In this paper an attempt is made to examine the two accepted embryologies, namely, the spiritualistic and the materialistic in the classical literature. The Hindu and Buddhist moral codes declare the fetus to be a spiritual being having consciousness and the elements of life. The materialist point of view regarding the status of the fetus is accepted by the classical and modern medical sciences. Both these approaches have been found inadequate in solving moral problems regarding the status of the fetus, and especially regarding foeticide. The contemporary pro-life and pro-choice debate has highlighted the seriousness of the ethics of foeticide. This paper balances the two approaches in making a case for humanistic ethics, which is not tilted towards either spiritualistic or materialistic embryology. It has been argued that foetus has a moral status as a future human being with rights to life. So the abortion of the fetus for no moral reason can be permitted. At the same time, mother’s autonomy must be respected keeping in view her creative role in making the life of the fetus possible. Humanistic ethics as it is defined here makes room for human considerations while judging the moral status of the fetus.
TK.C. Bhattacharya's investigation into the phenomenology of subjectivity starts with a linguistic turn: sharply distinguishing the unmeanable consciousness (cit which is aviaya) from the referent of personal pronouns such as "I", "You" or "He/ She". After giving the reasons why even the word "I" does not refer to this subject (the feeler who cannot be felt, the knower who cannot be known), the paper compares K. C. Bhattacharya's account of the subject with the analysis of subjectivity offered by his student N. V. Banerjee. Not only the styles of thinking and writing of KCB versus NVB are shown to be different, but the contents of their respective theories of subjective consciousness also are substantially distinct. NVB pays attention to the intersubjective plural first person pronoun: "We" about which K.C. Bhattacharya is silent. The essay ends with the author's own view suggested rather aphoristically: that the "I" is best interpreted as the "you" of the you. This view places the second person singular as a briedge between the I and the We.
Sāṅkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical discourse, has been interpreted in literature so far, predominantly in realistic terms which this essay criticises while it recommends phenomenological approach to its interpretation. The essay basing itself on classical Sanskrit sources demonstrates Sāṅkhya to be a proper phenomenological discourse. It explains the relation of bhūtas to tanmātras, demonstrates bhūtas as constitutions in and by consciousness and shows that ‘physical things’ are what we posit as spatiotemporal existents on the basis of bhūtas. This interpretation of the theory of objects is compared with the Husserl’s phenomenological theory of objects.
The Buddhist text Milindapañha (Milinda’s Questions) is a captivating dialogue between King Milinda and the Buddhist sage Nāgasena. In the text, Nāgasena explicates the notion of personhood without reference to the eternal self. However, despite early Buddhists’ rejection of the existence of this metaphysical concept, Nāgasena cannot avoid metaphysics while elucidating the concept of the self. Recent writers have developed a new approach to the Buddhist theory of self, arguing that it should be understood less as a metaphysical claim and more as a description of the nature of experience, particularly meditative experience. In this paper, I argue that this new approach to the problem of the self in early Buddhism has no merit because if we attempt to interpret Milindapañha using this new approach, our interpretation of the text becomes inconsistent.
The problem of refugee/migrant is one of the most vexing socio-political problems of twentieth century society. Because the arrival of the refugee/migrant brings to fore the problem of welcoming them into one’s homeland. Welcoming the refugee/migrant means sharing one’s own place, or as Levinas calls ‘dwelling’ with them. It prompts both ethical as well as political tension in the host community. Because ‘the Other’ (refugee/migrant) might show up unexpectedly, a guest can also pose a threat. In face of such a risk how can host community welcome the Other? The paper argues that Levinas ‘hospitality ethics’ (i.e. the ethical responsibility) can satisfactorily address this problem raised by the arrival of the Other. The idea of ‘hospitality ethics’ underlies Levinas’ political philosophy. Hence, his political philosophy (i.e. ethical politics) offers an approach that would address this problem on a positive note. The underlying principles that operate Levinas ethical politics are: the idea of ethical responsibility and its accompanying idea of hospitality ethics. At the same time, the paper along the way would contribute to resolving one of the following challenges often associated his philosophy: how can Levinas’ hospitality ethics to be performed? Thus, The paper aims at the following objectives: (i) it attempts to address the socio-political issue of refuge/migrants in light of Levinas’s ethico-political philosophy; (ii) to give an overview of Levinas’ ethico-political philosophy from his work TI (1969); (iii) to provide a theoretical analysis of Levinas’ ethico-political philosophy as based on idea of ethical responsibility and its accompanying concept of hospitality ethics; and (iv) to show that Levinas’ idea of hospitality ethics can serves as one of the alternative approach that satisfactorily address the problem of refugee/migrant.
In the naturalisation project of the phenomenal qualitative character of experience, the phenomenal realist thesis has been posited as one of the contemporary challenges against the external transparency thesis. The current paper will begin with delineating the debate between the external and internal transparency thesis. The paper is going to show the implausibility of the external transparency thesis argument through three primary grounds. Firstly, the paper will defend the epistemic role of cognitive attention against Harman and Tye’s external transparency thesis. Secondly, the paper will provide the counter-argument through the genealogical method of investigation against external transparency theorists’ primary claim that the transparency thesis is compatible with the external transparency thesis. Moore’s transparency thesis (i.e., externalists like Harman and Tye relied upon Moore’s diaphanousness argument for justifying their thesis) is itself grounded on epistemic foundationalism based on common sense, as most naturalists try to avoid such kind of position. Thirdly, the paper will argue that the issue of transparency will remain unresolvable until epistemic foundationalism is accepted in the first place and attempt to resolve the transparency conflict through a demystification strategy. The paper will also show that the external transparency thesis and epistemic foundationalism are incompatible; however, the phenomenal transparency thesis, as a synthesiser of the debate of internal-external transparency thesis, is at least compatible with epistemic foundationalism and transparent enough to provide the epistemic justification for transparency of phenomenal experience itself as well as in plausibly explaining the object of experience.
What does it truly mean to turn inward, and what do we find when we do? Jonardon Ganeri’s Inwardness: An Outsider’s Guide undertakes a cosmopolitan exploration of the inner self, drawing on diverse traditions—Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Christian, and Western philosophical thought. This review traces the book’s guiding claim that inwardness is the “presence of yourself to yourself,” and examines the philosophical challenges it raises: Does introspection require agency? Does Pessoa’s heteronymy deepen our understanding of inwardness, or does it blur it into confusion, aporia, and fragmentation? Can we study the self without metaphysical bias? Should inwardness be nurtured—or left behind? If these questions speak to you—about the self, memory, awareness, and the life of the mind—this book is well worth your close attention. And to address all such questions, Ganeri’s reflections move across philosophy, literature, film, and ethics, asking what it means to live with attention turned inward. Following this line of thought, we shall see that while the book is richly suggestive, it also opens up tensions between competing traditions and between different ways of understanding selfhood, inviting further reflection from the author and readers alike.
The book Feminist Theory: Some Contemporary Debates opens with an important assertion: feminism is inherently pluralistic. It challenges the notion of a singular, canonical interpretation of feminism, emphasizing that no single perspective can encapsulate what is defined as ‘the’ feminist position. This complexity is mirrored in feminist theory itself, which has evolved and been analyzed from a multitude of perspectives, reflecting diverse cultural, social, and historical contexts. The authour engages with various strands of feminist thought, highlighting how differing ideologies and experiences shape the understanding of gender issues, power dynamics, and social justice across contemporary discourse. Through this exploration, the text seeks to unpack the richness and variability within feminist theory, inviting readers to appreciate the nuanced debates that define the field today.
Swami Vivekananda is often remembered as a defining figure of modern Indian thought. His Chicago address, his universalist reading of religion, and his humanistically oriented presentation of Vedānta have together shaped his global reputation and secured his place in popular culture memory. These features have also led many to regard him as a philosophical representative of Indian culture and nationalism. This paper revisits this narrative through the critical lens of Acharya P. K. Mukhopadhyay. It asks whether Vivekananda’s philosophy reflects a sustained civilizational embeddedness or whether it was largely fashioned for a modern, international audience, thereby situating him closer to an internationalist than a nationalist in Mukhopadhyay’s sense. By contrasting Vivekananda with figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and K. C. Bhattacharya, the study further examines how intellectual and cultural figures ought to be assessed—through their writings and public influence alone, or through their deeper cultural and philosophical location as well. Altogether, we also critically assess Mukhopadhyay’s standpoint, which raises the preceding questions.
This review brings into conversation two distinctive thinkers—realists and traditionalists in their own right—Pradeep Gokhale and Sachchidanand Mishra, along with some classical and modern philosophical questions. Both scholars have recently undertaken the task of reviving the Indian materialist tradition of Cārvāka. Following a critical appraisal of their efforts, we argue that while their attempts are philosophically significant—indeed, amounting to a kind of renaissance—they remain incomplete in addressing certain cultural and contemporary challenges. These include not only the critiques posed by spiritual Indian traditions but also pressing issues from modern Western philosophy of mind, such as the nature of qualia and first-person experience, as well as axiological concerns that arise from the implicit ontology of the Cārvāka tradition. These unresolved issues, which resonate deeply with classical traditions such as Advaita Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism, reveal significant gaps in their reconstructions. In this light, we propose that if the Lokāyata tradition is to be meaningfully reinvented, it must engage with modern cosmopolitan philosophical and methodological concerns. This is not a colonial imposition, but a recognition of the universality of philosophical inquiry across cultures and historical epochs.
This paper raises questions about the apparent sincerity of Gandhi's faith in the existence of God. Such questions might seem strange given that Gandhi had written on the Gita affirming his faith and taking a devotional stance while commenting on Sri Krishna's revelation of the divine form in Chapter XI. However, the relevance of the enquiry becomes apparent in the context of contemporary arguments suggesting that Gandhi's equation of Truth with God brought out his insights into the "apprehension of the death of God" (Skaria, In Unconditional equality: Gandhi's religion of resistance. Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2016, viii). Accordingly, the first section of the paper will discuss arguments about the godless-ness of Gandhi's religion and morality. The second will support the significance of Gandhi's faith by revisiting Murdoch's2 argument about the philosophical implications of the death of God (as a transcendent object of attention) for morality. The third will discuss the central themes in Gandhi's commentaries on the Gita which are important to understand his conception of G od and role of God in the cosmos. The conclusion will bring out the significance of the equation between T ruth and God both for an understanding of Gandhi and, for moral philosophy, in general.
This review will unpack the set of interconnected issues taken up in The Battle for Consciousness Theory. In this context the review will list these issues beginning with the first which is to unpack Sri Aurobindo’s contributions towards understanding the nature of consciousness and evolution in continuity with the diverse readings of the same within the Indian tradition. It will suggest that the second issue (which the book takes up) is that of countering (what the authors criticize as) the appropriation of Sri Aurobindo by the American philosopher Ken Wilber. The third is to bring out the apathy of Indian academia to such appropriations and underscore the need to ensure some presence of modern Indian philosophers in university syllabi. This-it is undeniable- is important not only for freedom in the Indian mind but also to make space for the recognition of the contributions of Indian thinkers to mainstream debates in philosophy, religion and politics. This review will suggest that the value of this book does not entirely lie in determining the extent of Wilber’s appropriation of Sri Aurobindo’s concepts. Rather its influence is more far reaching and can be unpacked in terms of methodological suggestions about how comparative philosophy should be attempted. The review will also bring out the significance of this book for both consciousness studies and the renaissance of the old-world Indian mind.
In an era marked by global crises, environmental degradation, social injustice, and mental health challenges, the ancient spiritual tradition of Buddhism has emerged with a renewed commitment to social transformation. Socially Engaged Buddhism, a modern evolution of traditional Buddhist practice, bridges the inner path of mindfulness and liberation with the outer world of activism and civil responsibility. This paper examines how Socially Engaged Buddhism, grounded in the teachings of compassion (karuṇā), non-violence (ahiṃsā), and interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda), has evolved from monastic seclusion to active engagement in the spheres of politics, society, and ecology. Drawing on case studies from Asia, North America, and Europe, and referencing key leaders such as Thich Nhat Hanh, B.R. Ambedkar, and Sulak Sivaraksa, the study examines how Buddhist institutions and lay practitioners are shaping global civil society. Through this lens, the paper critically evaluates the relevance, challenges, and potential future of this transformative movement in a rapidly evolving world.
Meditation is gaining popularity, as it has proved its impact on individual’s physical, mental, psychological, social, and cognitive nurturance. As a result, many kinds of meditations are suggested by the yoga gurus and professionals. In Theravada Buddhism too, meditation is the core of philosophy. But unlike other thoughts, it cannot be taken up just as per liking of an individual. It has to be taken up according to one’s carita. The meaning of carita in Pāli literature is behavior, the state of arising, good conduct or bad conduct. The carita is a predominant nature in one’s behavior pattern. It can be related to personality, or temperament means personal nature, the character of a person as revealed by his or her natural attitudes and conduct, that makes a person different from others and unique. There are many kinds of caritas, as mentioned by the Buddha, i.e., Raga, Dosa, Moha, Saddha, Buddhi, and Vitakka. Human being has always been inclined to achieve purity of carita. In order to relieve oneself from one’s impurities, one needs to select appropriate carita, as right type of carita for that personality will only be able to take one toward Nibbana.
Indian philosophy, particularly the Vedānta tradition, has long engaged in hermeneutic and exegetical practices, especially in interpreting the prasthānatrayī texts—the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and Brahmasūtra—which are central to Vedāntic schools of thought. These interpretations have produced diverse readings highlighting knowledge, action, devotion, Advaitism, Dvaitism, Viśiṣṭādvaitism, and other perspectives, often marked by exclusivity and intense internal critique among the different traditions. However, similar interpretative engagement with Śramaṇa traditions, including Jainism, has largely been limited. Addressing this probable gap, this paper re-examines the central philosophy of Jainism by foregrounding its ethical foundation of ahiṃsā, viewing doctrines like anekāntavāda and syādvāda as extensions or expressions of this core principle. Accordingly, it argues that Jainism, as both a religious and philosophical system, offers a profound model of pacifism and a framework for non-violence that remains deeply relevant to contemporary moral and cultural challenges.
Often religious experience has been used in its broad sense to include the notion of spiritual experience. The present essay, after considering various views through a comparative analysis, attempts to delineate the latter from the former by using what is termed as the principle of detachment. It goes further to propose two types of spiritual experience, namely, the meditative and the encounter. The two types roughly correspond to the understanding of spirituality and spiritual experience in the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. While the meditative type of experience is characterized as an inward directed consciousness for the realization of the self, the encounter type is an outward directed experience of the self with some higher or divine being. Noting the resurgence of interest to study spiritual experience in the recent time, it suggests the need to explore deeper into the concept to gain more clarity and understanding. By identifying and employing key terms to characterize spiritual experience, the essay at the same time seeks to bring further conceptual clarity among cognate concepts like self-realization, spiritual realization, ultimate experience and ultimate meaning. It suggests that gaining conceptual clarity is important to bridge different views and approaches to the study of spiritual experience.
This paper explores how the classical Indian aesthetic theory of rasa, traditionally confined to the domains of drama and poetry, might be meaningfully extended to account for aesthetic experience in everyday life. Drawing from seminal texts such as Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra and Pollock’s A Rasa Reader, the essay reconstructs rasa not merely as a dramaturgical outcome but as a perceptual orientation structured by sādhāraṇīkaraṇa (universalization), camatkāra (aesthetic wonder), and āsvāda (relishing). The central question guiding this inquiry is whether rasa, with its insistence on aesthetic distance and impersonal emotion, can emerge in non-art contexts without dissolving into mere sentiment or moral reflection. To this effect, the paper enters into dialogue with contemporary theories of everyday aesthetics, particularly the work of Thomas Leddy, James R. Williams, and Yuriko Saito. The essay argues that when the everyday is perceived with sahr̥dayatva, the cultivated sensibility of the aesthetic subject, it can become alaukika, or wondrous, without recourse to stylization or performance.
This review engages with Bhāratīyatā kī Ātmagaveṣaṇā: Ādhunik Bhārat kī Nirmiti par Nyāyaśāstrīya Dṛṣṭi (Introspection into Indianness: A Nyāya-based Perspective on the Making of Modern India), a dialogical work by Acharya Pradyot Kumar Mukhopadhyay and Dr. Udayan Vajpeyi. Eschewing the structure of a conventional treatise, the book unfolds as a reflective conversation on India’s civilizational and intellectual challenges. Mukhopadhyay critiques reformist and reductionist tendencies, the flattening pressures of modernity, and dominant views on culture, aesthetics, nationalism, and religion. He resists the portrayal of Indian culture as merely spiritual or reducible to systems like Advaita Vedānta, proposing instead a rational, Nyāya-grounded alternative. While his critique is both rich and provocative, his marked preference for Nyāya over more integrative traditions like Advaita invites scrutiny. Our objective in this review is not to dismiss his position but to raise concerns about how inclusive and accessible a reason-centred framework can be, particularly when situated within the narratives, claims, and contexts of India’s philosophically humble yet spiritually layered and embedded traditions.
Shasiprabha Kumar’s book examines key theories in the classical Vaiśeṣika framework of Indian philosophy, focusing on concepts such as categories, cosmogony, and atomic theory. It addresses consciousness and cognition while analyzing dharma, highlighting the highest good and expert testimony as important epistemic modes. Kumar in the book explores the theological links between Vaiśeṣika and Paṡupata Śaivism, along with connections to Vedic and Yogic thought. It also discusses the relevance of Vaiśeṣika in contemporary science, hermeneutics, and metaphysics, drawing on recent Sanskrit commentaries. This work is a significant resource for scholars in Vaiśeṣika studies. I wholeheartedly recommend this book to anyone with a keen interest in the intricate history of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It provides a thorough and engaging exploration of how concepts within this philosophical tradition have evolved over time. The author, ShashiPrabha Kumar, skillfully interweaves various elements of Vaiśeṣika thought, offering valuable insights that are often neglected in conventional academic discourse.
This paper examines the modern scholarly discourse on Vaiśeṣika philosophical interpretations from the early nineteenth century to the present. The range of interpretations is striking, stretching from dominant realist readings to more marginal idealist accounts. The paper traces key stages in this evolving discourse and highlights the most influential contributors. Early interpretations by Colebrooke, Müller, Chatterji, and others were shaped by the scientific and empiricist trends of their time, establishing a predominantly realist reading that has strongly influenced contemporary understandings. A new wave of studies, exemplified by Frauwallner and Shastri from the 1940s onward, introduced more philologically grounded and critical perspectives. More recently, alternative readings offered by scholars such as Gradinarov and Murakami have questioned the adequacy of the standard realist paradigm and emphasized other, often overlooked, dimensions of the system. Current research may be broadly grouped into four interpretive trends: a philological-textual school deriving from Frauwallner’s method; the Japanese exegetical tradition; the analytic-philosophical approach; and a neo-traditional strand represented by Indian scholars working within the classical framework. By charting these trajectories, the article argues that viewing Vaiśeṣika simply as “realist” is both historically and philosophically insufficient. In line with its broader aim, the study offers a balanced interpretive map, one that can serve as a resource for future scholarship and help navigate beyond reductive or one-dimensional readings.
