The heightened polarisation inflicted by Imran Khan on Pakistan has permeated into the country's military, undermining the unity of command of its powerful army. This does not bode well for the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons as the breakdown of unity of command in the armed forces might also affect the institutional cohesion of the paramilitary organisation in charge of securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons-the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Considering that SPD mostly recruits its personnel from the Pakistan Army, this article argues that it would be an underestimation, rather than an exaggeration, to presume that Imran Khan's politics is disconnected from the lives of Pakistan's nuclear guardians in uniform. The study underscores the potential for a decline in the institutional cohesion of the SPD in the years ahead, as a consequence of the intense polarisation inflicted upon the country by Imran Khan. This article opens grounds for further research on the scope of mainstream polarisation potentially impacting the loyalties of Pakistan's nuclear guardians in uniform.
Afghanistan's emergence as a central pivot challenges traditional regional security frameworks, positioning it at the intersection of South, Central and West Asian geopolitical dynamics. The construction of the Trans-Afghan Railway, connecting Uzbekistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, represents more than a transportation infrastructure project. It aims to act as an instrument of regional geoeconomic transformation. This article argues that the railway is reconstituting Afghanistan's regional identity from a fragile buffer state into the core node of an emerging Asian supercomplex. Afghanistan's re-emergence revives its historic role along the ancient Silk Road, which once channelled trade, culture and imperial aspirations across Asia. The article adopts a qualitative, theory-led approach that combines the regional security complex theory with the spatial and geopolitical mapping of corridor projects, drawing on institutional documents, regional agreements, policy reports, and curated media and official digital sources. The infrastructural centrality of Afghanistan is reconceptualised as both an opportunity and a source of vulnerability. The article proposes that Afghanistan's role in the regional security architecture can no longer be assessed in isolation or as a spillover zone; rather, it is better understood as part of a larger inter-regional security complex in which South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia are beginning to fuse strategically through trade, transport and regional security mechanisms. This evolution is indicative of a broader departure from Cold War and early post-9/11 security paradigms and calls for a reassessment of how power, influence and stability are produced in landlocked and post-conflict spaces. This delicate nexus of development and stability will be essential for anchoring Afghanistan as a resilient transit state within an increasingly interdependent and volatile Eurasian order.
This article explores Vietnam's multifaceted approaches in navigating its relationship with China, namely constructivism, neoliberalism and hedging. Vietnam's constructivist approach towards China as a good comrade is informed by shared ideological values, historical connections, political-diplomatic efforts and people-to-people diplomacy. However, Vietnam's neoliberal approach prioritises economic collaboration, framing China as a good partner. This approach aims to draw lessons from China's successful model of economic governance and development while deepening bilateral and multilateral economic ties, thereby enmeshing China into mutual economic benefits and a structured framework of commitments for promoting regional peace and stability. Vietnam's hedging perspective towards China reflects a prudent stance shaped by historical grievances and concerns over its expansionist tendencies, particularly in the South China Sea. This strategy involves diversifying partnerships with multiple powers, particularly the United States, to enhance its strategic autonomy and maritime security, further illustrating its cautious yet proactive stance in regional geopolitics.
This article explores how Chinese culture influences the Communist Party of China (CPC) leaders' decision-making and policy setting to predict future CPC decisions and better control escalation. We investigate the question, 'Which Chinese cultural values influence the CPC's understanding and application of deterrence strategies to meet their cultural objectives?' We argue that cultural influences principally explain CPC nuclear build-up and, by extension, the policy shift from minimum to limited deterrence within the CPC. During this process, we discover that the two most prominent deterrence policies in the consciousness of the CPC leadership are minimum and limited deterrence and that the CPC nuclear arsenal is expanding, which may reflect a shift in the CPC policy. To test our hypothesis, we conduct a content analysis of the 2013 and 2020 editions of the Science of Military Strategy and the 2019 Ministry of Defence white paper. We found links between deterrence strategy trends and cultural philosophies, concluding that the CPC deterrence policy has shifted.
The Global South has become a prominent topic in today's global agenda. Although the countries in this group have not formed a unified bloc, they play a crucial role on both regional and global stages. India, as a key player in the Global South, is experiencing rapid economic and political growth. As global power shifts from the West to the East, India is positioning itself as a bridge for the countries of the Global South, helping them move closer to the prosperity of the Global North. Through identity construction, the study explores India's evolving role in the Global South, from its ideological to practical actions through India's initiatives in trade, development assistance, climate diplomacy and bilateral, multilateral engagements in the region, including the synchronous and comprehensive implementation of the 'Act East' policy with India's comprehensive strategic partners such as Vietnam and Indonesia. It concludes that India is gradually becoming a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, advocating for a more inclusive and representative global order and creating a future where the Global South plays a key role in shaping policies and advancing sustainable development.
This article analyses Qatar's mediation during the November 2023 Israel-Hamas hostage negotiations, which secured a temporary ceasefire and the exchange of hostages for Palestinian prisoners. Applying Saadia Touval's framework, the study argues that Qatar's involvement was a calculated act of statecraft aimed at advancing its political goals. The analysis demonstrates that Qatar's diplomatic decisions were driven by three intersecting imperatives: maintaining domestic legitimacy, reinforcing its regional indispensability and protecting its vital partnership with the United States. Using a single case study design, the research traces how these objectives guided Qatar's crisis diplomacy, from agenda-setting to designing verification mechanisms. These findings contribute to the mediation theory by highlighting the linkage between a mediator's political motivations and their tactical choices, providing the first systematic analysis of Qatar's multifaceted role in this high-pressure conflict.
This article analyses the misperceptions, confirmation bias and groupthink exhibited by South Korea's progressive presidents regarding North Korea's nuclear armament and the prospects for denuclearisation. Historically, progressive administrations have characterised North Korea's nuclear programme as fundamentally defensive-intended for regime survival-and as a negotiable issue that could be resolved through voluntary disarmament. These perceptions have persisted to the present, reinforced by entrenched confirmation bias and groupthink. An in-depth examination of the Moon Jae-in administration demonstrates that the misperceptions, confirmation bias and groupthink held by the president and his advisors regarding Pyongyang's willingness to denuclearise led to an overemphasis on negotiations. This approach ultimately provided North Korea with the time necessary to consolidate its nuclear arsenal and undermine the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. Consequently, South Korea's progressive political leaders must transcend these cognitive biases and prioritise the development of robust deterrence and defence measures to protect the South Korean public from the North Korean nuclear threat.
This study examines China's stance in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) emergency sessions on Ukraine through the lens of the securitisation theory, situating it within the broader historical trajectory of China's UNGA practices since its admission in 1971. The study demonstrates that China's rhetorical strategy is not an isolated response to the Ukraine crisis, but part of a long-standing pattern of ideological securitisation and pragmatic desecuritisation. In the Ukraine debates, China desecuritised the war itself by framing it as a 'situation' resolvable through dialogue while securitising systemic threats such as NATO expansion, unilateral sanctions and Cold War mentality. This allowed China to protect its strategic partnership with Russia while upholding UN Charter principles and appeal to the Global South's concerns. The findings contribute to the securitisation theory by showing that securitisation is best understood diachronically as a repertoire of practices evolving over time and that multilateral forums such as the UNGA function as arenas of normative contestation and coalition-building rather than sites of emergency decision-making. Institutionally, the analysis underscores the UNGA's role during the Security Council paralysis as a stage for great-power discursive competition.
This article examines Kazakhstan's securitisation of religion and its implications for religious freedom, using securitisation theory as an analytical framework. It explores how the Kazakh government frames religious issues as existential threats to national stability, thereby justifying restrictive policies that impact religious freedom. The research argues that international criticism of these policies, often characterised by 'name and shame' approach, has been largely ineffective. This ineffectiveness stems from the government's perception of such criticism as biased and its failure to account for the region's complex geopolitical and security dynamics. By situating Kazakhstan's policies within broader debates on security and governance in Central Asia, the study provides insights into the intersection of domestic policy, international relations and human rights in a geopolitically sensitive region.
The nature of wars remains constant, while their character evolves as per the technologies of the respective times. The character of contemporary and future wars is primarily going to be an attribute of the military application of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), achieved through seamless integration. The integration encompasses identifying and prioritising EDTs to enable a focused approach. Militaries ought to factor in a doctrinal rethink and an organisational revamp, condition the human resources and proceed in a graduated manner, which includes building upon the existing legacy system, till their phasing-out. Ultimately, a superior strategy, combined with the successful integration of technology into an organisational structure and doctrine, is what shall lead to success in warfare. This article covers the above-mentioned facets with respect to the Indian Armed Forces. The arguments in this article cover the contemporary and futuristic threat perception, to justify the doctrinal, structural, cognitive and strategic recommendations towards policy formulation.
There is evidence of a shift in Chinese grand strategy starting in the late 2000s from a defensive to an offensive posture. More recently, cyberattacks attributed to the People's Republic of China have impacted its neighbour, South Korea, placed the disputed territory of Taiwan on high alert, and resulted in the theft of millions of US government records. How does the empirical evidence support the rise of China as a cyber power? This article investigates whether there is an offensive shift in China's cyber posture consistent with its overall grand strategy and explores three critical cases of cyberattacks to explain whether they constitute offensive cyber power. Using an offensive realist lens and balance-of-threat theory, this article extends the concept of power maximisation to the cyber realm. It assesses whether the Chinese leadership is seeking cyber hegemony based on threat perceptions. Using process tracing and case studies, this work finds that Chinese cyberattacks have been highly ambitious, constituting a form of power maximisation in a bid for cyber hegemony, and consistent with a shift in Chinese grand strategy from a defensive to an offensive posture.
Japan's announcement of its counterstrike doctrine through its National Security Strategy, 2022, has been widely regarded as marking a paradigm shift in the country's post-Second World War posturing in international affairs. The doctrine, which lays down a legal basis for Japan's self-defence forces to strike enemy territories to neutralise imminent threats, has evolved in response to changing threat perception since the Cold War decades. This article attempts to situate Japan's national security policymaking and the recent formulation of the counterstrike doctrine within its threat perception. It identifies the counterstrike doctrine primarily as a tactical response to missile threats from China, Russia and North Korea, to allow Japan to ensure survival on its own accord. It further delves into an analysis of full-spectrum capabilities that Japan needs to operationalise counterstrike while situating the same within threat perception. It concludes that counterstrike in the long term can evolve to become the mainstay of Japan's efforts to emerge as an autonomous actor of significance in the security sphere.
The assessment of Japan’s security policy during the first 23 years of the twenty-first century went through a 180-degree turn from that of a reactive pacifist to a proactive strategic player. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new challenges at a global and regional level, Japan’s leading political drivers, summed up in the Yoshida Doctrine, seemed unable to address the new geopolitical context, entering a phase of reform. The late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s unusually strong and long leadership between 2012 and 2020 undoubtedly contributed to this shift. While the role of prime ministers in post-Abe years appears to have reverted to a more traditional facilitator role, the strategic direction Abe set in such initiatives as the Quadrilateral meetings among the United States, Japan, Australia and India, as well as the enhancement of Japan’s participation in collective defence and security, remain largely intact in rhetoric. Exploring how this rhetoric exercise translated into more tangible security policies, the article examines Japan’s security diplomacy and defence strategy in the post-Abe context.
