Motivated by the contradictory arguments about the relationship between data and theory in science, such as the holistic, data relativizing Duhem/ Quine thesis of the underdetermination of theory by data, and a new empiricism, according to which the availability of large amounts of data is a sufficient basis for objective science, I analyze, both historically and conceptually, the generation of two highly important conflicting theories in early molecular biology: Linus Pauling’s structural and Francis Crick’s informational theory of biological specificity and protein synthesis. My goals are: (1) To explore the relationship between experimental data, knowledge, and theory in Pauling’s and Crick’s theories. (2) To show that both Pauling and Crick based their views on only a few, and almost the same, experimental data, evaluating them, however, from the different perspectives of structural chemistry and informational biology. (3) To argue that despite the apparent equivalence of data, the theories themselves were not equivalent, scientific theory choice was possible on the basis of knowledge beyond the direct experimental data, and that in general data does not speak for itself.
The epistemological idea according to which knowledge can and perhaps must be gained by the making of something new, has played a central role in Western philosophy for about two Millennia. While largely unknown in the theory-focused philosophy of physics/science prevailing nowadays, it was crucial for the development of both modern chemistry and biology, from synthetic chemistry to genetics and synthetic biology. Rather than discarding that as technology, or relabeling it as ‘techno-science’, this paper takes knowingthrough- making as an epistemological principle of science proper and analyzes its role in the history of philosophy, chemistry, and biology up to the presence. It argues for comparative epistemology of science, here for a comparison between chemistry and biology, to develop a better understanding of the similarities and differences of the sciences, rather than lump them altogether and treat them according to one’s favorite discipline, which has usually been physics. Taking knowing-through-making seriously also requires a new integration in philosophy of science that includes epistemology (knowing), ontology (making something new), and ethics (the normative implications of changing the world).
The use of in vitro stem cell models in toxicology represents an important opportunity to engage with the interplay of ethical and epistemological issues in regulatory science and technology. Stem cell toxicology has been proposed to tackle epistemological, ethical as well as practical problems associated with the use of laboratory animals in toxicological studies to address a shortfall in chemical risk assessments. This paper argues that these developments are problematic if viewed as simply ameliorating these problems in the near term. Stem cell toxicology arises within a relatively novel intersection of the ethics and epistemology of pluripotent stem cell research and animal experimentation. It appears to require an expansion and a diversification of ethical and regulatory oversight due to epistemological and regulatory dependencies on therapeutic stem cell biology, the entrenchment of data from animal experimentation in toxicology, and the potentially novel implications of some aspects of the research. Understanding the role of stem cell toxicology models as model for will help to grapple their role in the transfer of knowledge between non-human animal models and humans as target systems. But advancing chemical risk assessment will not be a matter of simply addressing a normative problem by scientific and technological means.
In his work Leibniz provides different approaches to the idea of organism. In the present paper I would like to focus on two of them. On the one hand, we find a chemical approach that studies the organism as a composite body. On the other hand, from a biological perspective, the organism is the result of a natural generation, i.e. the development and transformation of organic structures. The thesis that I defend in this paper is that both perspectives are convergent in the same ontological project built around a certain understanding of the chemistry that Leibniz proposes in his latest works.
In recent years philosophers of biology have made renewed efforts to develop and defend a process ontology. These efforts have often focused on the example of living systems, which provide a strong case for a processual view of biological entities. Here I will analyze a different kind of biological entity, namely macromolecules. Looking at protein biology, I will show that contemporary theories in this field present us with a substance-like picture of macromolecules. Whilst this poses a challenge for existing process accounts, I will argue that the challenge can be overcome if metaphysicians abandon their focus on theory and follow a practice-informed scientific metaphysics. Turning to the practice of protein biology, and in particular the use of what I will refer to as ‘energy-level management’ practices, will suggest that macromolecules are processes, much like organisms.
The epistemological idea according to which knowledge can and perhaps must be gained by the making of something new, has played a central role in Western philosophy for about two Millennia. While largely unknown in the theory-focused philosophy of physics/science prevailing nowadays, it was crucial for the development of both modern chemistry and biology, from synthetic chemistry to genetics and synthetic biology. Rather than discarding that as technology, or relabeling it as 'techno-science', this paper takes knowing-through-making as an epistemological principle of science proper and analyzes its role in the history of philosophy, chemistry, and biology up to the presence. It argues for comparative epistemology of science, here for a comparison between chemistry and biology, to develop a better understanding of the similarities and differences of the sciences, rather than lump them altogether and treat them according to one's favorite discipline, which has usually been physics. Taking knowing-through-making seriously also requires a new integration in philosophy of science that includes epistemology (knowing), ontology (making something new), and ethics (the normative implications of changing the world).
Motivated by the contradictory arguments about the relationship between data and theory in science, such as the holistic, data relativizing Duhem/Quine thesis of the underdetermination of theory by data, and a new empiricism, according to which the availability of large amounts of data is a sufficient basis for objective science, I analyze, both historically and conceptually, the generation of two highly important conflicting theories in early molecular biology: Linus Pauling's structural and Francis Crick's informational theory of biological specificity and protein synthesis. My goals are: (1) To explore the relationship between experimental data, knowledge, and theory in Pauling's and Crick's theories. (2) To show that both Pauling and Crick based their views on only a few, and almost the same, experimental data, evaluating them, however, from the different perspectives of structural chemistry and informational biology. (3) To argue that despite the apparent equivalence of data, the theories themselves were not equivalent, scientific theory choice was possible on the basis of knowledge beyond the direct experimental data, and that in general data does not speak for itself.
Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology's specificity each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of articulation, i.e. a new way of articulating the questions and phenomena it wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal biology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever.
When Mario Molina and Sherwood Rowland in 1974 predicted the depletion of stratospheric ozone through chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which posed a threat to almost all terrestrial life, they initiated an unprecedented and still unique political process that led to a global ban of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances. After a brief introduction to atmospheric chemistry and the history of CFCs, the first part of this paper narrates the history of that prediction, its experimental verification, including the discovery of the Ozone Hole, and the international political consequences. The second part investigates if and to what extent chemists have a moral duty to research and warn us of possible hazards, taking Molina and Rowland as moral role models.
Rare earths are a critical resource for contemporary societies. Among their diverse uses, they are key components of sustainability technologies such as wind turbines and electric vehicles. While rare earths can help societies transition away from fossil fuels to renewable energy and conserve energy, their extraction, processing, and use creates serious environmental and social effects around the world, especially in China. We argue that environmental justice and intergenerational justice concepts can provide an ethical framework for navigating this green energy bargain. We survey the environmental and social effects that rare earth production causes and the changing geography of production that means these effects are being distributed worldwide, both in and beyond China. Finally, we consider several strategies that miners, manufacturers, designers, and users can use to achieve greater environmental justice and intergenerational justice, now and for the future.
When Mario Molina and Sherwood Rowland in 1974 predicted the depletion of stratospheric ozone through chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which posed a threat to almost all terrestrial life, they initiated an unprecedented and still unique political process that led to a global ban of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances. After a brief introduction to atmospheric chemistry and the history of CFCs, the first part of this paper narrates the history of that prediction, its experimental verification, including the discovery of the Ozone Hole, and the international political consequences. The second part investigates if and to what extent chemists have a moral duty to research and warn us of possible hazards, taking Molina and Rowland as moral role models.
: Throughout the biotechnology age, fears about the distortionary effects of property and other legal institutions upon the health and self-determination of individuals and societies have accompanied more popularly sensational fears about unscrupulous choices within the scientific community itself. Still, for most of that time the prevailing legal regime both in the United States and in Europe remained generally permissive of ownership of, and ex-clusionary power over, the fruits of much biomedical research, though this le-niency took different forms and came about in different ways. In particular, the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to grant patents on genetic compositions such as DNA sequences produced an extensive landscape of legal rights that would eventually provoke a backlash in both legal and popular opinion during the Myriad Genetics lawsuit. This case study examines the normative dimension of patent rights over isolated DNA sequences through the lens of the Myriad case, discussing the institutional context in which the case arose and identifying ethical lessons that the case offers.
According to the principle of plenitude, or what in a different version is also known as the totalitarian principle, what can possibly exist does actually exist. This metaphysical idea has in the past played an important heuristic role in the life sciences and can still be found in some areas of modern science. The paper critically examines how chemical ideas about elements and their compounds have on occasions been inspired by plenitude reasoning if mostly implicitly. The emergence and interpretation of the periodic table is one case and the existence of exotic forms of matter, such as muonium and superheavy elements, is another. Generally the principle of plenitude problematizes the fundamental ontological notion of what it means for a chemical entity to exist in nature.
We contrast two facets of elemental ontology, one so straightforward that it can be taught as the adjunct to a grade-school chemistry demonstration, the other involving eight decades of discourse at the graduate-school level. To explore the latter, we begin by critiquing the Lavoisier/Mendeleev relation as presented by Fritz Paneth in 1931 in German. Following the 2003 reissue of Paneth 1962 (an English translation), one observes a gradual shift such that Paneth seems the source of the substance/element distinction that was drawn by Mendeleev in 1869. Eventually, in 2009, a certain wheel is reinvented: Mendeleev's. We advocate that the focus be returned, overtly, to Mendeleev, and to two of his words in particular, substance () and element (). When suitably framed, those two words alone capture the essence of his elemental ontology.
