Creative response to interdisciplinary symposium held at University College London in June 2023, on ‘dams, displacements, legacies’.
The reference to a ‘European community of values’ as the core of a shared European identity is now a central element of political rhetoric. From a historical perspective, however, it becomes apparent that such a reference to values, depending on the political and temporal context, underwent a significant transformation between the early 1950s and the 2000s. This article aims to describe this shift from the early phase of integration through the 1970s and 1980s to the turn of the millennium and to analyse the reasons for it. In doing so, it treats the concepts of ‘European identity’ and ‘community of values’ primarily not as political or social ‘realities’ but as historical sources.
Far-right and nationalist parties and movements have traditionally been understood through the framework of “Euroscepticism” as critics of the European Union. However, the conceptual lens of “Euroscepticism” and a rejection of “Europe” ignore these movements’ endorsement of the notion of Europe. In fact, far-right groups have explicitly drawn on the concept of Europe and European civilization as an ideological underpinning. At the same time, these groups have shifted their focus away from advocating their countries’ exit from the European Union and have established closer institutional ties. This article examines how Europe functions as an idea and framework for the European far right and how these groups and parties embed the nation within Europe, drawing on historical continuities. It will examine how ideas of Europe matter for far right and nationalist movements by first exploring their historical evolution, then briefly examining three dimensions: (a) European structures, (b) European themes, and (c) European communication and framing. In doing so, it seeks to bring different strands of literature into dialogue to argue for a transnational, interdisciplinary understanding of “civilizational” and a transnational approach to the study of nationalism and the far right.
This article explores the notion of European ‘civilisation’. Around the time of the Renaissance, some Europeans began to think about Europe in terms of its civilisation; before that period only Christianity had given Europe any semblance of unity. But since then, and even more so since the 18th century, Europe came to think of its civilisation as being different from that in other parts of the world, and indeed better, based on assumptions of so-called European virtues and values. Especially since the age of the European overseas empires, Europeans have championed those virtues and indeed tried to export them to the rest of the world. It is an essential part of historical Eurocentrism. What exactly were those ways of thinking? When and how did those ‘European virtues and values’ arise, and how have they changed over time? What is the origin of the much-vaunted European values of the European Union?
In the Czech Republic, discussions on dams convey a sense of ambivalence. Despite awareness of the cultural and natural losses their construction entails, existing dams are nonetheless commonly received positively, as seemingly natural landscape features, admirable technical achievements and recreational destinations. Taking the Lipno Dam on the Vltava River, built 1951–1959, as an example, I consider views of the region, asking what factors contribute to this generally positive perception. The reasons lie partly in cultural history, for example, a generationally transferred desire for the sea, and an enthusiasm for technology, both of which persist through successive state regimes.
