Abstract In light of the recent discussion by Rose, this paper aims to reconsider a notorious crux in the chronology of early Hellenistic Athens, namely the dating of the exile of Demochares of Leukonoe, nephew of Demosthenes and pivotal character in the political scene of the late fourth/early third century BCE. The paper presents new arguments in favour of the traditional chronology of the exile in 304/3; in particular, it demonstrates that the peace/truce/alliance with the Boiotians, which the honours for Demochares identify as one of the causes for his exile, followed an armed conflict between the two parties, and that this conflict should be identified with one of the clashes the Athenians faced during the Four-Year War (307/6–304/3). Finally, the paper explores the possibility of simultaneous exiles of Demochares and Kallias of Sphettos.
Abstract The study of Roman grand strategy often follows a binary debate that either makes grand claims for Roman strategic planning or discounts entirely the idea that the Romans had any form of strategic thinking. The following paper argues that these debates neglect what was distinctly Roman about Roman strategic thinking. Through looking to a case study of the Emperor Tiberius, this paper shows that Rome was driven by inter-elite competition and not by modern conceptions of national security. The paper therefore challenges ahistorical accounts of Roman warfare and concludes with exploring ways forward to better understand what was uniquely Roman about Roman strategic culture.
In this article, I demonstrate that electrum is an unusual material for a monetary medium and that the common explanation that this material was chosen for the manufacture of the first coins to make a profit does not suffice. Electrum as raw material was typically used to produce luxury items, which rather connects with two elements of Lydian culture, namely the feudal character of its society and the offering of gifts to ensure support. Therefore, I connect the appearance of coinage with the switch from gift exchange to market exchange, the war-permeated Middle Lydia period and the rise of mercenaries. In conclusion, I sketch the change over from gift to monetary medium.
Increasingly, scholars have recognised the significance of volunteers in the Roman army during the middle Republic (c. 264–146 BCE). Whilst studies have noted the phenomenon of individual volunteers, during the 190 s veterans volunteered for service in the armies sent to the eastern Mediterranean from a recognised, cohesive and famed military collective: Scipio Africanus’ veterans from Spain and Africa. It is suggested that Scipio’s veteran volunteers brought experience, skill and esprit de corps , aspects of professionalism only otherwise found in the legions of the late Republic and Principate. This provides another explanation for Rome’s extraordinary military successes in the eastern Mediterranean between 200–188.
In the middle 90 s, the geopolitical interests of Pontus, Armenia, Rome, and Parthia in the Near East converged on the minor kingdom of Cappadocia in Anatolia. Although there were many different motivations, intentions, and perspectives concerning this emerging international affair in Cappadocia, this phenomenon reflects the increasingly complex geopolitical realties of the international environment of the Near East at this time. Cappadocia was not only within the edges of the Parthians’ and Romans’ separate spheres of influence, but it also became a target of the ascending powers of Pontus and Armenia. The emergence of Tigranes II as the Parthians’ vassal king of Armenia in the middle 90 s, adjacent to Cappadocia, gave Mithridates VI of Pontus a new opportunity to control the region, and the two kings agreed to work together against their common regional rival. Although it is important to consider the place of Parthia within the contexts of the wider Cappadocian affair, one should not overestimate the involvement or cooperation of Parthia in the progressively tense geopolitical atmosphere surrounding the region. That said, these developments facilitated the first official meeting between the Parthians and Romans, even though neither side had much interest in such a meeting nor appreciated its potential implications. For centuries, the origin and impact of the first meeting of the Parthians and Romans in Cappadocia have been exaggerated and diluted by the anachronistic and myopic perspectives of the surviving Greco-Roman sources. Because of this, the focus of scholarship has been and continues to be on the agency of the Romans at the expense of the agency of other important eastern actors. Yet with a renewed focus on the Cappadocian affair, this article will challenge Rome-centric understandings of these developments, emphasizing instead new interpretations that highlight the considerable agency and motivations of various eastern actors.
