
ABSTRACT How does demand uncertainty affect firms' investment decisions? We examine this question in the context of electricity‐producing firms' planned investments in new power plants. We measure uncertainty about future electricity demand using plausibly exogenous variation in temperature projections across scientific climate models. The results show that uncertainty increases investment in power plants with flexible production technologies, while reducing investment in less flexible technologies. Overall, the net effect of uncertainty on investment is positive when firms have access to flexible investment opportunities. These findings are consistent with models in which production flexibility shapes the investment response to demand uncertainty.
ABSTRACT This paper estimates the cross‐sectional distribution of Epstein‐Zin preferences using the wealth and risky portfolio shares of a large panel of Swedish households. We find modestly heterogeneous risk aversion (standard deviation 0.97, median 7.50) and a meaningfully heterogeneous and right‐skewed time preference rate (TPR; standard deviation 7.31%, median 4.08%) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS; standard deviation 3.17, median 0.70). Risk aversion and the EIS are only very weakly negatively correlated. We estimate lower risk aversion for households with riskier labor income, and a higher TPR and lower EIS for households that enter our sample with low wealth.
We present results from a field experiment that introduced digital payroll accounts to unbanked factory workers to examine how inexperienced consumers learn to use a new financial technology. We find that exposure to payroll accounts leads to increased account use, accelerated learning, and avoidance of common consumer protection risks. Those receiving electronic wage payments gradually build trust in the technology, learn to use accounts without assistance, and avoid illicit fees. Using experimental variation in assignment to bank versus mobile money accounts, we show that these impacts are concentrated in mobile money accounts, the newer, more complex, and less trusted financial technology.
We propose a measure of the valuation gap between debt and equity-debt-equity spread (DES)-based on the difference between actual and equity-implied credit spreads. DES predicts cross-sectional stock and bond returns in opposite directions. This predictability is unique compared to existing mispricing measures and cannot be explained by exposures to various risk factors. High-DES firms are more likely to issue equity and retire debt, and have more insider equity selling. These findings are consistent with DES capturing relative mispricing between debt and equity, and provide empirical support for the model of partially segmented markets in Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2018, Review of Financial Studies 31, 3307-3343).
We show that FX interventions can be effective, particularly in attenuating global financial spillovers. We exploit global financial shocks and Brazilian central bank interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: bank credit (to firms), foreign credit to banks, and employer-employees. After the U.S. Taper Tantrum (followed by emerging markets' FX turbulence), Brazilian banks with more foreign debt cut credit supply, reducing firm-level employment. A subsequent large policy intervention supplying derivatives against FX risks -hedger of last resort- halved the negative effects. A 2008 to 2015 panel exploiting global FX shocks and local FX interventions confirms the results and the hedging channel. However, the FX policy entails fiscal and moral hazard costs.
Dealer quotes in corporate bonds, though indicative, lower trading costs and increase trading volume. Dealers offering higher quality quotes attract more order flow and execute trades at favorable prices. Dealers advertise quotes to manage their inventories and attract orders from nonrelationship clients. However, quote competition is imperfect. The best quotes often fail to attract orders, and trade-throughs are common. Nevertheless, quote competition is important as clients exploit quotes from other dealers in negotiations, forcing dealers with lower quality quotes to offer price improvements. Quoting is not a zero-sum game, as more active bond-level quoting leads to more bond-level trading.
We introduce a simple measure of informed trading risk, , the residual to liquidity quote-improvement-to-deterioration ratio times . When facing with increased informed trading risk, liquidity providers compete less to provide liquidity, reducing their undercutting activity. Reductions in undercutting leave footprints in trade and quote data that are captured by . Unlike prior measures, is easy to construct, can be computed intraday, and is orthogonal to liquidity. The measure outperforms prominent existing alternatives in reflecting the extent of information asymmetry before earnings announcements, predicting unscheduled press releases, and identifying informed trading spillovers around them.
We examine optimal capital requirements in a quantitative general equilibrium model with banks exposed to nondiversifiable borrower default risk. Contrary to standard models of bank default risk, our framework captures the limited upside, but significant downside risk of loan portfolio returns. This helps to reproduce the frequency and severity of twin defaults: simultaneously high firm and bank defaults. Hence, the optimal bank capital requirement, which trades off a lower frequency of twin defaults against restricting credit provision, is higher than under default risk models which underestimate the impact of borrower default on bank solvency.
We estimate the indirect costs of corporate bankruptcy associated with lost customers. In incentivized experiments, randomly informing consumers about a firm's Chapter 11 reorganization lowers their willingness to pay for the firm's products by 17% to 28%. Consumers worry that bankruptcy could reduce product quality or prevent future interactions with the bankrupt firm. On average, 38% of consumers are aware of major bankruptcies. Using our experiments to estimate a structural model, we show that these indirect costs of bankruptcy amount to 12% to 15% of a firm's value. We show that these costs are unlikely to arise before bankruptcy.
Using a novel data set linking private equity (PE) deals to individual managers, we document evidence of manager skill in terms of generating net present value (NPV), a performance measure that captures both scale and returns. PE firms have strong economic incentives to raise larger funds and execute larger deals. While relative returns decline with scale, NPV persists and even increases. Skilled managers are entrusted with more capital and achieve better career outcomes, and approximately 40% of NPV is attributable to internal capital allocation decisions. These findings highlight the role of PE firms in creating value through performance-based capital deployment.
Mergers of firms that share labor markets increase labor market concentration which can lead to labor efficiency gains and/or create labor market power for the merged firms. Using a novel measure based on establishment-level employment data, we find that merger-induced increases in labor market concentration explain value creation in a sample of completed U.S. public firm mergers from 1991 to 2016. Analysis of the stock market reactions of rival, supplier, and customer firms, as well as firm- and establishment-level real effects in the merging firms, supports a labor efficiency explanation of these merger gains.
We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value-enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53, 1315-1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free-rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.
Homeowners insurance is central to managing the rising losses from climate-related disasters. We show that insurance premiums are subject to starkly different regulations across states, creating persistent cross-subsidies and price distortions. We employ states' regulatory rules in an instrumental variable estimation and a border discontinuity design to show insurers do not adjust rates in highly regulated states and compensate by raising rates in less regulated states. Rates and risks diverge in the long run, distorting cross-state risk-sharing and increasing insurer exits from highly regulated states. We argue these patterns stem from the interactions between rate regulation and insurers' financing constraints.
Antitrust laws mandate review of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that exceed an asset size threshold based on accounting standards that exclude most intangible capital. We show that this exclusion leads to thousands of intangible-intensive M&As being nonreportable. Acquirers in nonreportable deals achieve higher equity values and price markups, especially when consolidating product markets. Furthermore, nonreportable pharmaceutical deals are three times more likely to involve overlapping drug projects, which are subsequently 40% more likely to be terminated. Our results suggest that the growth of intangible assets may exacerbate market power through nonreportable consolidation of the sectors most concerning for consumers.
We show that a U-shaped monetary rate path increases banking crisis risk, via credit and asset price cycles, analyzing 17 countries over 150 years. Rate hikes (raw or instrumented) increase crisis risk, but only if preceded by prolonged cuts. These patterns are unique to banking crises, unlike noncrisis recessions. Regarding the mechanism, prolonged cuts raise the likelihood of large credit and asset price booms, consistent with higher credit supply and risk-taking. Subsequent hikes strongly reduce credit and asset prices, and increase banks' realized credit risk, rather than interest rate risk. We find consistent results in administrative loan-level data for Spain.