Federalism is centred on the principle of divided sovereignty. Capturing the essence of this principle, Daniel Elazar (1987) coined the phrase "self-rule plus shared rule." For functional and practical reasons, forms of delegated authority are readily apparent in democratic and authoritarian unitary states alike, suggesting perhaps that elements of self-rule and shared rule may be common across all states. In federations, however, the implications of shared rule carry far beyond functional and practical matters - it is integral to the legitimacy and expression of the sovereign state. Studying federalism and interrogating the performance, effectiveness, and sustainability of federal states in action thus entail appreciating the theory and practice of power that is both territorially divided and shared. This symposium contributes to ongoing efforts to conceptualize, interrogate, assess, and understand the integrity of shared rule to federalism.
Since 2017, interest in the National Guard has increased as it has taken on a more prominent role in domestic political disputes. We ask how the National Guard-the heirs of the republican ideal state-led citizen militia-became a tool of federal intervention in, and control over, the states. We argue that the view of the National Guard as a key bulwark against federal aggression was always more political myth than reality, leading to a constitutional compromise and thus an opening for contestation. This has manifested in areas of traditional political struggle in US institutions, in trends toward greater executive power, greater national authority, and greater partisan polarization. In short, the United States may be on the verge of a renegotiation of the federal bargain on a scale not seen since at least the 1960s.
While recent scholarship on executive-centered federalism emphasizes unilateral action and the growing partisan divide between "red" and "blue" states, it often treats the role of party organization and presidential leadership of the party system as secondary. Tracing key episodes that played out during the first year of Trump 2.0's administration, including disputes over transgender and immigration policy, presidential support for aggressive redistricting strategies in several states, and state-led litigation, we argue that understanding contemporary federal-state relations must take account of how presidential partisanship has remade the party system over the past half-century. Our analysis draws on a new historical dataset measuring party organizational and geographic consolidation from 1834 to 2024, which shows that Trump's merging of party and presidential power is decades in the making-a culmination of an executive-centered nationalization of partisanship that has placed states on the front lines of battles for the services of administrative power.
