Abstract Why do ancient authors differ so markedly in the number of principles they ascribe to Plato? This article surveys ancient Platonist and Pythagorean accounts that posit anywhere from six principles down to one. It proposes three progressively stricter criteria for the term ‘principle’ and maps these onto the ancient testimonies. In so doing, it reconstructs the argumentative choices that drove the reduction in the number of principles. The study also brings to light a range of underexplored texts and authors whose formulations of the first principle’s superordination helped narrow the term ‘principle’ and thus propel the shift towards the Neoplatonic doctrine of a single first principle.
In letter 120, Seneca tells Lucilius that we gain our concept of the good through analogia. Earlier Stoic texts describe analogia as a mental operation of conceptual magnification. However, some scholars, particularly Brad Inwood, have marshalled evidence from Cicero against interpreting analogia as conceptual magnification. Although scholars more recently have noted that conceptual magnification is the most likely reading of analogia, Inwood's argument has not been adequately answered, and the implications on reading letter 120 of interpreting analogia as conceptual magnification have not been fully appreciated. In this article, I aim to show how Inwood's argument may be answered through an accurate circumscription of analogia's scope and its application in letter 120. On the reading proposed here, analogia turns out to be, contrary to the judgment of previous scholars, a rather mundane and reasonable way of conceptualizing virtue. Furthermore, Seneca uses an additional conceptual operation in letter 120: contrariety. These two conceptual operations are also at play in Seneca's exempla in letter 24.
This paper defends the Pyrrhonian skeptic against the objection that, because she lives entirely without belief (adoxast & omacr;s) in pursuit of psychic tranquility (ataraxia), she is unable or unlikely to act ethically, particularly in unjust sociopolitical contexts. This objection takes the form of three connected charges: (1) the skeptic lacks the moral psychological resources needed to deliberate and act as an ethical agent ought; (2) even if in principle she has these resources, she is likely to just perform whatever action causes the least psychic disturbance regardless of whether it is morally objectionable; and (3) in order to engage in decision-making procedures that would result in ethical action, she would need to hold some beliefs, thus rendering her adoxast & omacr;s Skeptic Way inconsistent. This paper refutes these charges by arguing that the Pyrrhonist is not wholly without moral psychological resources needed for acting ethically by illuminating the role that preferences and desires (i.e., "pro-attitudes") play in her decision-making procedures and showing that these attitudes are distinct enough from belief to preserve her adoxast & omacr;s Skeptic Way, while also being stable and persistent enough to guide her actions in a way that is both reliable and predictable. I demonstrate that the kind of states of affairs the Pyrrhonist's pro-attitudes are likely to be reliably directed toward are those that orient her toward morally praiseworthy actions and away from conformism in unjust sociopolitical contexts. Indeed, I argue she might even be more likely to act ethically in some sociopolitical contexts than her dogmatic peers, whether these be philosophical dogmatists or ordinary people. Consequently, I assert that the Pyrrhonist can be a robust - though certainly atypical - moral agent whose preferences and desires give us reason to be cautiously optimistic about viewing at least some elements of her philosophical way of life as morally praiseworthy.
This paper argues that Socrates' refutation of the Dream Theory amounts to an accusation of Protagoreanism and it defends the aptness of this refutation. It also argues that grammatik & emacr;, which scholars suggest is the model for an improved version of the Dream Theory, fails to survive Socrates' refutation of the original. Though not as disastrously Protagorean, an epistemology of grammatik & emacr; is as inappropriate for human beings as the Dream Theory.
This paper presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle's negative definitions of recollection (alpha nu alpha mu nu eta sigma iota sigma) in De memoria et reminiscentia 2 (451a18-452a4), arguing that his apophatic method critiques Plato's core definitional claims rather than merely setting up the positive definition of recollection as a simile reasoning process (453a9-12). By reconstructing the dialectical structure of this first part of the chapter, I highlight that Aristotle's remarks mirror Plato's statements in negative form, revealing his polemical intent. This reading leads to three key conclusions: first, it deepens our understanding of Plato's influence in De memoria; second, it shows that Aristotle rejects Plato's recollection definition as inadequate for explaining the recovery of past contents (Philebus 34b-c; Meno 81d); and third, it highlights the philosophical significance of Aristotle's theory, which focuses on the unique recovery functions of recollection. Thus, De memoria 2 should be seen as Aristotle's physiological response to Plato's theory and a continuation of his epistemological critique of Analytics.
