While there is perennial concern about the role of business in policy and politics, the trade associations (TAs) that represent industry in policy contests remain undertheorised. This article introduces a theory of TA position-taking that explains who calls the shots over TA policy positions when their member firms are divided. We identify three camps within TAs that can shape their policy positions: the largest members, the broader membership and professional staff. The relative influence of each camp depends on several conditioning factors: TA decision-making governance, resource differentials between camps, and the organizational preservation imperative. Our theory suggests that, while large members often call the shots over TA policy positions, they can also be willing to compromise in order to preserve the political effectiveness of their association. We illustrate our theory drawing on rare interviews with executives from oil and gas trade associations and a detailed historical analysis of the American Petroleum Institute’s policy positions. Our contribution not only represents a step towards developing a broader theory of TA political behaviour, it also contributes to enduring debates about the nature of business bias and the mechanisms underpinning business unity on policy issues.
How do political entrepreneurs choose among different organisational forms? Existing research explains how electoral systems and access rules shape the feasibility of political parties and interest groups but offers limited insight into how political entrepreneurs choose between organisational forms when multiple options are available. This article argues that organisational choice is shaped by uncertainty regarding future opportunities, assessments of available channels of influence, and the organisational commitments associated with alternative forms of political organisation. Drawing on a qualitative comparison of two Norwegian political organisations, one that consolidated as an interest group and one that escalated to party formation, it examines how founders and early organisers evaluated alternative organisational forms for pursuing policy influence. Based on ten semi-structured interviews, the analysis shows that organisational choice is shaped by assessments of influence channels, coalition management, organisational commitments, and uncertainty regarding future political opportunities. The evidence suggests that interest group organisation can constitute a deliberate long-term choice rather than a temporary stage before party formation, particularly when non-electoral channels such as litigation, advocacy, and administrative participation are perceived as effective. The evidence further shows that substantial organisational growth, membership expansion, and financial consolidation do not necessarily generate pressures for party formation. Party formation, by contrast, can constitute a selectively binding organisational commitment that may reshape participation by filtering which activists remain involved. The findings suggest that organisational form is not determined by institutional incentives alone. Instead, political entrepreneurs continuously evaluate and revise alternative strategies for achieving political influence.
When might interest groups normally lobbying the top level of government choose to lobby lower levels? Little research focuses on this kind of multivenue lobbying, so in this paper I study patterns of national group advocacy in the American states using data from 2006 to 2020. While it is rare for national groups to lobby state governments, some do. Why? My explanation draws on the idea that sometimes national groups need to lobby when opportunities present themselves coupled with their ability to lobby. I find that it is business-oriented associations that are more likely to lobby than cause-oriented citizen groups, but that advocacy resources are also an important motivator as is federal spending in the states or high levels of state corporate taxation. While the partisan leanings of state lawmakers do not matter much, party polarization does, with all national groups more likely to lobby a polarized state legislature.
The study draws on original biographical data for 267 individuals in leadership positions in Norwegian interest groups and identifies 400 career transfer events. Distinguishing between intra-sectoral transfers within the education domain and inter-sectoral transfers across policy domains, the study shows that, within the observed population of interest group leaders, leaders with prior experience in policymaking environments, including state organizations and interest groups, are particularly prominent among employed leaders, reflecting the strategic recruitment of individuals with insider knowledge and governance expertise. Building on actor homophily and professionalization perspectives, the study further demonstrates how organizational- and individual-level factors (type of interest the group represents and type of position, respectively) shape transfer patterns. Leaders representing employees and providers of education services are more likely to remain within the same sector, reinforcing professional continuity and domain-specific expertise, whereas leaders representing beneficiaries exhibit greater inter-sectoral mobility, reflecting more heterogeneous recruitment pathways. Employed leaders display higher inter-sectoral mobility and elected leaders remain more embedded within their sectoral domain. While based on Norway, the findings have broader relevance for corporatist and welfare-state systems and offer comparative insights for pluralist settings.
Research suggests that lobbyists derive value from both political connections—“whom they know”—and issue expertise—“what they know”—but that connections generally command the larger premium. This study examines whether those market premiums vary across the policy agenda. Drawing on resource-dependence theory, we argue that clients value different lobbying resources depending on the constraints they face within a given issue domain. Using nearly 600,000 U.S. federal lobbying reports from 1998 to 2017, we examine how the premiums associated with lobbyists’ connections and expertise vary across domains that differ in size, technical complexity, and partisan conflict. We find that connections carry a persistent premium and generally outweigh expertise in magnitude. The premiums associated with both connections and expertise are higher in larger domains and in more technically complex domains, where clients face greater constraints on access and information. However, expertise receives a lower premium in highly partisan domains, while the evidence that partisan conflict changes the connection premium is less robust. Together, these findings suggest that clients place different market values on lobbying resources as the political constraints they face vary across issue-domain environments.
