This paper, based on Hirai (2022), proposes a “Multi-Timescale” (MTS) interpretation of Henri Bergson’s theory of pure memory (mémoire pure). The main focus is Bergson’s Preservation-in-Itself Thesis (PII), the claim that past experiences persist without relying on stored neural traces. Traditional trace-based memory theories are criticized by Bergson for neglecting the phenomenal component of remembering and failing to account for genuine temporal extension. To address these issues, I introduce a concept of “Trans-Timescale” (TTS) systems, characterized by multiple coexisting timescales ranging from perceptual immediacy to an individual’s lifespan. In such a framework, experiences preserved at longer timescales remain contemporaneous with shorter timescales, thereby explaining the direct phenomenological connection to the past. This approach positions Bergson’s theory as a genuine alternative to contemporary trace-based and simulationist models of memory. By systematically reconstructing Bergson’s arguments within an MTS framework, this paper seeks to provide a coherent philosophical and empirical grounding for pure memory, opening avenues for dialogue between Bergson’s philosophy and contemporary theories of memory.
Ernest Sosa defends an imagination model of dreams. His main motivation for doing so is to avoid dream scepticism—the eternal sceptical concern that we cannot have knowledge of the external world, given that we might be dreaming. In this paper, we argue that Sosa’s appeal to an imagination model of dreams does not, in fact, allow him to avoid dream scepticism. This is because, even if we accept an imagination model of dreams, we should still accept that deceptive beliefs can enter into dreams. To make the point, we develop two lines of thought. The first draws on the imagination literature. We argue that since the imagination in general does not operate entirely independently of our belief forming mechanisms, we should not suppose that it does so in the particular case of dreaming. And second, we appeal to the empirical literature on sleep-dependent memory consolidation to suggest that there are also empirical reasons to think that beliefs can form and update in dreams.
Imagine that Einstein falls for a scam, losing a week’s salary, and his wife Mileva says: “You idiot!” This seems like blame for an epistemic failure rather than a moral one. Is there such a thing as epistemic blame, and if so, what is it? Cameron Boult’s book Epistemic Blame develops a conception of epistemic blame as a kind of relationship modification. Some critics think this conception cannot distinguish blaming from excusing. I argue that the concern about excuses is an instance of a much broader problem: how to distinguish blame from excusing, forgiving, impersonal responses, and non-blaming ways of holding accountable. Relationship-centered views of all kinds of blame tend to define blame too broadly, folding in many non-blaming reactions. Taking “You idiot” as a paradigm case can help us articulate what kind of response can count as distinctively epistemic blame: a response that focuses on the blamed person as a locus of fault.
Tyler McNabb and Erik Baldwin argue that (among other Asian traditions) Buddhism is logically consistent with the existence of a fundamental being of the sort in classical theism. They further contend that the Jonang-Zhentong (Shentong) and Jodo Shinshu (Shin) Buddhist traditions endorse that there really is (at least something like) such a fundamental reality. This article is a friendly reply to McNabb and Baldwin. I explicate two issues for their argument—one from a general lack of engagement with Buddhist dialetheic-paraconsistent perspectives, and another from a potential internal inconsistency in their view of fundamental reality. Ultimately, I draw on advancements in contemporary metaontology and higher-order logics to provide helpful resolutions. We begin by considering a concise summary of their argument (section 1). Afterwards, the earlier issues are explicated, and the subsequent outlined resolutions given (section 2). Finally, a central concern is engaged (section 3).
In “Russellian Monism: Ignorance and Prospects,” Haoying Liu (2026) contends that Russellian Monism (RM) is a theoretically sterile framework, incapable of informing empirical inquiry. Liu’s central thesis rests on the ignorance hypothesis: because the intrinsic quiddities postulated by RM are fundamentally inscrutable, they offer no explanatory purchase for scientific research. By drawing a historical analogy to Thomistic Hylomorphism (TH), Liu suggests that just as TH was discarded for its explanatory vacuity, RM should likewise be abandoned. While accepting Liu’s characterization of RM for the sake of argument, this paper identifies four critical flaws in his position. First, Liu’s argument relies on the thesis of Ramseyan Humility that paradoxically implies we know quiddities ground physical structures while maintaining they are unknowable. Second, even granting epistemic ignorance of fundamental entities, one may still theoretically understand the mechanisms by which these entities necessitate observable phenomena. Third, it is unclear whether RM is intended by its proponents to function as a guide for empirical research, rather than a metaphysical solution to the hard problem. Finally, the analogy between RM and TH falters, as the two frameworks exhibit significant functional and conceptual dissimilarities that Liu fails to address.
