The grey zone has been at the centre of lively debates since the concept was formalised more than a decade ago. An abundant literature has emerged over that period that has considerably improved our understanding of the "space between war and peace". Yet, grey zone operations have continued to be, in many ways, frustratingly difficult to capture fully and even more difficult to efficiently respond to. This article examines the recent proposal to overlay the grey zone with the 'Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive' (ICAD) framework. It argues that ICAD can fruitfully contribute to a disambiguation of the grey zone, by linking grey zone operations to known sets of behaviours and actions. In doing so, ICAD also facilitates the formulation of potentially more efficient responses, as it allows a more fine-grained identification of the challenges posed by specific grey zone operations and the mobilisation of relevant countervailing approaches.
This study examines how Philippine presidents have rhetorically constructed foreign policy orientations toward the United States and China across nine administrations, from Ferdinand Marcos Sr. to Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (1966-2025). Using Critical Discourse Analysis and content analysis of State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs), the study maps patterns of hawkish and dovish rhetoric toward both powers. It introduces an analytical framework that combines the Hawk-Dove spectrum with [Eysenck, Hans J. 1956. Sense and Nonsense in Psychology. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books.] political spectrum model, as adapted by [Tangonan, Kevin. 2024. "Hawks & Doves: U.S.-DPRK Foreign Policy Speech Analysis and the Perception of the Other." Journal of Global and Area Studies 8 (2): 335-358.], to analyse the relationship between ideological orientation and foreign-policy discourse. Beyond presidential rhetoric, the study examines patterns of reciprocal diplomatic signalling through official U.S. and Chinese statements and embassy communications. The findings reveal that Philippine presidents frequently depart from expected ideological patterns, with liberal and conservative leaders alike adopting both hawkish and dovish rhetorical positions toward China. These results suggest that foreign-policy discourse is shaped less by ideological identity than by leadership style, strategic context, and the highly personalised nature of political leadership in the Philippines. Rather than replacing structural explanations such as hedging, the study complements existing scholarship by demonstrating how foreign-policy orientations are publicly framed, justified, and communicated through presidential discourse.
This article examines how U.S.-China technological competition is reshaping the strategic choices of regional states in the Indo-Pacific, with particular attention to the ways Singapore deploys economic statecraft to navigate great-power rivalry. Existing scholarship has often portrayed small states as passive recipients of economic statecraft, largely constrained by the coercive power of stronger actors. This article challenges that view by arguing that non-great powers can exercise agency through strategic economic action in the technology sector. It shows how Singapore combines active economic diplomacy, domestic mobilisation, and strategic network development to strengthen technological capabilities, reduce vulnerability, and position itself at critical nodes of global supply chains. Drawing on interviews, policy documents, and speeches by Singaporean elites, the article demonstrates that Singapore's economic statecraft is not simply reactive. Rather, it is a pragmatic and adaptive strategy for preserving autonomy, resilience, and relevance in an increasingly fragmented geoeconomic environment. In doing so, the article contributes to the literature on economic statecraft and small and middle powers by showing how non-great powers can use technology-centred strategies to survive and remain influential amid intensifying geopolitical competition.
The geopolitical developments over the last decade in the Indo-Pacific have signalled increasing competition between China and the US, affecting regional security. For the smaller and weaker regional states, especially the members of ASEAN, the growing China-US rivalry is concerning due to the potential for conflict and the rearming of major powers' Southeast Asian military partners. This paper asks how ASEAN manages strategic competition and promotes stability between opposing great powers? Drawing upon the English School of International Relations, we propose the concept of a buffer institution and apply it to understand ASEAN's role and position in the dynamic geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. While the existing literature has defined territories separating two conflicting powers as buffers, our study modifies this definition, arguing that a buffer institution is a regional society of sovereign states that builds order amid contestation between two great powers. ASEAN's potential as a buffer institution in the China-US competition is sustained by its diplomatic culture and experience in managing relations among great powers inclusively.
The growing multipolarity urges middle powers to elaborate a grand strategy that balances their regional aspirations with the systemic constraints and enhance their capabilities by relying on the partnership with fellow powers. In this context, middle powers gradually moved away from multilateralism to face great power competition. Aiming to comprehend how middle powers can actually develop a grand strategy beyond multilateralism, and seeking to comprehend whether secondary states are capable of formulating a strategic posture, the paper expands Ramon Pacheco Pardo's framework to examine whether all middle powers possess the capacity to enact a grand strategy. Reconstructing the Turkish and Australian posture in the great power competition, respectively the Euro-Russian rivalry for Ankara and United States (US)-China rivalry for Canberra, the paper compares the grand strategy developed by the two middle powers. Arguing that not all middle powers are capable of enacting a grand strategy, the paper contends that while Turkey has embraced a transactionalist grand strategy that aims to take advantage of the rivalry to enhance its status, on the other hand, Australia has followed a US-based minilateralism, accepting the constraints of its status and capacity to the Sino-American rivalry.
