This article examines the dynamics of bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Latvia. Drawing upon established theoretical models, it identifies the key factors shaping these interactions and thereby provides a basis for projecting their probable development in the coming years within the evolving global order. Particular attention is devoted to the paradigm of interaction between great powers and small states that are not historically, politically, or geographically connected. The primary objective of this study is to assess the explanatory value of selected theoretical frameworks for analyzing a highly asymmetric and geographically distant bilateral relationship, exemplified by Sino—Latvian relations. The authors conclude that the development of relations between Latvia and China is entirely determined by the current stage of evolution of the international system and its contemporary geopolitical context, which reaffirms the validity of political realism theory.
The relevance of the study stems from the growing digital inequality among Russian regions amid the rapid development of the digital economy. Disparities in digitalization levels perpetuate existing interregional gaps and create risks of concentrating human and technological potential in a limited number of regions. The aim is to identify and quantify the dynamics and spatial structure of digital inequality in Russian regions (2011—2023), differentiating it into primary (infrastructural — internet access) and secondary (human capital and competency-based — ICT employment) levels. The methodology combines cartographic methods of quantile classification, the Gini index, kernel density estimation (KDE), and Moran’s index to verify neighborhood effects. The results indicate divergent dynamics: a steady reduction in the infrastructural gap in internet access is accompanied by an increasing concentration of human capital in ICT. Significant spatial autocorrelation is confirmed, manifested in the formation of stable clusters of leading and lagging regions. Conclusions. The key challenge for regional development is shifting towards overcoming the secondary divide, necessitating a transition from universal infrastructure policies to targeted measures that stimulate the diffusion of digital competencies and the development of human capital in peripheral regions.
Germany and Sweden have significantly increased military spending and have also sought to dramatically expand their armed forces, distinguishing themselves from several other NATO member states in this regard. A key objective of this militarisation is to enhance their contributions to NATO’s deterrence posture against Russia, thereby advancing their respective leadership aspirations within the Alliance. At the same time, cooperation has consistently outweighed competition in German-Swedish security and defence collaboration. This article examines the dynamics and evolution of this military-political partnership in the late 2020s, with particular emphasis on Sweden’s NATO accession in March 2024. Methodologically, it draws on political neorealism and theories of armed forces development. Historically, the two states’ peaks of power never coincided, sparing them large-scale conflict and creating a favourable backdrop for cooperation. In the mid-1990s, West Germany viewed Sweden’s de facto rapprochement with NATO positively. This process gained greater scale and depth amid the Euro-Atlantic confrontation with Russia that intensified after 2014. Germany pursued a strategy of gradual and consistent deterrence; in the mid-2010s, Berlin still considered formal Swedish NATO membership overly provocative, communicating this stance through the N3 + 1 format (2014—2019), which involved the Nordic EU member states. By the end of the decade, however, Germany had come to accept and actively support Sweden’s abandonment of its non-aligned status, as evidenced by the N5 + 1 platform (from 2019, encompassing all five Nordic states) and high-level bilateral contacts. The study compares both countries’ militarisation models. Germany particularly values Sweden’s reinstatement of conscription in 2017, which has substantially boosted troop numbers, especially in ground forces. It details Armed Forces cooperation in manning NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups in the Scandinavian-Baltic region, including geographic burden-sharing. Special focus is given to the risks posed by strengthened German-Swedish eFP contingents, particularly concerning potential attempts to blockade the Kaliningrad region from the east.The conclusions identify the drivers of harmonisation achieved by Berlin and Stockholm in coordinating their military-political plans and actions under NATO auspices.
The term ‘geostrategic territory’ was introduced in the Spatial Development Strategies of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2019 and 2024. However, the principles for identifying such territories remained ambiguous, with no clear priorities or differentiation criteria specified. This study aims to conduct a substantive analysis of the concept of geostrategy and its derivatives across various fields of scholarly knowledge, drawing on both international and Russian literature. Historically, in international scholarship, geostrategy was associated primarily with military geography and geopolitics. Today, geostrategic analysis encompasses not only the potential use of military force beyond national borders but also the pursuit of national interests through non-military means. In Russia, a strategic territory is defined as a region facing actual or potential external threats to its security, necessitating specific policy measures to eliminate or mitigate their consequences. The term ‘geostrategic territory’ refers to the sources of such threats — specifically, a territory’s position within a multi-scale spatial system of network structures. External challenges are closely intertwined with internal ones, including the need to overcome economic backwardness, poverty, depopulation, and related socio-economic problems. The analysis demonstrates that a geostrategic position is dynamic and historically contingent, shaped by the geostrategic characteristics of individual settlements and strategic facilities. At the same time, similar geostrategic properties may also characterise extensive macro-regions encompassing several administrative units (e. g., the Arctic or the Russian Far East). The assessment of geostrategic position is inherently discursive, depending not only on material factors but also on the civic identity of the population, including their perception of global political actors, assessment of national security threats, and attitudes toward neighbouring countries. The article concludes by proposing criteria for classifying geostrategic territories and offers a refined definition of the concept.
This paper examines the evolution of Swedish national-conservative discourse on Russia between 2014 and 2024, focusing specifically on the Sweden Democrats (SD) and their affiliated magazine Samtiden. Having become Sweden’s second-largest political party, the SD effectively broke through the political ‘cordon sanitaire’ in the Riksdag prior to the 2022 elections. Throughout this process, the concept of the “Russian menace” played a pivotal role. Employing methodologies from historical and political imagology, the study analyzes the image of Russia within SD narratives and its transformation over time, as the party strategically invokes the “Russian menace” myth for political mobilization. Prior to 2014, the Sweden Democrats did not perceive Russia as an existential threat to Sweden —a position that clearly distinguished them from other Swedish right-wing actors, particularly the conservative Moderate Party (Moderaterna). Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, however, the SD began reevaluating their stance. Before the 2018 Skripal case, both the party and its affiliated commentators largely framed Russia as a legitimate participant in the international order. Subsequently, their discourse gradually shifted toward more pronounced criticism of Russian foreign policy and political system. Since February 2022, the Sweden Democrats have actively employed the “Russian menace” narrative more intensively than any other Swedish political party. In doing so, they frequently reference arguments from historians, political scientists, and international relations scholars. These discursive developments have profoundly shaped the party’s evolving position on Sweden’s NATO membership and constitute a central pillar of its broader political messaging. Within this context, the “Russian menace” narrative has emerged as a cornerstone of the Sweden Democrats’ political agenda.
