The Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) governs U.S. immigration law and was enacted to assist and protect international refugees from persecution and threats to life or freedom. The primary legislative purpose of the INA was to conform U.S. asylum law to international standards established in the 1967 Refugee Protocol. This Comment will critically examine the former Biden administration's June 2024 Proclamation on Securing the Border by illustrating how the Proclamation's deterrence-based policies failed to meet the United States' protective obligations under both international and federal law standards. This Comment will also underscore the inherent flaws of the Executive branch's enforcement of U.S. asylum law, particularly in the context of gender-based violence claims. Specifically, the Proclamation is a continuation of the Executive branch's misinterpretation of the INA. This trend is increasing in the current Trump administration and has led to the impermissible denial of access to fundamental procedural and substantive rights for non-citizens seeking asylum, especially women and girls fleeing gender-based violence, who are already at heightened risk of discrimination and exclusion within the asylum-seeking process. This Comment argues that the recent overturning of Chevron opens the door for creative litigants to leverage judicial oversight and review to hold the Executive branch accountable for following the statutory directives of the INA in immigration enforcement. In order to preserve foundational principles of separation of powers and uphold U.S. international treaty obligations, this Comment asserts that judicial intervention is a necessary step to shift the focus of immigration reform back towards legislative solutions that better respond to modern conditions and provide gender-based violence victims access to their legally entitled rights.
There is increasing litigation over whether employer-provided health insurance and state Medicaid plans can exclude coverage of medical procedures for so-called "gender transitions. "Plaintiffs claim that coverage exclusions of these sex-rejecting procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal nondiscrimination statutes. While Fourteenth Amendment claims should be foreclosed by the Supreme Court's holdings in Geduldig v. Aiello and United States v. Skrmetti, statutory nondiscrimination claims require a separate analysis. This article shows the proper analysis for whether coverage exclusions of sex-rejecting procedures violate federal nondiscrimination statutes. Looking to the history of coverage exclusion claims, Part I traces sex and pregnancy discrimination claims challenging coverage exclusions of pregnancy and contraception. Pregnancy coverage exclusions are squarely prohibited by the second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Supreme Court precedent, but that prohibition is limited. Neither the PDA nor Title VII's general prohibition against sex discrimination mandates equal coverage of contraception or other sex-related conditions. Part II surveys legal claims challenging coverage exclusion of sex-rejecting procedures that have arisen under sex and disability discrimination laws, including Title VII, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Considering these claims in light of the statutory text and history discussed in Part I, the article argues that sex-rejecting procedure coverage exclusions are not discriminatory. Part III explores how finding coverage exclusions of sex-rejecting procedures discriminatory would open Pandora's box, create a host of practical and legal concerns, and allow discrimination claims challenging coverage exclusions of any medical procedure associated with a protected basis. The article concludes that such a theory of discrimination should be rejected by the courts because it is unsupported in law, unlimited in reality, and unworkable in practice.
Is murder by omission a crime of violence? In its October 2024 term the Supreme Court of the United States was asked this very question in Delligatti v. United States. This case appeared before the Supreme Court as a result of its 2019 decision United States v. Davis. In Davis, the Supreme Court narrowly held the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. & sect; 924(c)(3)(B) to be unconstitutionally vague as a result of its interpretation that the statute required a categorical approach. As a result, federal courts have been forced to provide pages of painstaking analyses to hold that murder by omission is a crime of violence. In other instances, federal courts are forced to reach the illogical conclusion that second-degree murder is not a crime of violence. This Comment suggests a way out of the absurd results created by the categorical approach by demonstrating that the addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court will provide the swing vote to overrule Davis. Barrett, like the Davis dissenters, would read 18 U.S.C. & sect; 924(c)(3)(B) to allow a conduct-specific approach causing the clause to no longer be unconstitutionally vague. This Comment demonstrates why a call to revisit Davis is likely due to the frustration and confusion in federal courts' application of the categorical approach. In the event this happens, this comment first explains how Barrett's approach to textualism will likely cause her to interpret the clause similarly to the Davis dissenters. Second, it demonstrates that she shares the Davis dissent's approach to applying the avoidance canon and rule of lenity. Finally, as Barrett has a flexible approach to stare decisis, this comment provides an evaluation of stare decisis factors. In so doing, this Comment demonstrates that the Davis majority's reasoning is egregiously wrong, that the precedent is unworkable, and that overruling will not upset reliance interests. By overruling Davis, the Supreme Court can begin to find its way out of the madness of the categorical approach.
This Article compares the legal thought of James Wilson, a leading jurisprudential figure during the American Founding, and Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the most well-known medieval philosopher, on crime and punishment. It argues their theories are closer than the historical gulf between them suggests would be the case. Both limit the definition of crime to morally culpable acts involving public harm. Each considers redressing the public disorder crime causes as the primary justification for punishment. While Wilson defers to the English common law to emphasize protecting certain natural rights and to prevent crime, Aquinas points to his understanding of natural law to focus on restoring the individual and social facets of the common good. Aquinas's theological lens also adds a third type of harm to crime, namely what the perpetrator causes to himself. The comparison also underscores the relevance offirstprinciples about human nature, morality, political society, authority, and law to the scope of criminal law andpunishment. Both agree that how apolitical order chooses to punish should reflect fundamental principles rather than the mere will of the majority or power dynamics within society. Wilson's precommitment to natural rights as the cardinal organizing principle of legal systems-in contrast to Aquinas's emphasis on the natural law and the common good-matters greatly in the details of their views, including the role ofpositive law. Finally, Wilson's perspective on crime and punishment is further evidence that the Founders were not exclusively positivist in their political and legal philosophy, which might inform questions of constitutional interpretation and meaning relating to crime and punishment to the extent Wilson's ideas are considered relevant in contemporary original meaning debates.
The traditional summary judgment standard across state and federal courts has long been that facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant; this has developed as both a baseline measure to test whether the claims are even fit for a trial, but also as a measure of fairness3/4it is the movant who wants to dispose of the case before trial, so this standard gives the nonmovant a more level playing field. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris carved out a unique exception to this standard: when there is video evidence that so clearly contradicts the alleged facts put forth by the nonmovant that no reasonable jury could find for them, the court is permitted to view the facts in the light most favorable to the movant. In many respects, this is a sensible exception to the standard and has been applied narrowly across federal courts; however, many courts still struggle to keep the exception narrow, and have applied the exception in situations where the quality of the video evidence is much more dubious. Rather than overrule its existing precedent, the best way forward for the Supreme Court to maintain this exception while preventing further misapplication of it would be to clarify it as permitting its use only when video evidence is clear and complete, rather than partial and unclear.
