Even decades after historical traumas, their scarcity shapes victimhood perceptions and beliefs about outgroups. In one correlational ( N = 369) and one experimental ( N = 510) study, we examined how exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs predict outgroup, World War II-related, and generic conspiracy beliefs. We also tested the mediating role of three victimogenic cognitive biases: hostile intentions attribution, negative interpretation, and memory bias. Unlike prior work focusing mainly on exclusive victimhood, our studies provide the first direct comparison of both victimhood forms, revealing their distinct and sometimes opposing effects on conspiracy thinking. Correlational results showed that exclusive victim beliefs heightened conspiracy beliefs, with different biases mediating different conspiracy types. Experimental results showed that exclusive victim beliefs increased outgroup and generic conspiracy beliefs through negative interpretation bias, whereas inclusive victim beliefs reduced WWII and generic conspiracies by weakening hostile attribution bias. We discuss the implications of the findings for intergroup relations and post-conflict beliefs.
Individuals vary in how they approach diversity; some emphasize relationship-building across groups ( bridging ), while others favor driving systemic change ( dismantling ). White participants ( N = 1224) evaluated an employee who embraced or forewent these approaches. Participants low in social dominance orientation (SDO)—those less supportive of hierarchy—evaluated targets who endorsed bridging (Study 1a) and dismantling (Study 1b) approaches more positively (i.e., warmer, more competent, preferred for leadership) than targets who opposed either of these approaches. However, when directly comparing targets who strongly endorsed both approaches, participants high in SDO distinguished between targets, preferring the target who endorsed bridging over the target who endorsed dismantling approaches (Study 2). This effect was mediated by anticipated discomfort. While both bridging and dismantling can promote equality, these studies uncover a subtle way structural change may be curtailed, even when not outright dismissed, thus limiting the full potential of diversity approaches.
The aim of this research was to examine the interrelationships between regional, national, and European identities in the Basque Country (Study 1) and Catalonia (Study 2) using the Social Identity Complexity model. Across two studies (total N = 1200), we found that the greater the perceived similarity and overlap between regional and national identification, the stronger the identification with Europe. A more detailed analysis showed that this relationship was positively mediated by national identification. A parallel negative mediation via both regional identification and glorifying regional identification was weaker and less consistent. Moreover, greater perceived similarity to Spain, together with higher levels of identity overlap, was associated with more harmonious attitudes toward other autonomous communities and European nations. In Study 2, these findings were further interpreted through the lens of the Ingroup Projection Model, indicating that for Catalans, Europe—rather than Spain—functions as the primary point of reference.
This study draws from the literature in group processes and intergroup relations, metacognition, motivational processes, and criminology to identify risk factors for joining an extremist group, classifies individuals into risk profiles, and examines how the risk profiles moderate efforts at recruitment into such groups. The results of a latent profile analysis ( N = 721) demonstrated the existence of three risk profiles (i.e., low, moderate, and high), and an experiment demonstrated that those in the low- and moderate-risk profile were significantly less likely to identify with a violent online political group compared to non-violent online political groups whereas those in the high-risk group were equally likely to identify with a violent or non-violent political online group. By taking a broader perspective, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding of individual susceptibility to being drawn into a violent online extremist group and has important implications for those seeking to combat online radicalization.
This study explores whether exposure to positive (vs. basic) interactions with a migrant through an immersive 360 degrees video with partial embodiment-where participants viewed the scene from a first-person perspective and observed only their virtual hands-can reduce implicit prejudice, attitudes, and emotions toward migrants. A total of 207 Italian participants were involved in the study. Approximately two weeks before the immersive video session, participants completed a questionnaire with scales measuring attitudes and emotions toward migrants and the Racial Implicit Association Test (IAT). In the laboratory, they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: observing a migrant in the 360 degrees video scenario engaging in either prosocial or basic behavior, while embodying virtual hands with either a White or Black skin tone. Results showed a reduction in implicit racial prejudice across both conditions (positive and basic contact), regardless of hand color. In addition, we observed a significant reduction of negative emotions and negative behavioral intentions toward migrants only in the positive condition. These findings highlight the potential of brief virtual intergroup contact that shows positive behaviors of outgroup members to reduce both implicit and explicit negative attitudes, adding evidence that even short immersive interventions can shape intergroup perceptions.
Intergroup contact is known to predict advantaged group members' solidarity with minority outgroups, which is crucial given persisting racial inequalities. To identify whether exposure to a conceptualization of racism can affect the contact-action relationship, two studies were conducted with White participants randomly allocated to a systemic racism, individual racism, or baseline condition, and their intergroup contact quality with racial minorities measured as a predictor of solidarity. Study 1 (N = 311) showed that higher contact quality generally predicted greater intergroup solidarity, particularly when exposed to individual racism. Study 2 (N = 322) clarified that individual racism exposure not only strengthened the positive contact-action relationship, but, relative to systemic racism exposure, could also minimize the negative contact-action relationship for lower quality contact. These findings highlight that individual racism exposure and positive contact experiences may together be conducive to promoting solidarity, offering practical considerations for future contact interventions.
Social change can take different forms, including incremental reforms within the existing system and radical transformations that dismantle and rebuild institutions. This research examined how historical trajectory narratives, specifically the progress narrative, and the longstanding injustice narrative, shape support for different types of social change. Across one experimental and two correlational studies (ntotal = 2,520) with a diverse sample of Americans from different racial groups, we found that the progress narrative was associated with greater support for incremental change and for maintaining the status quo, but lower support for radical change. In contrast, the longstanding injustice narrative was linked to greater support for both radical and incremental change, and lower support for maintaining the status quo. Additionally, longstanding injustice increased attributions of racial disparities to racism and moral outrage (Study 2), and perceived moral failure of the country (Study 3), which in turn were associated with higher support for radical social change.
Social mindfulness (SoMi), defined as demonstrating goodwill with minimal resources, is a central component of prosociality. Although sport participation has been associated with changes in prosocial behavior, its influence on intergroup bias in SoMi remains unclear. This research used four studies (N = 463) with adapted SoMi and minimal group paradigms to explore this issue in adolescents. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that sport participation significantly reduced intergroup bias, particularly by increasing SoMi behaviors toward outgroup members, with variations across different sport contexts. In Study 3, the roles of cooperation and competition within sport participation were examined separately, revealing that cooperation heightened ingroup favoritism while competition increased outgroup derogation. Study 4 examined these effects in non-sport contexts, revealing that competition fostered both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, whereas cooperation did not significantly affect overall bias but alleviated outgroup derogation. These findings suggest that sport participation can substantially influence intergroup bias in SoMi through sport-specific mechanisms of cooperation and competition.
In the last decade, the percentage of Americans who identify as atheists has almost doubled from 2% to 4%. Still, prejudice against this ever-growing group persists. Across four studies, we explored two distinct yet related correlates of antiatheist prejudice amongst American Christians: (a) the perception that atheists lack a moral compass and (b) the belief that faith in God is necessary to living a moral life. Grounded in moral foundations theory and big gods theory, we investigated this dual pathway to antiatheist prejudice in four samples. In Studies 1a and 1b, we found that Christians' (total N = 389) distrust of atheists increased to the extent that they perceived atheists to lack individualizing (especially concerns about harm)-but not binding-moral foundations. Further, Christians who endorsed the idea that belief in God is necessary to behave morally tended to be more distrusting of atheists. In a subsequent study (N = 253), we replicated these findings using the new Moral Foundation Questionnaire-2. In a final, preregistered study (N = 663), we again replicated these findings in a larger, politically diverse sample. We discuss how internal and external guides to moral conduct are each associated with distrust of atheists.
Political bubbles may foster the moralization of attitudes on polarized issues-that is, create a subjective connection between individuals' attitudes (e.g., pro-refugee) and their core values. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms-which could be rooted in the dynamic social interactions occurring within those bubbles. We examined those mechanisms by using a unique methodology focusing on small group conversations (N = 142; n = 46 groups) about controversial outgroup statements (concerning refugees). Multilevel analyses distinguished individual-level from group-level processes. Supporting pre-registered hypotheses, results show that moral emotions exerted a contextual effect on moralization: individuals in groups with stronger emotional responses moralized the issue more strongly, independent of their own emotional responses. Moreover, group-level moral emotions mediated the association between group-level perceived attitude strength and individual moralization. In contrast, pre-discussion attitude strength did not show comparable contextual effects. These findings suggest that moralization can be shaped by emergent emotional norms during group discussions.
Inclusive group norms can reduce children's discriminatory behavior and contribute to positive and diverse peer relationships. Little is known about how outgroup inclusive group norms are associated with children's behaviors and attitudes towards cross-gender peers. To address this gap, the present study investigated how 7-12-year-old American children's (N = 983, MAge = 9.64 years, SDAge = 0.89); 51% female; 58.5% White, 17.5% Multiethnic, 8.3% Asian American, 5.6% Black, 4.2% Latinx, 0.6% Other, 5.3% not reported) perceptions of their gender outgroups' inclusive norms were related to their reported play, desired play, and positive trait attributions of gender outgroup members. Children held higher inclusive norm expectations (INE) for their gender ingroup than outgroup. Children with higher outgroup INE reported and desired more play with gender outgroup members and had more positive attitudes towards them. The associations of INE with reported and desired play appeared to be stronger for boys than for girls.
Nowadays, the use of conspiratorial narratives targeting marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, is increasingly pervasive. These narratives depict LGBTQ+ people as a threat to the social order, undermining their rights and social inclusion. Across four studies (N = 2111), we experimentally investigated whether exposure to an anti-LGBTQ+ conspiratorial narrative affects conspiracy beliefs and civic engagement among cis-heterosexual people. Results showed that exposure to conspiratorial narrative increased the endorsement of anti-LGBTQ+ conspiracy beliefs, which, in turn, were associated with lower perception of interconnectedness with LGBTQ+ people, lower support for progressive collective action, lower support for inclusive education programs at school, and lower altruistic behavior toward LGBTQ+ individuals. Our findings highlight how conspiratorial narratives might fuel discriminatory beliefs and subtly erode intergroup solidarity and civic engagement. Addressing these processes is crucial to tackling the harmful effects of conspiratorial narratives and designing interventions to counter the spread and impact of conspiracy-driven rhetoric.
Identity fusion is a powerful form of social cohesion capable of motivating extreme pro-group action that can result from the sharing of personally transformative memories of a dysphoric event with other group members. However, it is not known whether such experiences need to be shared directly or if indirect sharing via eye-witness accounts would be equally effective. In this study, we examine the impact of the 2002 Bali bombings, a powerful dysphoric event, on group cohesion and morality among Balinese Hindus. We hypothesized that being copresent would predict stronger fusion with ingroup members compared with vicariously shared experiences, and that fusion scores would be more strongly associated with select moral domains compared with social identification. Using a questionnaire, data were collected in person from 340 Hindus in Bali. Our findings confirmed that directly experiencing this dysphoric event was associated with higher levels of fusion-especially with others who were copresent-which were mediated by the experience's transformative impact and its recall for those present. Nevertheless, indirect experiences also proved to be powerful drivers of group bonding through similar processes. The study provides new insight into the long-term psychological impacts of terrorist atrocities and their wider consequences for societal cohesion.
Workplace weight discrimination is pervasive and negatively impacts employees and organizations. Yet, little is known about the psychological processes linking weight discrimination and work outcomes. The current research addresses this gap in the research literature by testing emotion invalidation as a mediator of weight stigma's negative effects on employees. Dehumanizing aspects of weight stigma include the denial of complex emotions, higher-order mental faculties, and professional potential, which were theorized to leave heavy employees feeling invalidated, an experience termed social pain minimization (SPM). Three studies (Ntotal = 1,097) with cross-sectional, experimental, and multi-wave designs provide convergent support that workplace weight discrimination triggered actual and expected SPM, which in turn negatively impacted perceived organizational support (POS), workplace belonging, and workplace ostracism. These results offer insights into psychosocial processes linking workplace weight discrimination and key indicators of worker well-being. In conjunction with efforts to eliminate workplace weight stigma, organizations need to foster a supportive and emotionally validating climate.
In the past decade, collective action advocating for a disadvantaged group's rights has increased exponentially. However, only a fraction of supporters of a disadvantaged group's rights takes collective action. What drives some to take collective action for a disadvantaged group's rights while others do not? We argue that antiprejudice, the belief that one should proactively fight discrimination and injustice faced by a group, is a critical component of promoting collective action for that group and differentiating between those who are engaged and those who are not. Across field and online studies, we examined antiprejudice's role in driving protesting and intentions to take collective action for a disadvantaged group's rights among causes associated with liberals (e.g., racial equality) and conservatives (e.g., pro-life rights). Antiprejudice repeatedly emerged as a key construct for differentiating between protestors and non-protestors and for predicting collective action intentions.
Decades of research have shown that androcentric bias (i.e., assuming that men represent the default) is prevalent across text, images, and social interactions. Despite this evidence, recent research on the mental imagery of faces shows an opposite of the expected androcentric bias: Mental representations of "typical" faces appear more like women than men. In the present research, we first aim to reconcile this apparent discrepancy by examining the mental imagery associated with typical persons using generative reverse correlation-a data-driven method that leverages artificial intelligence to construct photo-realistic imagery of visual stereotypes for both groups and individuals. Second, we explore potential reasons for the observed reversal in mental imagery by examining individual differences in typicality judgments. Across two studies, our results show (1) individuals tend to equate "typical persons" with "men" in their mental representations at the group-level; but (2) there is large individual-level variability in both "typical person" mental imagery and explicit "typicality" judgments that complicates conclusions drawn from aggregate-level data.
Since teaching about past racism in the United States often necessitates deliberations over White Americans' ingroup transgressions, it can elicit historical defensiveness. We tested this hypothesis across three experiments (Ns = 109, 263, and 601) and further investigated if this effect was moderated by White collective narcissism. White American participants were randomly assigned to an ingroup transgression (presented with the history of racism) or an ingroup nontransgression (presented with the history of general events) condition. Across all experiments, (a) facing ingroup transgressions increased perceived ingroup responsibility among participants with low collective narcissism but not among those with high collective narcissism, and (b) among participants facing ingroup transgressions only, strong collective narcissism was consistently associated with less perceived ingroup responsibility. This research highlights the potential dangers of collective narcissism in erasing the history of racism.
Conservatives report much more favorable attitudes toward Confederate symbols (e.g., flags, monuments) than liberals. However, little work has examined factors that mediate or explain this robust political difference. Across two studies, we explored whether knowledge of historical racism mediates political differences in Confederate symbol attitudes. In a predominantly White internet sample (N = 227, U.S. South), Study 1 found that the association between political conservatism and attitudes toward Confederate symbols was mediated by historical knowledge. Further, this mediation effect remained after adjusting for Southern identity. Study 2 replicated the predicted mediation effect in a racially diverse university sample and found that it obtains across racial-ethnic groups (N = 557, U.S. Southeast). These results suggest that ignorance of historical racism helps to explain political differences in Confederate symbol attitudes. We discuss implications of these findings for research on the connection between historical knowledge and racial attitudes (i.e., the Marley hypothesis).
Previous research has demonstrated that when White allies confront racist comments, it reduces future prejudicial behavior in perpetrators, establishes egalitarian norms, and has positive effects for confronters. The current studies sought to examine whether the delivery of the confrontation affects perceptions of these allies. Three studies examined whether emotional expression (angry vs. control, Study 1), response type (direct vs. indirect, Study 2), and the interaction of these factors (Study 3) affected perceptions of White allies. Participants (N = 740) evaluated a White person in a vignette who confronted a racist comment. Results indicated that confronters who expressed anger were viewed more negatively than those who did not, due to perceptions that they were motivated to make the perpetrator look bad. Direct responses also elicited more positive perceptions of the confronter than indirect responses. These results may inform educational strategies that encourage allies to confront racist remarks.
Recognizing social identity complexity as one form of group complexity, we introduce two new kinds. Intergroup complexity encompasses perceived overlap between the ingroup and outgroup(s), whereas outgroup complexity entails overlap among outgroups (greater overlap yields simpler perceptions). Both apply to domains with at least one ingroup and two outgroups. Testing ideas from the social identity, gender, and sexuality relations literatures, we collected peoples' perceptions of intergroup and outgroup complexity among gender and sexuality categories separately, using an online survey with a convenience sample of American adults (N = 287). Results revealed that people perceived greater intergroup than outgroup complexity, less sexual than gender complexity (especially so among sexual outgroups), and were more likely to report greater intergroup complexity as their ingroup's status increased. Moreover, social dominance orientation moderated status effects. Implications focus on the applicability of these new forms of group complexity and their consequences.
