In the Asia and Pacific region, national and large city governments have provided most family planning, family health, and family welfare services since the early 1950s. The leading reason for government involvement continues to be that governments have adequate resources to set up and administer large enough family planning programs to achieve government objectives of lower fertility and slower population growth. Many of these government programs have indeed increased contraceptive use, reduced population growth, and decreased fertility. On the other hand, these programs often use coercive tactics to persuade couples to accept family planning. Other negative parts of these programs are inadequate monitoring, slow to improve service quality, limited contraceptive choices, improper service provision, inadequate information for and counseling of clients, and inadequate follow up of acceptors. Some reasons for these negative aspects are insufficient resources, too much emphasis on new acceptor recruitment, lack of recognition of the importance of continuing contraceptive prevalence, and too little emphasis on client satisfaction. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also helped in the evolution of family planning, family health, and family welfare services in the Asia and Pacific regions. They have provided policy and programmatic innovations serving as new models to governments. NGOs can take the political heat off of political leaders who are anxious about those who resist family planning. NGOs tend to provide a broader mix of contraceptive services than do government programs. Increased use of working groups and expansion of operations research on NGO programs can strengthen collaboration between governments and NGOs. The working groups with specialists from government and NGOs could examine service delivery problems and propose solutions.
This paper examines the conceptual and practical issues involved in bringing the fields of population and environment closer together, and how these issues impact upon development planning. Although the international community's interest in environment and demography -- 2 areas closely intertwined -- continues to grow, they remain separated, viewed as distinct and specialized disciplines. The paper first discusses the separation between the 2 fields, explaining that it is the result of 3 types of imbalances: conceptual, organizational, and power. The essay then proposes 5 factors that can be used to develop population-environmental linkages. These include: developing conceptual models that reveal the interrelationships; taking an integrated approach for collecting environmental, population, and development data; encouraging local officials to monitor and act upon their findings of population and environmental situations; and garnering the political support needed to establish a decentralized, multi-sectoral development approach. The paper goes on to consider a conceptual framework for understanding the interrelated transitions between population and environment. These include demographic, epidemiologic, agricultural, forestry, toxicity, urbanization, and fossil fuel transitions. The paper points out the similarities of these transition -- among them, the fact during these periods society is especially vulnerable. Having considered the policy implications of a transition theory, the paper concludes by proposing a multi-method, decentralized, and comprehensive approach to development planning.
The relationship between migration and development in the ESCAP region including southeast and south Asian countries and the Pacific island of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Samoa, and the Solomon Islands is discussed in terms of mobility transition and origin and destination factors. The changing patterns of mobility in Asia are further delineated in the discussion of internal movements and international movement. Emigration in the smaller countries of the Pacific are treated separately. Future predictions are that the Asia Pacific region will experience continued fertility decline and stabilization of low rates over the next 20 years. The declines will result in slow labor force growth, and increased demand for labor in traditional core and neocore countries as defined and presented in table form by Friedman will be heightened. International movements are likely to increase in large urban areas within destination countries. Tokyo and Singapore are the principal cities in Asia. Tokyo by restrictive government policy has limited immigration, but future labor shortages of unskilled labor from southeast Asia and China are expected. Singapore is already dependent on foreign labor by 10%. Current labor shortages have led to the creation of a growth triangle between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Other cities expected to emerge as primary cities in international regional complexes with spillover into the hinterlands include the Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Macau triangle in the Pearl River delta, Taipei and Seoul, and possibly Kuala Lumpur. Internal migration is expected to increase in the capital cities of Bangkok, Manila,j and centers such as Shanghai, Beijing, and other large cities of southeast Asia. These cities will be linked through the flows of skilled international migrants, which began in the 1960s and is expected to become a future major flow. Recreational and resource niches will be left in much of the Pacific, the Himalayan Kingdoms, and mountainous regions of northern southeast Asia and western China. Flows will be regulated by national government policy. Difficult decisions will be made on the extent to which multinational corporations and banks are sanctioned or regulated, i.e., currently Hong Kong development is company directed within the law governing power, transport, housing, and land, while in Singapore development is government planned and directed.
Fertility trends and prospects for east and southeast Asian countries including cities in China, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Viet Nam are described. Additional discussion focuses on family planning methods, marriage patterns, fertility prospects, theories of fertility change, and policy implications for the labor supply, labor migrants, increased female participation in the labor force (LFP), human resource development, and social policy measures. Figures provide graphic descriptions of total fertility rates (TFRS) for 12 countries/areas for selected years between 1960-90, TFR for selected Chinese cities between 1955-90, the % of currently married women 15-44 years using contraception by main method for selected years and for 10 countries, actual and projected TFR and annual growth rates between 1990-2020 for Korea and Indonesia. It is noted that the 1st southeast Asian country to experience a revolution in reproductive behavior was Japan with below replacement level fertility by 1960. This was accomplished by massive postponement in age at marriage and rapid reduction in marital fertility. Fertility was controlled primarily through abortion. Thereafter every southeast Asian country experienced fertility declines. Hong Kong, Penang, Shanghai, Singapore, and Taipei and declining fertility before the major thrust of family planning (FP). Chinese fertility declines were reflected in the 1970s to the early 1980s and paralleled the longer, later, fewer campaign and policy which set ambitious targets which were strictly enforced at all levels of administration. Korea and Taiwan's declines were a result of individual decision making to restrict fertility which was encouraged by private and government programs to provide FP information and subsidized services. The context was social and economic change. Indonesia's almost replacement level fertility was achieved dramatically through the 1970s and 1980s by institutional change in ideas about families and schooling and material welfare, changes in the structure of governance, and changes in state ideology. Thailand's decline began in the 1960s and is attributed to social change, change in cultural setting, demand, and FP efforts. Modest declines characterize Malaysia and the Philippines, which have been surpassed by Myanmar and Viet Nam. The policy implications are that there are shortages in labor supply which can be remedied with labor migration, pronatalist policy, more capital intensive industries, and preparation for a changing economy.
In developing countries, infant and child mortality affect fertility through biological or involuntary mechanisms operating through shortened breastfeeding, and more rapid return of ovulation following upon an infant death. Fertility is also affected through volitional responses of couples to perceived mortality levels in the community (insurance effect) or experience of earlier child loss (replacement effect) as well as through societal responses to high probability of child loss. In return, fertility affects infant and child mortality through birth to very young mothers, due to physiological immaturity of teenaged mothers and low birth-weight, as well as through birth to old mothers in high birth orders, due to maternal depletion syndrome. Trussel and Pebley estimated that the elimination of 4th and higher order births, along with the limitation of reproduction within the age of 20 to 34 years old, would reduce infant mortality by about 12%. A large number of studies show strong evidence that the timing and spacing of birth have a significant impact on both maternal and child health. According to Maine and McNamara (1985), who analysed data from 25 developing countries, if all children were born 2 years apart, 1/5 of infant deaths could be avoided. Mother's ill-health, maternal mortality, mother's malnutrition and its consequences in low quality breast milk and short breastfeeding, reduce sharply the new child's chances of survival. Many of these adverse biological and physiological conditions for childbearing can be compensated for by the provision of health care of high quality, including family planning, as well as education and good nutritional status of the mother and her children. Unfortunately, in many societies and for large segments of the population, such conditions are still a dream.
