Abstract Korean faith-based organisations (FBOs) have long been involved in aid provision, yet their relationship to South Korea’s donor identity and development cooperation norms remains underexplored. This article examines how Korean FBOs engaged in humanitarian assistance to North Korea function as invisible norm entrepreneurs within Korea’s aid system. Drawing on a constructivist and norm diffusion framework, and based on semi-structured interviews with leaders of major FBOs, government officials, and NGO platform representatives, as well as analysis of policy documents and FBO reports, the study shows that FBOs shape key humanitarian norms such as needs-based assistance, transparency, and localization through their agenda-setting, funding practices, and coalition-building. Despite their limited formal visibility in core ODA laws and strategies, Korean FBOs operate as knowledge providers, catalysts for humanitarian initiatives, and quiet standard-setters in the politically sensitive field of aid to North Korea. The article argues that understanding Korea’s evolving donor identity and aid practices requires recognising the normative agency of FBOs and their ambivalent position between state policy, religious communities, and global humanitarian regimes.
Abstract How do Indo-Pacific middle powers adapt their security strategies under conditions of fragmented regional order and intensifying strategic rivalry that increase conflict risk? Debates on the Indo-Pacific have often focused on great-power competition, particularly the strategic implications of US-China rivalry, while paying comparatively less attention to how middle powers respond to growing geopolitical, institutional, and technological fragmentation within the regional order. This article argues that the evolving peace and security role of middle powers in the Indo-Pacific can be understood through the concept of strategic vulnerability. Under conditions of fragmentation, middle powers increasingly pursue adaptive strategies aimed at mitigating vulnerability and preserving strategic flexibility. The article develops a theoretical framework linking fragmentation to middle-power adaptation as focused by strategic vulnerability, and introduces the concept of networked security cooperation to explain emerging patterns of regional governance and conflict prevention. Drawing on the cases of South Korea, Australia, India, and Indonesia, it argues that middle powers increasingly rely on minilateral buffering, multi-alignment, and strategic diversification through overlapping and functionally differentiated forms of cooperation across security, economic, and technological domains. The article concludes that Indo-Pacific middle powers increasingly function as adaptive stabilizers within a fragmented regional order, contributing to regional resilience while simultaneously reinforcing decentralized patterns of order-building.
Abstract The purpose of this work is to empirically assess the security sphere of European states under the influence of Russia’s foreign policy. The article focuses on consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the security domain that embraces military expenditures, hybrid warfare, migration processes and energy supply. The authors have also observed policy of European states to increase resilience and to implement security measures. Finally, the research deals with NATO’s reaction to the war and military Schengen that complement the topic. Event analysis is followed by comparative analysis. The former is used to identify events chain that affected security policy of European states while the latter demonstrates commonalities and differences among the EU states towards various aspects of the security domain. The work also raises the issue of European military forces considering current threats. The authors come to the conclusion that Russo-Ukrainian war has economic, social, and military outcomes for the EU states and their security.
Abstract The Five-Point Consensus (FPC) adopted by ASEAN in April 2021 as a framework for engaging with the junta in Myanmar has not been fully implemented five years after the coup. This article examines the normative, structural, and geopolitical factors that explain the ineffectiveness of ASEAN’s diplomacy in dealing with the civil war in Myanmar. It argues that despite the adoption of the framework that breaks from ASEAN’s usual cycle of diplomacy in the past, the FPC’s implementation has not made any progress. This is primarily due to the military regime’s continuing defiance and non-compliance with the agreement for which ASEAN leaders have thus far opted only to impose ‘soft sanctions.’ Geopolitics has also undermined the FPC’s effective implementation since China and Russia are also steadfast in their political and military support to the junta, including their endorsement of the junta-organised phased elections beginning in December 2025. Protecting their strategic interests in Myanmar has served to undermine ASEAN’s centrality in the pursuit of a ‘Myanmar-led and -owned’ approach to ending the conflict within the FPC framework.
Abstract This study explores the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the military sector, focusing on its influence on warfare, strategic management, and national security policy, with Kazakhstan as a case study. The research assessed AI’s role in military evolution, strategic positioning, and related risks and opportunities. The methodology included content and institutional analysis, discursive reconstruction, and conceptual modelling based on strategic documents and international agreements. Findings reveal that AI has created a new warfare paradigm where information dominance, algorithmic superiority, and autonomous systems are crucial. The United States focuses on innovation within democratic norms, China emphasizes military-civil integration, and the EU leads in ethical frameworks. Kazakhstan, however, remains technologically reliant on China and Russia, lacking a national strategy for military AI, which weakens its sovereignty. The study concludes that sustainable security requires integrating ethics, technology, and global regulation, offering a foundation for Kazakhstan’s policy on military AI.
Mandates of the UN peace operations differ in different situations, contexts, and missions. The protection of civilians has now become an essential part of these mandates. Even without explicit inclusion in the mandate, it is the peacekeepers’ moral responsibility to protect innocent civilians from life-threatening consequences. Despite several policy documents issued by the UN and using the Chapter vii mission mandate, the protection has remained a huge challenge for several reasons. These could vary from a hesitation to use force, a dictate from the home country or even a contingent’s desire to avoid future hostilities with a contesting group. This adversely impacts the UN peace operations’ performance and creates a negative perception of the UN’s ability to protect civilians. Even though military force has been used in many places to carry out the UN mandate, specific instances of such use to protect civilians have given mixed results. This paper examines if there is any tangible value in authorising UN peace operations to use force in protecting civilians in armed conflicts. An evaluation of the use of force for carrying out the mandate and specifically for the protection of civilians has been attempted. It proceeds first to ascertain the reasons for such authorisation and successful usage and looks at peacekeepers’ reluctance to use force. This has been followed up by examining a few cases of the use of force at operational and tactical levels and deducing that using force to protect civilians can be the right decision.
The study aims to examine the overall security situation on a regional scale by analysing the specifics of security policy in Central Asian countries. The main methods used were historical, which addressed the key stages of security system development in a temporal context, and statistical, which analysed the basic qualitative and quantitative indicators of the issue under study. The analysis of global trends in the development of the national security system determined that factors such as the level of economic development, the peculiarities of the political system, and the professionalism of the military forces are among the constituent elements of security guarantees – both at the national level and within a particular region. Central Asian countries are among those where the frequency and intensity of intra-regional conflicts and clashes are steadily increasing, and the ways of resolving them are becoming more and more radical. Cases of close cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and neighbouring states, as well as international support in neutralising certain threats to the region, serve as a practical example of an effective scenario for guaranteeing security at the global level.
As part of a global initiative, the German Foreign office organized together with Poland and Estonia a regional conference in Seoul focusing on the icc’s restrictive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Experts from Asia, Europe, and the U.S. discussed the urgent need to align icc jurisdiction for aggression with that for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The current framework, with complex rules and opt-out provisions, weakens the icc’s deterrent effect. Proposals for reform included eliminating the opt-out clause and streamlining state referrals to enhance accountability and legal clarity. The conference also addressed broader issues, such as the historical importance of combating impunity in Asia, the current role of the icc in the region, and the underrepresentation of Asian member states in the icc system. With the 2025 Kampala Amendments review in New York approaching, the conference framed these reforms as a critical opportunity to reinforce the icc’s role in upholding international law amidst growing geopolitical instability.
The United Nations (UN) has acted as a norm entrepreneur, expanding its own assumed legal competence, but also pushing forward the progressive codification of norms into international law. This normative growth has primarily occurred in terms of human-centring in global governance. UN peacekeeping operations (pko s) are viewed traditionally as forces placed between parties to a conflict with the aim of preventing future breakdowns of peace and security, and for monitoring cease-fire agreements. Since the Cold War, however, discussions of, and operations involving comprehensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding have proliferated. In addition to strictly binding rules under international law, international norms including those related to responsibility to protect (r2p) and protection of civilians (PoC), raise expectations of how and when the UN, member states and peacekeepers should act. International norms have generally become more permissive of an expanded role for peacekeepers, including, but not limited to, the expansion of conditions under which deadly force may be used, the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups in conflict affected societies, human security, and peacebuilding, even state-building activities such as security sector reform (ssr) and post-conflict development. This expansion is also seen in global governance efforts aimed at breaking down the barriers between policy silos and stakeholders. Normative expansion has, however, caused great controversy and experienced significant pushback. This article assesses the growth of human-centring, and progress in breaking down silos in the global governance and pko agendas, but also resistance from state-centric stakeholders, and opponents of universalistic multilateralism. It addresses the unique human-centred challenges posed to the global governance agenda, when the formerly greatest champion of multilateralism turns against it. In reaction to the dramatic dismantling of the global governance normative consensus by the United States during the early days of the second administration of Donald Trump, the paper asks what hope is there for the future of human-centring?
Timor-Leste became the first new sovereign state of the 21st century on 20 May 2002, but with ongoing United Nations (UN) and other international security support for another decade. It has been championed as a paradigmatic success story of UN-led peacekeeping operations ( pko s), liberal peacebuilding, and statebuilding. Since the withdrawal of UN actors, the Government of Timor-Leste has adopted a more “Eastphalian” perspective focused on non-interference by external actors, national stability, security, and development. This article identifies, however, the extent to which such narrow approaches to the building of peace can undermine its long-term resilience. It uses the ongoing state of “unpeace” in Timor-Leste to highlight latent challenges in even the apparently most successful case studies. It embraces multistakeholder hybrid approaches to peacebuilding, intersectoral approaches like the humanitarian-development peace nexus ( hdpn ), and related “positive” conceptualizations of peace. Yet it argues that further expansion towards comprehensiveness is required, including a greater focus on vulnerable individuals and groups (human-centering), and the inclusion of everyday, social capital, resilience, and welfare-related perspectives. Only through the implementation of governance measures informed by such perspectives can a truly sustainable peace be constructed in Timor-Leste, or in other conflict-affected societies in Southeast Asia.
In 2025 subnational contestation and violence are alive and well in Southeast Asia in the form of continuing conflicts within at least five countries in the Southeast Asian region. This Special Issue takes a look at these crises, why they exist, what peace efforts have been tried, and potential paths to achieving conflict resolution and transformation of conflictual relationships. This Introduction offers a review of literature on peacebuilding particularly in Southeast Asia. Notably, peace is highly relevant in Southeast Asia because, though the region has become prosperous economically, greater stability necessitates that states work towards resolving civil wars, insurgencies, and people’s grievances. Peacebuilding can also facilitate improving the human security of peoples living in Southeast Asia’s conflict zones in terms of their standard of living as well as their access to health, education, and other areas. Moreover, this Introduction emphasizes how peacebuilding is a concept entangled with legitimation, recognition, redistribution and geopolitics. At the same time, there can be liberal peacebuilding and illiberal peacebuilding—both have been tried in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Introduction reflects on efforts by asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to help resolve conflicts in the region. It then summarizes the case-study articles in this Special Issue. In sum, this Introduction prefaces the Special Issue’s attempt to offer comparisons and contrasts of peacebuilding in Southeast Asia as well as offer hope that the cases discussed herein can provide lessons-learned in the difficulties of peacebuilding through Southeast Asian experiences so as to help others far and wide.
Despite their remarkable growth in the post-cold war era, UN Peacekeeping Operations ( pko s) have been constantly challenged by personnel shortages, namely, the huge gap between the actual contributions from troop contributing countries ( tcc s) and the size authorized by the Security Council. Insufficient peacekeepers have become one of the major concerns to fulfill UN pko s’ mandates. Although UN pko personnel contributions have been a heated topic in the literature, little heed has been paid to personnel shortages. While we know many pko s are understaffed, we have only limited knowledge on how and why personnel shortfalls vary across pko s and, for a specific pko , across various types of peacekeepers (troops, military observers, and civilian police) and over time. This paper fills the blank of our empirical analysis of UN pko personnel contributions by presenting a new dataset on UN pko Authorized Strength. Using UN Security Council Resolutions and Secretary-General Reports, this dataset provides monthly and annual data for most UN pko s’ authorized strength in the post-cold war era. Using the authorized strength as the benchmark, we analyze the features, patterns, possible reasons as well as consequences of UN pko personnel shortages.
Thailand’s Deep South has been embroiled in exacerbated insurgency since 2004. In 2025 the region is experiencing an upsurge in violence. How did this conflict begin? Can it be diminished or concluded? This paper argues that the Thai state has possessed insufficient legitimacy for its peace policies to end the insurrection. Indeed, Thailand has followed an illiberal peacebuilding agenda in the Deep South. This paper then examines the conflict, analyzes to what extent it might continue, looks at potential methods to diminish it, and offers a conclusion.
For decades, Indonesia has designed, deployed, and shifted various policies, agendas, and strategies to sustain peace in Papua. Indonesia has produced new security policies, enacted development strategies, made a special region for Papua, employed reterritorialization, and announced the possibility of dialogues. Yet the outputs and outcomes of building peace in Papua have not been satisfying. The practice of building peace as argued by this article remains entangled in the complexities of internal and external social processes. The key internal social process identified in this article affecting peace is in governing legitimacy. Meanwhile, the external social process identified herein, which shapes the contours and direction of peace, has been geopolitics. By disentangling the complexities of two processes, this article aims to understand how social processes are impacting peace.
Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Myanmar has struggled to attain peace after decades of conflict between the military (Sit-tat) and Ethnic Resistance Organizations ( ero s). The 2011–2020 peace process, framed as “Myanmar-led” or “Myanmar being in the driver’s seat” was dominated by elite negotiations over ceasefire agreements and failed to address entrenched structural inequalities. Following the 2021 coup, the rapid emergence of resistance across the country exposed the limits of Sit-tat rule and fragility of its governing body, the State Administration Council ( sac ), amid worsening economic, social and political instability. This paper applies key peacebuilding concepts, particularly Johan Galtung’s theory of positive and negative peace to analyse Myanmar’s pre-coup peace process. It further draws on critiques of illiberal peacebuilding to understand how the Sit-tat prioritized control over genuine conflict transformation. Using triangulated secondary sources including conflict event data, academic studies, and humanitarian reports, this paper seeks to examine conflict dynamics and the emergence of resilience among resistance actors. It argues that a genuine path toward peace process requires the relinquishment of military control, cooperation among resistance forces, and inclusive participation in political processes.
The establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ( barmm ) in 2019 (re)configured the rules of the political game in the historically conflict-ridden region, with both former revolutionary forces and traditional clans still figuring out how to adapt to them. Therein lies the essence of studying the elements and structures that sustain, albeit imperfectly, its political existence. In this article, the significance of legitimacy and hybrid peace governance in shaping barmm ’s post-conflict order will be examined. It will be underscored that legitimacy is an indispensable component in building resilient peace and governance systems. Understanding barmm ’s case through the lens of hybrid peace governance also helps us acknowledge the political realities in the region, where conflicts and stability co-exist as its defining features following decades of discontent. As barmm navigates through a critical period, key actors must adjust to the new political landscape and govern through ballots instead of bullets.
Finland has a robust history in international peacekeeping extending from UN operations in the Middle East to nato -led missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Finland’s participation in international peacekeeping operations has been informed by the country’s foreign and security policy that has evolved from Cold War neutrality to recent nato -membership. Current geopolitical changes, including Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, have redefined the Finnish security environment. It is topical to assess the drivers underlying Finnish peacekeeping policy and consider the future of Finnish peacekeeping. This study finds that, overall, Finnish participation has provided an important framework for integration with the country’s West European peers as well as for strengthening its transatlantic relations, especially after the end of the Cold War. Finland can be expected to continue to strengthen security cooperation based on aligned security interests on both a bilateral and multilateral basis within and beyond the nato framework. These pursuits will also inform future Finnish participation in international peacekeeping and other military crisis management.
With no new UN peacekeeping operations authorized since 2017, are they a relic of the past? This article argues that that although UN peacekeeping faces significant headwinds, there are alternatives that fill, at least in part, the gaps. Specifically, there are six alternatives that appear possible, and often likely, in the near future: (1) a return to narrowly mandated UN operations that monitor cease-fires after limited peace agreements, (2) operations carried out by regional organizations, (3) limited actions involving UN civilian police, (4) UN peace initiatives emphasizing diplomacy and technical assistance, (5) “minilateral coalitions of the willing”, and (6) privatization, involving private security services.
The purpose of the study is to determine changes in global trade flows due to the imposition of sanctions on the Russian government after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The study includes an analysis of the following media: Blomberg, the Financial Times, and a documentary analysis of reports from the World Bank and Project Expedite Justice, an analytical publication from the Research and Development corporation. A sociological survey was conducted among entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan in September 2024. The results of the study demonstrate a sharp decline in bilateral trade relations between the European Union and Russia in 2022–2024. In this regard, in 2024, more than 90% of petroleum products for the European Union are imported from the United States of America, Norway, and the Netherlands. However, trade flows of petroleum products from Russia have also diversified, with the governments of China, India, and Brazil becoming the main buyers in 2023–2024. It is also noted that in 2022, prices for such groups of goods as coal, oil, and flour increased by more than 140% compared to the price indices from 2010, but wood, metals, and minerals practically did not rise in price. Another notable trend, as the results of the study show, is an increase in exports of goods from European countries to Central Asian countries. For example, exports from Germany to Kazakhstan increased from usd 1.7 billion in 2021 to usd 3.4 billion in 2023. As a result, the sanctions have resulted in almost complete restrictions on trade between the European Union and Russia. However, global trade relations are marked by their flexibility due to the “shadow” trade and the search for alternative trading partners.
