Abstract The post-Cold War decline in violent conflict has given way to rising instability both within and between states. While many attribute this shift to intensified great power competition, we argue that nationalist geopolitics, manifested through conflict driven by grievances reflecting the political exclusion of ethnic groups and their kin, offer a more accurate explanation. We explain how endogenous and exogenous factors weakened the liberal international order, which allowed ethnic nationalism to resurge in the early twenty-first century. This erosion of broader liberal norms, particularly what we call liberal backsliding, has started to undermine the inclusive policies that ultimately helped to stabilize the post-Cold War peace. Using newly updated global data on ethnic power relations (1946–2023), we document a reversal of inclusionary trends that began in the early 2010s. These findings challenge power-centric explanations of global instability and highlight how liberal institutional erosion, particularly in the domain of ethnic inclusion, creates fertile ground for identity-based violence. The return of nationalist geopolitics is thus rooted in not only shifting power relations but also retreating institutional safeguards.
Abstract Fifty years ago, the founders of this journal hoped that its creation would help revitalize the academic study of international security. Their ambitions have been fulfilled: International Security is now one of the most widely cited journals in the field of international relations and there is a robust community of scholars studying different aspects of the subject. The contents of the journal constantly evolve in response to world events, new scholarly developments, and its contributors’ particular interests, but it remains a vital resource for scholars and students alike. By facilitating active debates on important scholarly questions, International Security and other academic journals help educate each new cohort and contribute to robust discussions of critical policy questions.
Abstract Why do great powers believe it is necessary to have nuclear first-use options? What explains the different types of first-use options in the nuclear force postures of Russia and the United States? Why did China not develop a first-use option in the post-Cold War era? Existing literature focuses on whether great power nuclear strategies should entrench mutually assured destruction or compete for superiority, but it does not fully explain variation in first-use options. We compare the approaches to first use in the nuclear strategies of China, Russia, and the United States. Each of these great powers has different plans for both pursuing limited conflict objectives and countering conventional and geographic vulnerabilities, regime threats, and threats to allies, as well as different beliefs about damage limitation. Acute conventional and geographic vulnerabilities explain Russia's first-use options, which are optimized for state survival. Despite speculation that China might use nuclear weapons first to compel reunification with Taiwan, China has weak reasons to do so because it prefers non-nuclear means to achieve this objective. In contrast, the United States maintains options for first use, largely because of its extended deterrence commitments to allies and beliefs about damage limitation. These different approaches could fuel nuclear escalation in a conflict scenario.
