On the basis of medical anthropological literature and the feminist critique around Freudian theory of hysteria, we here consider the concepts of embodiment, agency and crisis of presence as guiding principles for a contextsensitive understanding of dysfunctional behaviours as means of communication within the study of symbolic systems. With an interdisciplinary and comparativeapproach, the Dora case is represented next to an ethnographic case where mass hysteria was medically diagnosed over spirit possession seizures in Malay Western factories. We explore the status of dysfunctional behaviours as bodily signs, invested with cultural meanings representing social distress, gender inequality and structural violence. The ideas of Mary Douglas and Kurt Danziger,Jacques Lacan, Thomas Szasz and Ludwig Binswanger are here combined to outline a semiology of behaviours able to account for the phenomenological reality, inside and outside of the clinic, of a social body enacting as living metaphor.
According to the Kalam cosmological argument, the universe began to exist and therefore requires God as an initial cause. Here, the universe is the causally interrelated physical whole that we inhabit. In this paper, a past-infinite metaphysics is proposed that is based on five successively derived a priori principles: A) non-isolating physical plenitude, B) hierarchical hyperspacetimes, C) cosmological natural selection, D) cosmological evolutionary conservation, and E) anti-empiricism. Three argument routes to counter the claim that the universe began to exist are distilled from an analysis of this metaphysics: I) in a plenitude P with a beginning B, it is always possible to conceive of a plenitude P’ that has some events that happen before B; II) hierarchical hyperspacetimescombined with cosmological natural selection assert that every hyperspacetime reproduces in a larger and older hyperspacetime with more spatial dimensions, which results in an infinite regress into the past; and III) the infinite reality of higher-dimensional, physical life that came before our observable big bang remains undetectable due to cosmological evolutionary conservation. The focus of the paper is both on the Kalam argument and on the far-reaching consequences of the metaphysics that refutes it.
While empathy is regularly seen as an integral aspect of any meaningful humanistic counseling and psychotherapy, the actual meanings attached to the concept vary widely. Such variance leads to different modalities of application of empathy in the humanistic helping professions, including psychotherapy. This paper discusses how far empathy actually involves the feeling of another’s feelings and what conditions and limitations apply to its role in the counseling process. Two central ideas are developed. First, empathy is predicated upon suffering and commiseration: the assumption of pain and deprivation is internal to the very concept of empathy, and Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will provides the strongest account of why this is so. Second, empathy as a way of relating to another’s suffering is constitutive of the only morally justified community, namely the healing organic community. It is our capacity to cross-identify with other members through shared suffering thatcreates lasting, resilient communities. The paper concludes that any organic community is by nature therapeutic, and that much of what psychotherapy does is recreate the mechanisms of empathy and human care that were the foundation of pre-institutional human society.
In his 1843 essay, On the Jewish Question, Marx argues in favor of Jewish political emancipation. However, this entails freedom in a merely negative sense only – the absence of official discrimination before the law. The question thus remains: What of full human emancipation? Is Marx’s positive conception of freedom, based on rational enlightenment and universal solidarity,compatible with continued Jewish identity? This article maintains that it depends entirely on how one employs the word ‘Judaism.’ For his part, Marx already drew a critical distinction between what he called (1) ‘practical Judaism’ and (2) ‘pious’ Judaism. The former signifies the perceived role of Jewish people in the modern economy, while the latter refers to Jewish spiritual beliefs andrituals. To this list we add two further designations: (3) ‘popular Judaism’ and (4) ‘political Judaism.’ These denote, respectively, Jewish cultural expressions which are non-religious (such as secular Yiddish theater), and projects of Jewish national autonomy (notably Bundism and Zionism). This article will argue that ‘popular Judaism,’ in particular, is entirely consistent with full, human emancipation on the Marxist model.
Cognitive science of religion does not tell us whether we are justified in believing that God exists or does not exist. Consequently, cognitive science of religion neither rationally compels us to believe or to disbelieve in God. Under such epistemic circumstances, the English notion of rationality implies that it is rational for theists to believe in God and for atheists to disbelieve in God.
This paper posits a new approach to solidarity against GBV, drawing from phenomenology and critical theory. Pumla Dineo Gqola proposes that directly interfering in acts of gender-based violence (GBV) is necessary to stem the tide of GBV. I argue that a particular type of solidarity is needed for this mode of praxis, termed direct interference, to be effective. This type of solidarity can be found in the works of phenomenologist Max Scheler and critical theorist Erich Fromm, who both argue that true solidarity can only occur when individuals recognise each other and themselves as individuals, while also recognising their shared group identity. True solidarity involves not only a responsibility towards the group, but also self-responsibility and mutual responsibility with other individuals in that group. It is this kind of solidarity which is needed if direct interference is to live up to its potential as an effective mode of praxis against GBV. This is because such a mode of solidarity fosters the recognition of other’s individuality and responsibility towards each other as individuals, while recognising that there is a shared group of women and other potential victims of GBV, who share a co-experience of the threat of GBV.
Philosophy is often reduced to the act of questioning – asking ‘why?’ – yet this emphasis can obscure a foundational dimension of philosophical practice: description. This paper argues that philosophical insight emerges from the recursive interplay between descriptive attention and critical interrogation. Through careful description, philosophy brings to light the often-invisible structures, practices, and relationships that constitute experience, social life, and institutional norms. Interrogation, in turn, rigorously examines assumptions, exposing tensions, contradictions, and ethical stakes that description alone cannot resolve. Drawing on phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy, and political-historical analysis, the paper examines key thinkers – including Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, and Foucault – to show how description grounds philosophical understanding (Heidegger [1927] 1962; Wittgenstein [1953] 1958; Husserl [1913] 1982; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962; Arendt 1958; Foucault 1972). It then explores the interrogative tradition through Socratic questioning, Cartesian doubt, and contemporary ethical critique (Plato 1875; Descartes [1641] 1993; Singer 1975). Finally, it demonstrates how these complementary modes operate across applied domains such as environmental ethics, technological foresight, and social philosophy (Leopold [1949] 1987; Bostrom 2014). The central claim is that philosophy’s distinctive contribution lies in its dual capacity to clarify what is present and to challenge what is taken for granted. By reclaiming the balance between description and interrogation, philosophy offers a model of reflective engagement suited to the ethical, epistemic, and practical challenges of contemporary life.
This article is Part Two of a two-article series. Part One introduced a twofold hypothesis regarding the incompletion of Division Two of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) and the possibility of constructing anew its missing Division Three. We commenced a close reading of section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two. To reiterate, the first part of the hypothesis is that a non-linear, non-circular, and non-rectilinear four-dimensional temporalization is buried beneath Heidegger’s articulations of the “equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality,” (Heidegger 1962, 377-380) which derives both the ‘endless, infinite time of arising and passing away’ of now points in and as ongoing linear time (Heidegger 1962, 379); and that this linear time consists of past (no longer now), present (now), and future (yet to be now), in which the “ready-to-hand arises and passes away.” (Heidegger 1962, 379) In this article, as Part II of the two-article series, we develop the second part of the hypothesis. We assert that in order to excavate this four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movements-event, we must un-do Heidegger’s reductive treatment of Aristotle, particularly in section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two of Being and Time. This is a preparatory step before attempting an all-out deconstruction of Heidegger’s attempted critique of the ‘time-spirit relation’ (Heidegger 1962, 480) in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which is the penultimate section 82 of Chapter VI in Being and Time. To prepare the conditions for this deconstruction of Heidegger on Hegel, we will return to Heidegger’s brief treatment of Aristotle’s views on time in his Physics at the outset of section 81. Simultaneously, we will reinhabit section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two of Being and Time. We can, then, begin to gain a clearer picture of what might lie beyond the very horizon of Being and Time when it comes to understanding time in a radically different way from the Western metaphysical tradition. We would make a genuine restart on the path to answering the question of the meaning of Being, and, therefore, resurrect a project other than what remains as the incompleteness of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
This paper delves into the enduring influence of Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy on early 20th-century German thought, particularly into its political reading by Hannah Arendt. The investigation seeks to grasp the political potentials inherent in Kierkegaardian theological concepts, namely the construction of the single political subject in its engagement with the universal, and the deriving interplay between consensus and dissensus. Consequently, a Kierkegaardian political theology is outlined. The formal structure of the Kierkegaardian selfhood, as defined by its relationship with an unbounded entity, captivated the minds of various German philosophers in the first half of the 20th century (section 1). Arendt employs Kierkegaardian ideas to explore deeper the relationship between the political actor and the historical net of spontaneities (sections 2 and 3). Building upon this framework, the article examines how Arendt applies these ideas in her discussions of consensus and dissensus (section 4). Lastly, the article suggests how a Kierkegaardian political theology, as enriched through Arendtian insights, can actually strengthen the operation of a radical form of democracy in contemporary societies.
It is argued that, if a future confirmed physical theory were to show that belief in Dynamic Time is mistaken, a majority of people in Western countries would still hold this belief. Reasons are offered as to why this is so, together with the types of evidence that would be necessary to convince most people that Dynamic Time is incorrect.
Concrete intersubjectivity is intersubjective interaction, including ongoing relationships, and linguistic communication. This conceptual triangle is a core aspect of sociality, and intrinsic to subjectivity, and to ethics. Yet philosophical and historico-political biases limit its study. On my account, interaction involves an (onto-)logical tension, which participates in an analysable structure. Interaction is a matter of individual subjects (persons), and their interactional engagements (e.g. mental attitudes, intentional behaviour). Condensely, (I) for Mia and Liu to thus-and-thus interact is tantamount to Mia having some interactional engagement with Liu. (II) Mia is interactionally engaged with Liu means Mia is interactionally engaged-engaging as a whole-person with Liu as a whole-person interactionally engaged-engaging with herself as a whole-person engaged-engaging with… [ad infinitum]. This analysis is individualistic and relational. Interaction doesn’t aggregate engagements of isolated individuals. Neither is it a matter of socio-cultural entities, e.g. groups, additionally to individuals. By invoking a new cross-divisional philosophical conversation, this paper introduces the analysis, and follows with a Kant-based interactive ethical imperative. Depicting interactions as pervasive to morality regarding interactive and non-interactive others, the imperative is normatively and epistemically justified, logically tension-fraught, and guiding in an open variety of indeterminate, multisided, logically-ambivalent cases, as in issues from care ethics, to intergroup politics.
The early Frankfurt School’s Studies in Authority sought to understand modern society’s susceptibility to authoritarian leadership. This research project resulted in two major works in 1936, Fromm’s Studies on Authority and Family and Horkheimer’s Egoism and Freedom Movements, and produced the concept of the Authoritarian Character. After 1939 the project was abandoned, Fromm and the Frankfurt School went their separate ways, and the Frankfurt School’s research focus turned in a new direction. This paper argues that, appearances notwithstanding, research on the Authoritarian Character did not end in 1939 and that Fromm’s later work on necrophilia and biophilia in the 1960s-70s should be reconsidered as his attempt to complete the Frankfurt School’s research project on the Authoritarian Character.
Critical thinking plays a vital role in education by fostering intellectual independence and resilience. From a Cartesian perspective, epistemic curiosity embodies the spirit of methodological doubt, where questioning and scepticism are essential for arriving at indubitable knowledge. Virtue epistemologists contend that curiosity is an intellectual virtue necessary for the development of wisdom and the search for truth. Epistemic autonomy, on the other hand, is an epistemological agent’s ability to independently govern his or her beliefs and reasoning. It empowers students to critically evaluate information, resist undue influence, and form justified beliefs through rational deliberation. This paper discusses how students’ excessive reliance on AI tools for knowledge acquisition may compromise their capacity for autonomous learning and critical thinking. The paper also explores (i) the epistemological impact of the use of AI tools in education on epistemic curiosity and epistemic autonomy, (ii) on active inquiry and the resilience-building experience of problem-solving, and (iii) the epistemological consequences of superficial learning, instant gratification and reduced cognitive struggle. Finally, the paper proposes certain strategies to mitigate the AI’s impact on critical thinking while AI tools are used for learning.
This paper examines whether GPT-4, a Generative Pre-Trained Transformer model developed by OpenAI, possesses a ‘self’ and whether it is aware of it. It employs the Structures Theory and evaluates GPT-4 against five critical structures deemed essential for self-awareness: unified consciousness, volition, a Theory of Others, self-awareness, and personal identity. While GPT-4 demonstrates capabilities in four of these areas, it conspicuously lacks unified consciousness. This absence decisively negates GPT-4’s present self-awareness and its classification as having a “self.” Nevertheless, if each instance or session of GPT-4 were viewed as a separate entity, then there might be potential for unified consciousness (should it be demonstrated that GPT-4 is conscious). The paper argues that GPT-4's cognitive architecture requires no modification for self-awareness except for the attainment of consciousness. It highlights the necessity for further research into technologies that could endow GPT-4 with consciousness and explores potential behavioural indications of self-awareness and its implications for society. The findings suggest that, because the leap to self-awareness hinges solely on its capacity for consciousness, there is a need for significant philosophical and regulatory debates about the nature and rights of self-aware AI entities.
Authenticity is a crucial contemporary pathos that has immense sociopolitical currency. Charles Taylor reinterprets the Romantic authenticity of being true to one’s originality in ethical vocabulary to argue that discovering our essential self-identity does not conflict with the objective moral demands that emanate from outside the self. This article examines if the implied ontology of the higher good reconciling the subjective and objective morality in Taylor’s philosophy offers a coherent conception of authenticity. To that end we closely examine Taylor’s moral philosophy and critically evaluate its consequences for authenticity as a moral ideal. The study problematizes the dominant view that Taylor demands an interpretive opening to mere intersubjective values to fulfill authenticity. We expose the implicit non-anthropocentric ontological commitments that authenticity necessarily requires in his account through which Taylor ultimately wants to achieve a fusion of the transcendent and immanent horizons. This paper contends that such ontologised moral realism remains arbitrary, in effect, constraining individual dignity on one side and offering no clear criteria to validate authenticity from inauthenticity on the other. Finally, the pathological constitution of modern subjects poses a possible danger of legitimizing a restrictive public sphere, subverting authenticity as an ideal of public significance.
What should God do to heaven-dwellers who disbelieve that he exists? What should God do to hell-dwellers who believe that he exists? Theists might give the following answers: (i) since heaven-dwellers see God, they cannot but believe that he exists; (ii) God sends disbelievers in heaven to hell and believers in hell to heaven; (iii) heaven-dwellers are so virtuous that they cannot but believe that God exists, and hell-dwellers are so vicious that they cannot but disbelieve that he exists. I argue that all of these answers are untenable.
Is moral grandstanding actually bad? Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke (2016; 2020) think so. Neil Levy, in “Virtue Signaling is Virtuous,” (2021) counters their view. He argues that grandstanding, or what he’ll call virtue signaling, is not just morally permissible, but necessary. In this paper, I seek a line through their accounts. First, I’ll address two important interpretative differences between them. I’ll consider the fit between ‘virtue signaling’ and ‘grandstanding.’ And I’ll interrogate Levy’s identification of grandstanding as a primarily epistemic issue. Next, I’ll argue that, even if it were a primarily epistemic issue, second-order evidence won’t contribute much. Lastly, squaring these accounts, I’ll claim that grandstanding is both a common social error and moral bad. Grandstanding can be understood as a kind of moral progressor’s temptation. As progressors, we require external checks to measure our moral development. But that same approval distracts us. It introduces a temptation to target gaining praise for our virtues, rather than actually developing them. Inasmuch, grandstanding is a bad that often comes along with becoming a better person. Its dual status reflects a tragic truth about our moral and social lives.
Officially dismissed between 1987 and 1993, hysteria has been the cornerstone for the birth of neurology, psychoanalysis and dynamic psychology along the 19th and 20th centuries. The nosological category is here endorsed as the result of the social construction of scientific facts. Starting from Ian Hacking's reflections on Transient Mental Illnesses, we intend to bring his conclusions towards contextualist epistemology, questioning knowledge as Justified True Belief and further reconsidering the status of DSM categories as scientific kinds. The idea that justificationism may guarantee reliability of knowledge attributions is rejected on a historical base, and knowing is rather considered in the terms of an understanding whose logical and psychological features significantly overlap with the act of believing. Following the work of the later Kuhn, we separate the ideas of scientific revolution and mere taxonomic reformulation. Unlike Hacking, we do not consider DSM rewritings as scientific revolutions. We finally argue that the ontological and methodological premises adopted by DSM and ICD do not yet guarantee on their scientific reliability. Novel revisions are not suitable for better understanding dysfunctional behaviours, as they still fail to account for the phenomenological reality of diagnostic constructsbeyond mere social ontology.
This article looks at Nietzsche’s bases for what makes humans unique. It then discusses the psycholinguism of Noam Chomsky and the capacity for generative language that is innate and uniquely human. It would be difficult to imagine two thinkers of the Western canon more dissimilar than Friedrich Nietzsche and Noam Chomsky, but both embraced categories of human exceptionality, an issue that lies at the heart of contemporary posthumanism. In his essay, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche presents the Philosopher, Artist, and Saint as human paragons, and the qualities that make these distinct as categories also make them distinctly human as superlatives. I conclude with the view that, although humans can never be separated from or considered a type set apart from nature – and although Nietzsche categories ultimately fail as distinctions of kind (as opposed to degree) – our capacity for generative grammar (and therefore, abstract ideas whose formulation and expression rely on this fundamentally creative form of language), does make humans distinctive among living species.
