ABSTRACT Democratization, via franchise extension, can reduce traditional elite representation and power. We study whether autocratization similarly increases the representation of these elites. We use the case of Denmark from 1849 to 1915. A constitutional change in 1866 created a privileged franchise to the upper chamber of the parliament weighted towards the wealthy and rural areas, while leaving the electoral rules to the lower chamber unchanged. Using MP‐year level data, we apply a difference‐in‐difference approach to study whether this autocratizing reform increased the representation of Danish elites in the upper chamber relative to the lower chamber. We find that this reform indeed increased the share of traditional elites in the upper chamber of the parliament such as the nobility and landed estate owners, including those with political‐dynastic ties, and arguably therefore the nature of democratic representation in 19th century Denmark.
ABSTRACT Recent scholarship argues that crises can create opportunities for women's political leadership. Yet crises also create opportunities for male political elites to adapt strategically to preserve their power. We develop and test a theory of crisis‐induced adaptation, whereby male political elites respond by shifting political attention toward crisis dimensions that reinforce their authority. We examine this theory using the Ugandan Parliament's response to COVID‐19, a health crisis in a policy domain traditionally associated with women. Using the complete corpus of parliamentary debates from 1998 to 2022 and text‐as‐data analyses, we find no evidence that COVID‐19 reduced gender inequalities in legislative speech. Instead, the pandemic widened them. Men's dominance in legislative speech grew as they increasingly framed the pandemic through traditionally masculine policy domains—the economy and national security—rather than public health. Rather than opening space for women, crises can provide men with new opportunities to entrench political dominance.
The Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy at Wayne State University Law School is in the process of creating the first-ever comprehensive database of congressional oversight reports for all House and Senate Committees since the 106th Congress (1999-2000). In this article, we place these reports into the broader context of the tools Congress has to conduct oversight in service of its many legislative branch responsibilities under the Constitution. We also explain the development of the database. We conclude the article by discussing how the congressional scholars in this special issue use this database to examine how Congress conducts oversight, and we propose several additional areas for future study.
How does unequal representation affect policymaking? Existing research shows that overrepresented districts exert disproportionate influence over public policy, yet our understanding of the underlying sources of this advantage remains limited. I argue that increased representation can independently bias policymaking via two channels: a mechanical effect, whereby additional representatives increase a district's likelihood of shaping the legislative agenda, and a behavioral effect, whereby legislators intensify constituency-oriented effort due to intra-district competition. To test this, I leverage the quasi-experimental setting created by the electoral rule of the Italian Senate (1994-2006), which allowed districts with similar population sizes to elect either one or two senators. Using a regression discontinuity design and comprehensive data on bill (co-)sponsorship, I find evidence consistent with both channels. Examining policy outcomes, I do not find that unequal representation yields distributive benefits, but I do find suggestive evidence of a broader legislative advantage.
How elections impact the behavior of legislators is one of the most fundamental questions in the study of representation, yet little is known about the role of electoral geography. In a federal system like the United States, national resources often flow to cities. However, members of Congress represent congressional districts, which do not align with city boundaries. Using spending data from 1967 to 2019 and a within-city research design, I show that the same city is represented differently depending on how it aligns with electoral maps. Cities benefit from having more representatives provided city residents still make up a substantial portion of each congressional district. These findings contribute to our understanding of representation within a federal system and illustrate how electoral geography can create inequalities in representation and the distribution of resources.
