
Abstract The adoption of a unified European regulatory framework for crowdfunding seeks to address the challenges arising from the pre-existing regulatory fragmentation among Member States by establishing harmonized requirements concerning the provision of crowdfunding services, the organization, authorization, and supervision of service providers, as well as the operation of platforms, transparency obligations, and marketing communications, while ensuring consistent mechanisms for investor protection. This paper focuses on the European supervisory architecture applicable to crowdfunding service providers, with particular attention to its distinctive features vis-à-vis the role assigned to national competent authorities, in contrast with the initially envisaged framework under which ESMA was relegated to a largely marginal role. The principal specificity of the system, however, lies in the interaction and partial overlap between European norms and national legal frameworks governing the sector, notwithstanding that the European crowdfunding regulation constitutes a fully binding and directly applicable instrument in each Member State pursuant to art. 288 TFEU. Considering these features, the study aims to evaluate the extent of discretion afforded to national authorities, through an examination of the implementation process in Italy, which serves as an illustrative case of regulatory expansion resulting from the coexistence of multiple national competent authorities.
Abstract This article engages with Digital Assets and the Law to examine the implications of digital monetary innovations, including cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and CBDCs, for the institutional foundations of contemporary monetary systems. It argues that these innovations bring into sharper focus fundamental questions about the purposes of money and whether existing public-private institutional arrangements remain adequate to fulfil them. Rather than viewing crypto-assets as exogenous developments, the article situates them within a broader historical and political context, tracing their emergence to longstanding tensions in monetary governance. Focusing primarily on policy responses in Western economies, it argues that many have been predominantly conservative, seeking to preserve and adapt the existing monetary order rather than addressing the underlying tensions from which these innovations emerged. Instead, the article proposes assessing alternative monetary arrangements according to their capacity to strengthen money’s character as a public good. It concludes by outlining five possible future scenarios, evaluating each in terms of their implications for monetary governance and the broader public interest.
Abstract I would like to thank Matthias Thiemann and Yuri Biondi for organizing this symposium on Rating Politics and Jacqueline Best, Quentin Bruneau and Alexandra Ouroussoff for their generous reading and inspiring comments. In my response to them, I elaborate on the strengths and weaknesses of the “financial infrastructures” approach to credit ratings. I argue that this approach allows for better understanding the dependence of both states and markets on credit ratings and the counter-intuitive incentive structure that shapes rating agencies’ behavior. At the same time, this approach yields a structuralist argument that has limitations when exploring the role of ideational factors in credit rating decisions.
Abstract Due to the emphasis placed on implementing confidentiality in arbitration, arbitration has become an important tool for settling international trade and investment disputes. Confidentiality constitutes a procedural guarantee for litigants without which arbitration cannot be envisaged. This is despite the demands to apply transparency to some issues related to international investment arbitration. To achieve its objectives, the study was divided into sections that dealt with the nature of confidentiality in commercial arbitration, the subjective and objective rationalizations that compelled arbitrators to staunchly adhere to the principle of confidentiality, and the issues that made the principle of confidentiality an impediment to international investment arbitration which generated serious calls to implement the principle of transparency. The study also defines the concept of confidentiality by distinguishing it from privacy, as misunderstandings surrounding the nature of these two concepts have confused confidentiality mechanisms. A further emerging trend that runs counter to the dominant idea of absolute confidentiality in arbitration resulted from the continuous international demand to give transparency a prominent role over confidentiality in investment arbitration. This trend also calls for a clear arbitration process that allows the public to participate in access the investment arbitration proceedings and assess their legitimacy and transparency. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has initiated a “paradigm shift” in arbitral proceedings by passing rules regulating the transparency of investment arbitration work: the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration” adopted in 2014. In this context, this study seeks to analyse the principle of transparency and balance it with the principle of confidentiality of international investment arbitration.
This paper examines changes in capitalism's dynamic structure that have brought international investors increasingly to rely on just three U.S.-based credit rating agencies for their assessments of the risk raised from a wide range of entities, including sovereign states, corporations, and the securities and securitisations they issue. Recent research from multiple disciplines shows how a dramatic increase in investor demand for ratings since the early 1980s, combined with internal constraints on governments and corporations to secure low interest rates, has inadvertently bestowed rating agencies with the power to circumscribe both the policy decisions of elected representatives and the strategic decisions of corporate leaders. Analyses of the criteria on which rating agencies base their assessments of the likelihood of future default expose the divergence between investor interests and two core components of liberal orthodoxy: democratic sovereignty and free market competition.