
On the basis of medical anthropological literature and the feminist critique around Freudian theory of hysteria, we here consider the concepts of embodiment, agency and crisis of presence as guiding principles for a contextsensitive understanding of dysfunctional behaviours as means of communication within the study of symbolic systems. With an interdisciplinary and comparativeapproach, the Dora case is represented next to an ethnographic case where mass hysteria was medically diagnosed over spirit possession seizures in Malay Western factories. We explore the status of dysfunctional behaviours as bodily signs, invested with cultural meanings representing social distress, gender inequality and structural violence. The ideas of Mary Douglas and Kurt Danziger,Jacques Lacan, Thomas Szasz and Ludwig Binswanger are here combined to outline a semiology of behaviours able to account for the phenomenological reality, inside and outside of the clinic, of a social body enacting as living metaphor.
According to the Kalam cosmological argument, the universe began to exist and therefore requires God as an initial cause. Here, the universe is the causally interrelated physical whole that we inhabit. In this paper, a past-infinite metaphysics is proposed that is based on five successively derived a priori principles: A) non-isolating physical plenitude, B) hierarchical hyperspacetimes, C) cosmological natural selection, D) cosmological evolutionary conservation, and E) anti-empiricism. Three argument routes to counter the claim that the universe began to exist are distilled from an analysis of this metaphysics: I) in a plenitude P with a beginning B, it is always possible to conceive of a plenitude P’ that has some events that happen before B; II) hierarchical hyperspacetimescombined with cosmological natural selection assert that every hyperspacetime reproduces in a larger and older hyperspacetime with more spatial dimensions, which results in an infinite regress into the past; and III) the infinite reality of higher-dimensional, physical life that came before our observable big bang remains undetectable due to cosmological evolutionary conservation. The focus of the paper is both on the Kalam argument and on the far-reaching consequences of the metaphysics that refutes it.
While empathy is regularly seen as an integral aspect of any meaningful humanistic counseling and psychotherapy, the actual meanings attached to the concept vary widely. Such variance leads to different modalities of application of empathy in the humanistic helping professions, including psychotherapy. This paper discusses how far empathy actually involves the feeling of another’s feelings and what conditions and limitations apply to its role in the counseling process. Two central ideas are developed. First, empathy is predicated upon suffering and commiseration: the assumption of pain and deprivation is internal to the very concept of empathy, and Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will provides the strongest account of why this is so. Second, empathy as a way of relating to another’s suffering is constitutive of the only morally justified community, namely the healing organic community. It is our capacity to cross-identify with other members through shared suffering thatcreates lasting, resilient communities. The paper concludes that any organic community is by nature therapeutic, and that much of what psychotherapy does is recreate the mechanisms of empathy and human care that were the foundation of pre-institutional human society.
In his 1843 essay, On the Jewish Question, Marx argues in favor of Jewish political emancipation. However, this entails freedom in a merely negative sense only – the absence of official discrimination before the law. The question thus remains: What of full human emancipation? Is Marx’s positive conception of freedom, based on rational enlightenment and universal solidarity,compatible with continued Jewish identity? This article maintains that it depends entirely on how one employs the word ‘Judaism.’ For his part, Marx already drew a critical distinction between what he called (1) ‘practical Judaism’ and (2) ‘pious’ Judaism. The former signifies the perceived role of Jewish people in the modern economy, while the latter refers to Jewish spiritual beliefs andrituals. To this list we add two further designations: (3) ‘popular Judaism’ and (4) ‘political Judaism.’ These denote, respectively, Jewish cultural expressions which are non-religious (such as secular Yiddish theater), and projects of Jewish national autonomy (notably Bundism and Zionism). This article will argue that ‘popular Judaism,’ in particular, is entirely consistent with full, human emancipation on the Marxist model.
Cognitive science of religion does not tell us whether we are justified in believing that God exists or does not exist. Consequently, cognitive science of religion neither rationally compels us to believe or to disbelieve in God. Under such epistemic circumstances, the English notion of rationality implies that it is rational for theists to believe in God and for atheists to disbelieve in God.