In this paper, it will be examinated addresses the paradox of modes that exist although they do not exist, which has its central place in Baruch Spinoza's Ethics II, p. 8. It will be argued that argues that there is no ambiguity of the proposition, even if it could sound undecidable from an historical-philosophical point of view, due to the lack of an explicit theory of distinctions. Thus, the problem of non-existent modes will be theoretically framed in relation to the eternal status of substance by showing that: 1) there is no contradiction in thinking something that does not exist;; 2) starting from the definition of God, all modes must necessarily give themselves and their non-existence is implied in the definition of God itself;; 3) the problem under consideration concerns rather the constitutive allusiveness of every image regarding God's eternal actuality and its infinite production.
Leopardi and Distraction: a Pascalian Heritage? This article aims to pre- sent the phenomenon of distraction (or divertissement) by comparing the perspectives of two classics of thought: Pascal and Leopardi. What does it mean to be distracted? How can this be done? What relationship does distraction have with human nature and with the theoretical apparatus of the two thinkers considered? To answer these ques- tions, the author puts into dialogue Pascal and Leopardi and the most relevant contem- porary critical voices on the topic, highlighting similarities and disagreements between the two modern intellectuals and trying to seize their main elements of originality.
