This article re-examines Transatlantic popular responses to the American Civil War, using the underexplored pro-Confederate movement in the metal-producing town of Sheffield. Export interests to the Southern states were central to the Sheffield movement, which spanned society, incorporating eminent figures, various manufacturers, and acquiring popular appeal. This article advances historiography on British pro-Confederacy, transcending debates around cotton imports, to instead examine the producer-side politics of inland manufacturing districts. It unearths rich socio-cultural connections between industrial Britain and the US South, revealing how complex Transatlantic attitudes to race and slavery influenced provincial economy and society beyond British emancipation in 1838.
This article provides the first comprehensive study of the role played by July 4th in the long history of US-UK relations, with a particular focus on the period 1776 to 1976. It begins by briefly considering how Britons received the news of American independence back in 1776 before then shifting focus to a key moment of diplomatic shift –the so-called Anglo-American ‘rapprochement’ of the period c.1890-1920. In the second section, the article turnsattention to how exactly July 4th has been actively ‘used’ by and within Anglo-American memory diplomacy, from the First World War through to the era of the special relationship (that is, the period c.1945 onwards). By drawing on a diverse source base, including press coverage, cultural ephemera, and anniversary commemorations, this article shows how transatlantic memory diplomats have reimagined July 4th – downplaying transatlantic division and emphasising instead themes of Anglo-American comradeship and connection. The article concludes by pondering what this all means for the Semiquincentennial and beyond.
Mixed signals by the West (the USA and its NATO allies) provided encouragement for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The charge that the invasion was a case of failed deterrence thus has some merit. Russia was already predisposed to attack its neighbour but acting on that predisposition was eased by a calculation in Moscow that the chance of Russia being punished for its act of transgression was low. Ambiguous, or mixed, signals are more likely to be discounted than heeded by a potential aggressor. Other than in very circumscribed circumstances (for instance, the conditions that might trigger nuclear use), ambiguity has limited benefit. It suggests a lack of commitment, undermines the credibility of defence alliances and partnerships, and encourages malfeasance. Ultimately, it exposes a vulnerable state to a higher level of danger. These were the features of the road to ruin that led to Russian aggression. The problems of mixed signals have an ongoing relevance to the effectiveness of Western policy when squaring up to Russia over Ukraine and to China in the Asia–Pacific.
This paper provides an analysis of the transition of American statecraft away from the “exemplarist” statecraft of the Founders’ era of United States’ foreign policy towards the “progressive imperialism” of the late nineteenth century. It identifies the consolidation of the power of the federal government and westward expansion at the expense of both Native Americans and the territorial claims of number of European powers as major contributing factors in the development of “vindicationist” forms of statecraft that posited crucial linkages between domestic political and economic stability, and geopolitical dynamics beyond the Western hemisphere. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the ascent of such “vindicationism” embedded the notion in elite discourse that American prosperity and national security required that it be actively engaged in core regions of the globe.
