We examine the impact of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on firms' carbon emissions following the introduction of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS). Using a matched difference-in-differences approach, we compare UK-regulated firms with a counterfactual group of EU ETS firms to assess whether the implementation of the UK ETS altered emissions behavior during its early stages. Our results indicate no statistically significant effect of the UK's departure from the EU ETS on firms' emissions. Sectoral analysis reveals that, both in the UK and in the EU, energy firms experienced greater average emissions reductions than manufacturing firms, suggesting sector-specific differences in decarbonization incentives and emissions-reduction capabilities. This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on potential linkages between ETSs.Key Policy Insights
The Arctic archipelago of Svalbard is currently undergoing a profound energy transition, shifting from coal-based infrastructure towards a low-carbon hybrid energy system. Following the closure of the last coal mine in 2025, a range of renewable energy technologies is expected to be implemented in accordance with a new national energy plan. This article investigates the expectations that residents of Longyearbyen have for this socio-technical transformation, with particular attention to the roles of institutional trust, energy citizenship, identification with nature and climate change denialism. Drawing on survey data, the study identifies five distinct public expectation profiles regarding the renewable energy transition. Two of these - Risk and Unreliable - reflect deep-seated concerns, while three - Opportunities, Climate and Innovation - express more optimistic outlooks. The findings highlight institutional trust as a key predictor of optimistic expectations, often in conjunction with energy citizenship. In contrast, identification with Svalbard's natural environment and climate change denialism are more strongly associated with the concerned profiles. While prior research has emphasized the importance of institutional trust in energy transitions, this study demonstrates how trust also shapes future-oriented expectations and operates in tandem with energy citizenship norms. The article concludes by outlining strategic opportunities for fostering inclusive community support and mitigating the risk of political polarization in Svalbard's evolving energy landscape.
Carbon taxes are efficient but politically fragile, especially in ageing societies where near-term costs loom large. We study how perceived distributional fairness shapes elderly support for carbon pricing, using two waves of representative survey data from Singapore and leveraging a real-world policy change. Our findings show that perceiving the tax as fair significantly increases support among the elderly while cushioning the adverse impact of further tax hikes. Elderly respondents who view the tax as fair also prefer allocating revenues to initiatives that generate broad societal and environmental benefits such as investments in renewable energy and policies fostering a green economic transition over direct transfers to affected households. Furthermore, we find that fairness perceptions boost older adults' willingness to contribute to climate mitigation through pension investments and charitable donations, although overall voluntary engagement fell after the increase, revealing a persistent support-pay gap. Together, our findings point to fairness-by-design: transparent, rule-based revenue recycling, targeted relief for financially vulnerable seniors, credible oversight (audits, public reporting, pre-announced rate paths), and fairness-centred communication linking near-term protections to longer-term benefits. While Singapore is a high-trust, high-governance-capacity setting, the stabilizing role of distributional fairness is likely to travel to other ageing societies, whereas acceptance of flexible spending may require tighter earmarking and external oversight in lower-trust contexts.
Carbon inequality implies that wealthy individuals contribute more to climate change than asset-poor individuals. This pattern is primarily driven by higher levels of consumption and investment in carbon-intensive industries. Yet the prevailing policy response - the carbon tax - is often perceived as regressive and therefore politically unpopular, given that perceptions of distributional fairness strongly shape public support for climate policies. We conduct two complementary survey experiments in a large online survey in Germany (n = 4653) to examine preferences over a recent policy proposal developed in response to accumulating evidence of carbon inequality: wealth taxation to finance the green transition. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that while baseline support for the wealth tax is high (72 percent), exposing respondents to a compensatory argument emphasizing carbon inequality does not further increase this support. However, emphasizing carbon inequality increases support for using wealth tax revenues to finance the green transition, making this the most popular option for using the revenue. A conjoint survey experiment further demonstrates that spending wealth tax revenue on public investment in transport infrastructure, subsidies for private investment in low-carbon technologies, and redistributive measures such as a lump-sum payment to all households paying carbon taxes receive the highest support among German respondents. In contrast, subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles and investment in geo-engineering are unpopular. These findings suggest that invoking carbon inequality can help build democratic majorities for using wealth taxation to finance investment in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Hence, there is a path towards lower emissions and greater climate resilience that is unlikely to produce popular backlash.
Climate-induced Loss and Damage (L&D) is becoming a defining challenge for global climate governance, especially in West Africa, where adaptation limits are increasingly surpassed. Yet, the literature has largely overlooked how national governments in Africa conceptualize, operationalize, and govern L&D. Existing studies tend to focus on international finance debates or localized impacts, leaving a gap in understanding the national policy frameworks shaping L&D responses. This paper addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of five West African countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, structured around four thematic dimensions: conceptual clarity, scope and depth of losses, policy integration, and institutional readiness. Drawing on more than 60 official policy documents, including National Adaptation Plans, disaster frameworks, and climate legislation, the study applies an interpretive scoring framework and proposes a three-stage typology of L&D policy engagement (Nascent, Emerging, Integrated). The results show that Senegal and Ghana fall into the Emerging category, with partial recognition of L&D concepts but limited institutionalization in formal policy architecture. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone remain Nascent, where L&D is either subsumed under adaptation and humanitarian action or only referenced anecdotally. No country has yet reached the Integrated stage. Across all five cases, economic losses in agriculture and infrastructure are frequently reported, while non-economic losses such as displacement, cultural erosion, and psychological harm remain weakly specified. Institutional arrangements for L&D are fragmented in national frameworks, suggesting uneven preparedness for engagement with emerging international L&D governance mechanisms, including the Santiago Network and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage. The findings suggest that the absence of formal L&D strategies in many national policy documents may limit the visibility of irreversible climate impacts and complicate future claims-making in international arenas. By advancing a systematic baseline of how L&D is framed in national policies and introducing a heuristic typology for crosscountry comparison, this study contributes conceptually, empirically, and policy-relevantly to debates on climate justice and the evolving governance of L&D in the Global South.
Climate assemblies (CAs) - a form of deliberative mini-publics - are increasingly used to engage citizens in climate change policymaking, particularly across Europe. There is an abundance of research on the design and implementation of CAs but less attention is paid to what happens afterwards; what to do with the resultant recommendations and if / how newly motivated and knowledgeable participants are engaged. The lack of follow-up action reduces CAs' potential impact, threatens their legitimacy and disillusions participants. Previous studies have identified the gap in CA follow-up, but there is a lack of research on what processes and mechanisms could address it This article presents findings from a pilot study of arts-based and creative innovations to public engagement via a series of co-productive workshops in the follow-up to South Yorkshire's Citizens' Assembly on Climate (2023). It aimed to demonstrate how creative methods such as participatory scenario-making and interactive documentary can be used to engage citizens in CA follow-up and the translation of CA outputs into actionable policies. Qualitative data collected from recordings of workshops, researchers' field notes and interview transcripts were analyzed through the lens of deliberative democracy. The results reveal notable frustration with the current lack of CA follow-up, overfocus on 'recommendations' as the defining features of CAs and an appetite for CA participants and the wider public to be productively and creatively engaged in translating CA outputs (recommendations and proposals) into policy and action. Scenario making was found to enable this process and improve inclusivity.Key policy insights The research identifies an appetite for citizens beyond CA participants to be involved in the translation of CA outputs into policy and action.To enable citizen engagement in CA follow-up, the outputs (usually recommendations or proposals) could be reframed as dynamic - requiring ongoing processes of reflection and interpretation as circumstances change - and thus, the start of a participatory process (of translation, implementation and action).Arts-based and creative participatory methods can contribute to processes of democratic innovation by engaging citizens in iterative co-production of CA outputs.
This study investigates the relationship between variations in the design of climate policy mixes and their impact on environmental innovation (EI). Specifically, it theoretically explores the interplay of these policy design factors and their potential influence on EI before empirically examining whether larger policy mixes, a greater diversity of policy instruments, and an increased emphasis on green industrial policies contribute to a higher share of environmentally related patents. By integrating insights from the literature on EI and policy mixes, this research develops a systematic approach to capturing the dynamics of climate policy mixes and is the first to separately analyze the distinct role of green industrial policies. The study examines policy mixes across 13 OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden) from 1990 to 2020, using a Bayesian hierarchical model and a novel dataset, CLIMAPP, to map policy design variations. The results indicate that the overall size of a climate policy mix is the strongest predictor of a higher share of EI, while policy diversity and the emphasis on green industrial policies do not play a significant role. Furthermore, the findings highlight a previously underexplored aspect: the operational logic of green industrial policies has remained largely unchanged over the past decades, potentially limiting their ability to drive radical innovation.
Background: Under Australia's National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme, the reformed Safeguard Mechanism employs a cap-and-trade framework to meet domestic emission reduction targets and international obligations under the Paris Agreement. It remains unclear whether the reformed policy provides sufficient incentives to drive emissions reductions, particularly in the coal mining sector. This is critical given Australia's targets of 43% below 2005 levels by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050.Methods: Using operator reported emission intensity data, we calculate the applied emission intensity used in setting facility emission caps (baselines) under the policy, to observe trends in future emission caps across mine types and locations. To evaluate the strength of economic incentives under the policy, we establish a high price carbon offset scenario, under the Australian Government's cost containment measure, to compare the maximum unit cost of offsetting for each mine facility. This is assessed within the context of historical fluctuations in the coal commodity price.Results: Through ex-ante analysis, we found that most open-pit coal mines will experience an increasing emission baseline over the policy lifetime, while most high-emitting underground mines will experience a rapidly decreasing baseline. Under the high price scenario, the unit offset cost across all mines is within the bounds of historical fluctuation in the monthly commodity price of Australian coal between 2019 and 2024. With respect to coal, to achieve the aims of the Safeguard Mechanism, this analysis indicated that the emission reduction contribution (ERC) would need to increase from 4.9% to 9.2%.Conclusion: Economic incentives within the policy do not provide adequate material incentive for coal mine operators to invest in emission reduction strategies. The policy imposes a weak and non-binding emission cap, particularly for the coal mining sector, which may impede its efficacy as an emission reduction policy. Reform to the Safeguard Mechanism is required to incentivise industry emission reduction in the Australian coal sector.
Against the escalating backdrop of climate change, investigating whether Artificial Intelligence (AI) can enable carbon neutrality (CN) attainment is critically imperative. Focusing on China, this research employs a methodological framework of full-sample and sub-sample rolling-window bootstrap causality testing to explore the dynamic linkages between AI and CN. The empirical results indicate the absence of a stable causal relationship in the full-sample scenario; however, the rolling-window approach reveals significant time-varying causality. As shown by the rolling window analysis, AI shows a negative association on CN (July 2020 to December 2020), suggesting that the high energy consumption attributable to AI may impede CN objectives. Conversely, CN exhibits a positive association on AI across several periods (December 2019 to March 2020, July 2020 to October 2020, and May 2022 to September 2022), indicating that CN policies may support AI advancement. According to this research, accelerating CN progress has proven to be an effective pathway for catalysing AI innovation and enhancing technological capabilities. This suggests a complex long-term relationship in which AI and CN may both complement and constrain each other over time.
Growing research shows that the world is in the Anthropocene, characterized by escalating environmental crises, with flooding emerging as a major threat to urban populations. Ghana ranks among developing countries that are highly exposed to urban flooding, with the Greater Kumasi Metropolitan Area (GKMA) experiencing frequent flood events that result in significant loss of life and property. Existing government responses, largely focused on structural measures, are often costly, short-term and less beneficial to vulnerable populations. Drawing on the adaptive capacity framework, this study uses data from 278 households to assess household adaptive capacity to floods and analyse its determinants in selected flood-prone communities in GKMA. A composite adaptive capacity index was constructed and analysed using an ordered logistic regression model. The results show that the majority of participants (61.5%) were classified as having low adaptive capacity, while 28.4% of households were classified as having moderate adaptive capacity, and only 10.1% were classified as having high adaptive capacity to respond to floods. Econometric results show that income, infrastructure, training and institutional support significantly increase the likelihood of higher adaptive capacity, while technology shows a positive but marginal effect, and awareness and information are not statistically significant. The findings suggest that climate adaptation policies should prioritize structural and institutional investments, particularly infrastructure, training and governance systems, over stand-alone awareness campaigns to effectively reduce flood vulnerability in rapidly urbanizing contexts.
While research on low-carbon urban renewal often prioritizes techno-economic efficiency, the socio-political dimension of justice remains undertheorized, particularly in non-Western contexts. This study addresses this gap by investigating how diverse governance configurations shape distributive justice during China's urban transitions. By integrating climate justice theory with an institutional lens, we reconceptualize low-carbon renewal as a hybrid governance process in which justice is negotiated through the interplay of top-down bureaucratic pressure and bottom-up participatory inclusion. Applying a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to 16 urban renewal cases, this study identifies multiple pathways leading to both just and unjust outcomes. The findings reveal that distributive justice is not merely a product of liberal democratic procedures, but emerges from context-specific configurations of accountability, participation and recognition. By highlighting the way in which justice is produced within specific political-institutional conditions, this study advances climate justice theory beyond Western-centric norms and provides a nuanced framework for the institutional production of justice in transitional settings.Key policy insights Distributive justice in low-carbon urban renewal emerges through diverse pathways when both accountability and culturally grounded inclusion exist.Authoritarian environmentalism produces different justice outcomes shaped by how accountability, participation and performance incentives interact.The erosion of either participatory inclusion or political accountability tends to generate distributive injustice and heighten social and spatial exclusion.Cultural recognition strengthens local responsiveness within hierarchical systems, improving the social legitimacy of low-carbon transitions in nondemocratic contexts.
