
Over the past ten years, Western defence analysts have assumed that, in any hypothetical war, Russia would be substantially, if not entirely, a sanctuary from NATO operations and even attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has challenged this assumption for two main reasons: it is implausible to defend one’s country effectively without striking into the enemy’s territory; and Ukraine has successfully struck and even invaded Russia without provoking nuclear escalation. Western hesitation toward hypothetical strikes on Russia is increasingly strained under these pressures, yet little dedicated analysis has emerged to evaluate the consequences of granting or denying Russia sanctuary. The article first explores the concept of sanctuary as such and the modern literature that implicitly or explicitly assumes Russia would be a sanctuary in case of war. Second, it discusses the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine’s campaign against Russia itself and, implicitly, Western hesitations about targeting Russia. Finally, it engages with the various military, strategic, and political considerations of extending or not extending sanctuary to Russia.
Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine was a wake-up call for the entire international community and, in particular, for NATO Alliance. It became obvious that Europe is no longer at peace, and that serious steps should be taken by the Transatlantic collective defence Alliance. NATO intensified the adaptation of its deterrence and defence posture. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit marked a major shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and it was agreed to transition from defence by reinforcement to forward defence. The article discusses the concept of forward defence, its historical evolution and its practical implementation by NATO. It evaluates forward defence in relation to defence and deterrence strategies that existed during the Cold War and how they have changed over the time. It examines how forward defence contributes to the doctrinal conventional deterrence and defence principles and indicates major changes in collective defence. It debates whether and how NATO is experiencing a real paradigm shift in its doctrinal deterrence and defence perception and how forward defence can help ensure that every inch of the Allied territory is defended.
This article argues that U.S. foreign and security policy is increasingly intertwined with the promotion of U.S. arms transfers (sales), thereby reflecting an enhanced geoeconomic orientation. Yet how effectively has the United States pursued this strategy among EU countries? Has this geoeconomic dimension been systematically incorporated in transatlantic security cooperation? To answer these questions, the study analyzes EU member states’ post-2000 procurement patterns in terms of the relative weight of U.S.-sourced heavy weapons in their orders. The analysis provides preliminary but systematic and consistent evidence showing a positive association between U.S. geoeconomic orientation and a higher share of European acquisitions of U.S. arms – an association that is stronger within the EU–NATO subset. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to examine such a geoeconomic linkage in the transatlantic context.
The current geopolitical changes and the dedication to regional safety have drawn researchers’ attention towards discussion on the multiple aspects of new residents’ integration. Ensuring that new members of society are welcomed has been of significant scientific and political interest in sustaining coherent and resilient communities. This discussion also extends to the well-being of soldiers and their families when relocating due to deployment. Since deployment locations vary, the state of scientific knowledge highlights the need to investigate the integration of soldiers and military-related families within the specific contexts of individual states. Accordingly, this study examines the case of Lithuania, with a focus on the socio-legal factors influencing the integration of military-related families. The research is based on a thematic analysis of international scientific literature, identifying the main challenges faced by families residing in foreign countries. It also outlines the conditions necessary for the successful integration of military-related families in the Lithuanian context. The findings indicate that: a) in addition to traditional integration programs, special attention must be given to the specific characteristics of military life; b) integration of military-related residents should adopt a family-centred approach that considers the past, present, and future experiences, needs, and aspirations of family members; and c) successful integration requires strong intersectoral cooperation. The practical implications highlight the need for practitioners to pay particular attention to monitoring and managing both the sequence and quality of the integration of foreign soldiers’ families during their residence in the host country.
The aim of this article is to evaluate the tenure of Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, through the lens of successes and failures on the international stage with selected countries. From a research perspective, Landsbergis’s term at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be analyzed in the context of continuity and change within Lithuanian foreign policy, framed by the neo-idealism approach. This analysis revealed that despite the lack of strategic guidelines for Lithuania’s foreign policy, it was perceived by external stakeholders as relatively predictable and values-driven, particularly with regard to specific actions taken by the Lithuanian government towards China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Taiwan.