
5 As they insert themselves into the realm of politics, the new information and communications technologies [ICT] are not only qualitatively altering old concepts, attitudes, and stereotypes in the area of political communications but are also altering many forms of behavior and models of relationships between political institutions and individuals. Electronic democracy 10 is any democratic political system in which ICT are used to perform the most important functions of the democratic process as well as to explore the public’s interests and adopt decisions. Electronic democracy is associated with the use of ICT to support democratic processes, adopt political decisions, to broadly involve citizens in these processes, and to strengthen 15 representative democracy. The major mechanisms through which ICT can support electronic democracy are access to the Internet through various channels (home internet and/or access to the web in public places), mobile phones, and interactive (formerly cable, now digital) television. The concept of electro20 nic/digital democracy rethinks the structure of communications between “the people and the government”; it is considered not merely a new stage in the development of democratic institutions that is capable of giving citizens the ability to interact conveniently with government bodies but also a way to reframe the issue of democracy. 25 According to the Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in February 2009, electronic democracy encompasses a variety of concepts: e-parliament, e-legislation, e-justice, e-mediation, e-initiative, e-elections, e-referendum, e-voting, e-consultation, e-petitioning, e-campaigning, e-polling, and e-surveying.
Social anxiety among the population can be viewed in the context of its social security, that is, the subjective sense that the most important features of the constantly changing environment are safe. Existing studies of these topics, as a rule, focus on macrophenomena, on the national and global levels. In other words, what is usually at issue is the social anxiety of the citizens of a country or group of countries. The case of organizing and holding the 2018 World Cup in a relatively small Russian regional center—Saransk, the capital of the Republic of Mordovia—makes it possible to explore this aspect at the local level of a specific city. A large-scale sports event does not merely affect the day-today life of a city’s residents, which is typical of megapolises as well, but also changes it in significant ways by making it follow the event’s own laws. During the several years that precede the Cup, daily life is largely driven by preparations for the event. The expectations and inner stresses felt by the residents of Saransk may differ in content and degree of manifestation from the feelings and emotions of the inhabitants of other, larger cities that organized the Cup. Unlike them, the Mordovian capital had not had experience holding events on a comparable scale—it had never had such scrutiny from the international community. All this caused the city’s residents to worry about how safe the arrangement of the mega sports event would be and whether the established plan would be successfully implemented. During the days when the matches took place, Saransk attracted large numbers of Russian and foreign fans, amounting at times to more than 13 percent of the city’s population. Such episodic migration disrupts the stability of the social world of the city’s residents. The urban environment
Projects to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the lifting of the Siege of Leningrad have predictably given rise to a wave of public debates about the history of the siege: its significance for the city’s and country’s history, the correspondence of existing memory to the scale of the tragedy, and the adequacy of the state’s practices to commemorate it. One of the main characteristics of contemporary conversations about the siege is their discursiveness—a common genre characteristic that sets most publications in the press and media apart. All the initiatives and artistic statements in memory of the blockade have been the subject of protracted and often difficult debate. As an example, here are some excerpts from articles on the new museum devoted to the siege, which was only recently planned for construction in St. Petersburg: “Debates surrounding the new Siege of Leningrad museum spur discussions about how we remember those 900 terrifying days”; “Debates about the new museum on Smolnaia Embankment continue”; and “Siege survivors ask that money not be spent on a new museum.” Amid “public muteness,” discussion of the siege became a trope for public debates, engaging and disengaging participants to an equal degree. Members of different social groups, generations, and professions became involved in conversations about how the siege should be remembered. In this essay, I would like to look at the rhetorical models used in the debates over siege memory and the arguments participants use to justify their various positions. Making a conscious effort to remove myself from these discussions,
The measurement and analysis of the trendlines and structure of people ’ s opinions on socioeconomic issues (family income and consumption, the labor-market situation, individual business opportunities
In November 2014 one of the organizers of the Russian March, Dmitrii Demushkin, announced that the movement had collapsed, and in November 2018 this was confirmed by the Russian nationalist Egor Kholmogorov, who lamented that the movement was not fated to celebrate its fifteenth anniversary. Why did the movement that was launched with great enthusiasm in 2005, in hopes that a “Russian spring” would soon follow, end in failure? How did it emerge? What were its tenets, and what goals did it set? What was the makeup of its participants, what was their attitude toward the Russian government, and what kind of future were they preparing for Russia? Why was there no unity in the movement, why was it plagued by schisms, and what caused it to decline after 2013? All these questions are quite timely since, first, they directly pertain to the specific features of contemporary Russian nationalism and the prospects for its further development, and second, they enable a discussion of the assessment of the march by experts—from “a respectable conservative movement,” according to rightwing ideologues, to “a brownshirt march” in the eyes of liberals, leftists, and human-rights advocates. To understand the atmosphere in which the Russian March originated, we must take a look at what the year 2005 was like for Russia. On the one hand, the second war in Chechnya had concluded by then, and thanks to a successful upsurge in the oil and gas sector, Russia had begun to emerge from the financial and economic crisis of the late 1990s, and the living standard of its population had begun gradually to improve. On the other, the end of the Chechen war was marred by a horrible terrorist attack in Beslan (in the Republic of North Ossetia—Alania) on September 1, 2004, and the development of the raw-material economy was accompanied by an aggressive government policy toward business (the “Yukos affair”). The start of President Vladimir Putin’s second term was marked by