The purpose of this bibliography, curated by Noam Ebner and archived by the National Center for Technology and Dispute Resolution, is to provide a comprehensive listing of publications on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) that focus on Artificial Intelligence and its use in anticipating, preventing, engaging, and resolving disputes. Each type of publication appears according to year of publication (in reverse order), and alphabetically (by the last name of the first author). Links have been provided when possible, with preference given to links to full-text versions of the articles. The bibliography is updated at least once a year. The most recent update was in February, 2026. The full ODR bibliography, encompassing a wider spectrum of papers unrelated to AI, can be found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5021688
We study how generative AI, and in particular agentic AI, shapes human learning incentives and the long-run evolution of society’s information ecosystem. We build a dynamic model of learning and decision-making in which successful decisions require combining shared, community-level general knowledge with individual-level, context-specific knowledge; these two inputs are complements. Learning exhibits economies of scope: costly human effort jointly produces a private signal about their own context and a “thin” public signal that accumulates into the community’s stock of general knowledge, generating a learning externality. Agentic AI delivers context-specific recommendations that substitute for human effort. By contrast, a richer stock of general knowledge complements human effort by raising its marginal return. The model highlights a sharp dynamic tension: while agentic AI can improve contemporaneous decision quality, it can also erode learning incentives that sustain long-run collective knowledge. When human effort is sufficiently elastic and agentic recommendations exceed an accuracy threshold, the economy can tip into a knowledge-collapse steady state in which general knowledge vanishes ultimately, despite high-quality personalized advice. Welfare is generally non-monotone in agentic accuracy, implying an interior, welfare-maximizing level of agentic precision and motivating information-design regulations. In contrast, greater aggregation capacity for general knowledge—meaning more effective sharing and pooling of human-generated general knowledge—unambiguously raises welfare and increases resilience to knowledge collapse. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
Not very. To answer this question, we conjecture that households might be non-Ricardian because they do not have rational expectations over their future tax burden. From this assumption, we derive a behavioral consumption function, where households act as if bonds are net wealth, and consume out of taxes and transfers. The coefficient on taxes is determined by the attenuation present in households' behavioral expectations. This consumption function also nests other causes of non-Ricardianism, including liquidity constraints and overlapping generations. To estimate the coefficient, we derive a Bayesian limited information method that uses a large number of macroeconomic shocks from the literature as instrumental variables. We find that households internalize only 1/5 of their future taxes. In a general equilibrium model, this low value implies that public borrowing substantially crowds out private investment.
In this Article I provide an account of the conceptual and doctrinal structure of insurance law, defining "structure" as the consistent arrangement and organization of the interrelated elements of this body of law. I contend that insurance law consists of three types of rules, defined by their scope of application. General rules apply to all forms of insurance. Category rules apply only to particular classes of insurance, such as liability or property insurance. Special rules apply to only one form of insurance, such as crop or flood insurance. In addition, insurance law consists of both mandatory rules, which may not be displaced by policy language, and default rules, that can be displaced. The Article also examines the ways in which the major treatises and casebooks present insurance law, showing that, interestingly, the casebook presentations do not follow and are not congruent with the structure of insurance law that the Article describes. I explain why the casebooks do not and could not effectively present insurance law in a manner that is purposely congruent with the structure of insurance law. Finally, the Article makes a series of observations about the significance of the very idea that a body of common law, such as insurance law, can have a coherent structure as I have defined that notion.
