This article offers the first systematic philological reconstruction of the sources underlying John Picard of Lichtenberg’s Quaestiones, newly available through 2025 critical edition. Traditionally regarded as an early representative of Thomism in the German Dominican milieu, Picard emerges here as a thinker deeply embedded in a wider transnational scholastic network. By comparing Picard’s text with works by Albert the Great, John of Paris, William Peter of Godin, Godfrey of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis, James of Viterbo, and the Oxford master of arts John Dymsdale, the study reveals previously unnoticed literal correspondences and shared argumentative structures. These findings rethink the long-standing narrative of a distinctly German philosophical Sonderweg, showing that medieval intellectual life in Cologne was shaped by dynamic exchanges with Parisian and Oxonian debates. Picard’s Quaestiones thus exemplify a microhistorical case whose ‘exceptional normality’ illuminates the broader patterns of medieval scholastic culture.
This article brings to light a complex ‘dynamic of errors’ which Albert, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physica, uses to elaborate on the problem of the void. In his analysis, the Dominican philosopher addresses issues such as the void’s definition, its existence, or its relationship to motion, while stating his own position on the matter, which heavily relies on Aristotle. Albert argues that the errors made by certain pre-Socratic philosophers (in particular, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Xuthus, and Pythagoras) contributed to the formation of flawed doctrines in the Middle Ages, such as that of Avempace (alongside whom Albert mistakenly places Avicenna). By identifying and exposing ‘errors’ Albert creates a valuable vantage point to address the problem of the void, whilst emphasizing the significant role played by pre-Socratic thinkers in the emergence and evolution of scientific discourse on the issue.
This paper analyzes the concluding book of Thomas of York’s Sapientiale, within the framework of the ongoing critical edition project. The complex relationships between manuscripts F, R, and V reveal an in fieri editorial situation and constant authorial revision. Drawing on textual and paratextual evidence, the study confirms the stemma proposed by Fiorella Retucci and Antonio Punzi and offers an integrative interpretation of the work. The paper shows that the editorial shifts reflect a deep doctrinal reconsideration of the project, grounded in the maturation of the distinction between ens in generali and ens in speciali. This distinction is key to the inclusion and ordering of the final arguments, such as cosmology, celestial intelligences, and the soul. Finally, on the basis of the structure of manuscript V, the study supports the hypothesis that the correct numbering of the concluding book was originally the sixth rather than the seventh.
By examining Francisco Suárez’s writings on prudence, this article challenges interpretations that align his conception with early modern, politically oriented notions of prudence. According to this interpretation, prudence would be considered as a skill related to the political life, a practical wisdom that primarily relates to the sphere of human action, connected to justice. Focusing on three moral treatises (De voluntario et involuntario in genere, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum and De actibus, qui vocantur passiones), this paper argues instead that Suárez understands prudence in continuity with 13th- and 14th-century scholastic thought, especially Thomas Aquinas. Prudentia is in fact conceived by Suárez as a cardinal and intellectual virtue, a connecting principle between the other virtues, an indispensable basis for good action, supported by the action of grace. Although concerned with the circumstances of active life, prudence ultimately remains ordered to wisdom (sapientia) and oriented toward the contemplative life.
Drawing on an analysis of the semantic ambiguities of pity and the pitiful, this paper seeks to highlight the tensions inherent in the concept as it appears in Rousseau’s work. The sentiment that inclines one to assist the destitute, akin to the Christian virtue of charity, cannot easily be transposed into terms of obligation. Furthermore, active beneficence presupposes the power of the helper and is therefore incompatible with the equality of beings that compassionate identification expresses. Finally, when pity takes the form of distributive justice, it distinguishes among those to whom it is addressed according to ambivalent criteria. The hypothesis is thus advanced of a rupture with the logic of pity in favour of equality of rights. Following Wollstonecraft (and opposing Rousseau), such a rupture with respect to women’s rights entails a critique of the contempt inherent in pity, as well as an adherence to an ideal of independence which is not without its own difficulties.
