In purely capitalist countries, governments rarely operate businesses, whereas in several developing and socialist economies, both public and private sector participants regularly engage in commercial activities. While governments can participate in various industrial, commercial, or investment activities, such activities can distort the marketplace and tilt the level playing field. While the issues surrounding government-run state trading enterprises that are involved in export and import activities have been a subject of disciplines since GATT 1947, recent free trade agreements take a more holistic approach in regulating the role of the State. Newer trade agreements explicitly incorporate competitive neutrality through enhanced disciplines on state-owned enterprises, subsidies, and competition. The goal is to ensure that no business gains an advantage on account of its relationship with the State. The article identifies the core tenets of the competitive neutrality principle and outlines how it is administered across comprehensive free trade agreements.
The role of antitrust law in prohibiting anticompetitive behaviour and promoting market competition has been well explored in the literature. Experiences of the leading economies in the world suggest that the antitrust laws in many countries have been successful in limiting monopolistic behaviour and fostering market competition. In India, the Competition Act (2002) broadly aims at prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance along with regulating combinations. However, while the Competition Act (2002) replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969), the subsequent changes in market dynamics, firms’ strategic behaviour and their implications for market competition and protection of consumers require deeper scrutiny. In particular, with the deepening of reforms in policies and regulations relating to trade, innovation and investment during the post-reform period, it is necessary to understand firms’ strategic responses to the Competition Act (2002) and their implications for market structure. In this context, this paper critically examines the theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence relating to the implications of the Competition Act (2002) for the structure of different markets in the Indian manufacturing sector, given the complex trade–innovation–investment–competition interface.
Margin squeeze has long been recognised as a potential form of exclusionary conduct under competition law. Traditionally associated with network industries such as telecommunications, the doctrine has generated extensive scholarship concerning its relationship with refusal to deal, predatory pricing and vertical foreclosure. The growing prominence of digital platforms has renewed interest in margin squeeze as these platforms control essential points of access for business users while competing with them in downstream markets. While the doctrine has been extensively analysed in the United States and the European Union, its development in emerging competition-law regimes such as India has received comparatively limited scholarly attention. This paper examines that, in the absence of a free-standing margin-squeeze offence under the Indian Competition Act, such allegations were assessed through unfair conditions, denial of market access and leveraging. It argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in CCI v. Schott Glass India (2025) provides the first coherent doctrinal framework and guiding principles for assessing margin squeeze in India.
The last decade has witnessed a changing scene of exclusionary abuse cases. As a result, competition authorities around the globe are now investigating new forms of exclusionary abuse in fast-evolving markets. These changes inevitably affect our understanding of the harm caused by exclusionary conduct and how redress is sought. Although there are many academic and practitioner papers on estimating damages in cartel and excessive pricing cases, they have limited applicability to exclusionary cases. This paper provides an overview of the main considerations that should apply in damage quantification in exclusionary abuse cases. We do this by giving a detailed account of the main characteristics of damage claims in these cases, reviewing the theories of harm and, building on these theories, discussing possible counterfactuals and methods for estimating the magnitude of harm.
This paper examines an antitrust dispute in the mobile gaming sector: Epic Games’ “Project Liberty” challenge to app store restrictions and mandatory in-app payment systems for its game Fortnite. Claims were brought against both Google and Apple in two very similar cases that, despite their parallels, produced completely different outcomes in the U.S. courts. The paper further highlights the contrasting logic of the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), which establishes proactive obligations for gatekeepers to prevent harm before it occurs. The analysis demonstrates how similar cases may produce divergent results depending on the interaction between ecosystem architecture (closed vs. contractually restricted) and whether they are adjudicated by judges, juries, or proactive regulators. Building on these observations, it contributes to the antitrust debate by examining which model most effectively ensures fairness, fosters innovation, and protects consumer welfare in digital markets, considering the perspectives of developers, platform owners, and consumers.
