
Motivated by the contradictory arguments about the relationship between data and theory in science, such as the holistic, data relativizing Duhem/ Quine thesis of the underdetermination of theory by data, and a new empiricism, according to which the availability of large amounts of data is a sufficient basis for objective science, I analyze, both historically and conceptually, the generation of two highly important conflicting theories in early molecular biology: Linus Pauling’s structural and Francis Crick’s informational theory of biological specificity and protein synthesis. My goals are: (1) To explore the relationship between experimental data, knowledge, and theory in Pauling’s and Crick’s theories. (2) To show that both Pauling and Crick based their views on only a few, and almost the same, experimental data, evaluating them, however, from the different perspectives of structural chemistry and informational biology. (3) To argue that despite the apparent equivalence of data, the theories themselves were not equivalent, scientific theory choice was possible on the basis of knowledge beyond the direct experimental data, and that in general data does not speak for itself.
The epistemological idea according to which knowledge can and perhaps must be gained by the making of something new, has played a central role in Western philosophy for about two Millennia. While largely unknown in the theory-focused philosophy of physics/science prevailing nowadays, it was crucial for the development of both modern chemistry and biology, from synthetic chemistry to genetics and synthetic biology. Rather than discarding that as technology, or relabeling it as ‘techno-science’, this paper takes knowingthrough- making as an epistemological principle of science proper and analyzes its role in the history of philosophy, chemistry, and biology up to the presence. It argues for comparative epistemology of science, here for a comparison between chemistry and biology, to develop a better understanding of the similarities and differences of the sciences, rather than lump them altogether and treat them according to one’s favorite discipline, which has usually been physics. Taking knowing-through-making seriously also requires a new integration in philosophy of science that includes epistemology (knowing), ontology (making something new), and ethics (the normative implications of changing the world).
The use of in vitro stem cell models in toxicology represents an important opportunity to engage with the interplay of ethical and epistemological issues in regulatory science and technology. Stem cell toxicology has been proposed to tackle epistemological, ethical as well as practical problems associated with the use of laboratory animals in toxicological studies to address a shortfall in chemical risk assessments. This paper argues that these developments are problematic if viewed as simply ameliorating these problems in the near term. Stem cell toxicology arises within a relatively novel intersection of the ethics and epistemology of pluripotent stem cell research and animal experimentation. It appears to require an expansion and a diversification of ethical and regulatory oversight due to epistemological and regulatory dependencies on therapeutic stem cell biology, the entrenchment of data from animal experimentation in toxicology, and the potentially novel implications of some aspects of the research. Understanding the role of stem cell toxicology models as model for will help to grapple their role in the transfer of knowledge between non-human animal models and humans as target systems. But advancing chemical risk assessment will not be a matter of simply addressing a normative problem by scientific and technological means.