activity. This article presents a methodological approach and the results of a multidimensional typology of Russia's coastal municipalities (186 urban districts, municipal districts, and municipal okrugs (a type of municipality in Russia)). The typology is based on interbasin natural and economic zonation; comparison of the economic, demographic, and areal size of municipalities; the position of their administrative centres relative to the coastline; central-peripheral relations within the framework of the 'main bases' of marine activity; marine economic functionality; prevailing local socio-economic and environmental problems; and the availability of federal support through preferential business regimes. The typologization algorithm is described along with its cartographic visualization (using GIS). The article also provides an assessment and comparative analysis of the socio-economic dynamics of different types and subtypes of coastal municipalities. The study identifies multidirectional trends in the spatial socio-economic development of Russia's coastal zone: polarization, population and economic concentration in some municipalities, and economic contraction in others. The most problematic typological groups and their geographic locations (Pacific Russia and the Arctic zone) are identified. Finally, the article emphasizes the importance of accounting for these typological features in Russia's spatial development strategy, including in the context of federal support for geostrategic territories and the creation of a network of anchor settlements.
The start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) created a conceptual vacuum in the European Union's policy toward Russia. By classifying Moscow as a strategic threat, Brussels curtailed all contacts with it, instead prioritizing sanctions and support for Ukraine. The aim of this article is to examine how decolonization, understood as a sociopolitical category, has become the ideational foundation of the EU's Russia policy and to highlight the role of Baltic entrepreneurs in shaping this discourse. Theoretically, the analysis is informed by the multiple streams framework; empirically, it draws on EU policy documents and political speeches delivered between 2022 and the present. Three distinct interpretations of decolonization are identified. The first highlights the previously limited agency of the Baltic States and Poland in shaping EU-Russia policy, which has now given way to Brussels' acceptance of the most uncompromising 'Baltic line'on Russia. The second emphasizes inter-imperiality, understood as both the liberation of post-Soviet Eurasia from Russian influence and the emancipation of states in this region through deeper and more equitable cooperation with the EU. This interpretation underpins the EU's revision of its enlargement policy, the additional legitimation of anti-Russian sanctions, and the creation of a new hierarchy of actors in the post-Soviet space. The third, currently marginal, interpretation focuses on restoring subjectivity to Russia's peoples and regions. While EU policymakers rarely elaborate on this perspective, its very existence reinforces a negative backdrop that constrains the possibility of dialogue between Russia and the EU. The article demonstrates the central role of Baltic entrepreneurs in advancing these interpretations of decolonization and underscores the differences in their technical feasibility. In conclusion, the three interpretations are compared and briefly assessed in terms of their implications for the potential restoration of Russia-EU relations.
The manufacturing industry of Russia's Baltic regions has faced major global challenges in recent years, including the COVID-19 pandemic and Western sanctions. This study aims to identify the spatiotemporal effects of these external shocks on industrial dynamics in Saint Petersburg, Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions, and to identify local clusters of industrial growth and decline. The methodological framework of the study is spatial analysis based on differential global and local Moran's I statistics, which allows for the assessment of spatial autocorrelation in changes in industrial output at the municipal level during 2019-2023. Official Rosstat data, normalized (deflated) to pre-crisis levels, serve as the empirical basis of the study. The findings reveal pronounced heterogeneity in regional responses. In the Kaliningrad region, extensive zones of industrial decline emerged, reflecting the region's high dependence on imports. By contrast, several municipalities in the Leningrad region demonstrated growth, supported by production diversification and government measures. These results make it possible to identify local poles of decline and growth, highlighting significant spatial disparities in the resilience of the manufacturing sector across Russia's Baltic regions.
