
The High Court’s 2024 constitutional law term was in the shadow of two major constitutional decisions handed down in late 2023. There were no moments of great rupture, and instead the Court had to come to grips with, and work out the implications of, its decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and the extent of the protections offered by Chapter III. In considering the 2024 constitutional law term, this article looks at how the High Court navigated both continuity and change. It does this by considering the extent to which the Court looks outwards to the world (the present), the extent to which it draws on history and precedent (the past), and finally the question of constitutional change (the future). These orientations of present, past, and future offer one way of understanding some of the deep divisions on the Court in the 2024 term.
Parliaments play a more significant role in Indigenous–State agreement-making than often acknowledged. While much attention focuses on the executive, which drives processes and negotiates settlements, Parliament is not merely a bystander. It can both actively support treaty-making and undermine processes. This article presents a typology of the roles Parliament may play before examining three case studies: British Columbia, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Victoria. In British Columbia, a parliamentary convention fosters collaboration in implementing treaties. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a long-standing political consensus on the meaning of Te Tiriti o Waitangi recently held in the face of intense contestation. In Victoria, treaty-making is nascent and politically volatile. While Parliament has played a constructive role thus far, its future is unsettled. The article contends that parliaments should see themselves as partners in reconciliation, shaping and sustaining the legal and political foundations of Indigenous–State relationships.
Trees provide shade, reduce daytime temperatures, and are a source of aesthetic delight. Since these benefits are not confined to the owner of the tree but can be enjoyed by anyone, they are examples of ‘public goods’. Because the cost of providing these goods is the value of the foregone uses of the resources required to produce them, any system of resource management should aim to create the optimum rather than the maximum number of tree-based public goods. Whilst the common law does a reasonable, if imperfect, job of achieving this aim, modern environmental regulations do not. Using New South Wales as an archetypal example, this article argues that regulatory regimes which aim to increase tree density not only produce more of these public goods than people would demand if they had to pay their true price, but also inequitably distribute the cost of doing so.
Electronic gaming machines (‘EGMs’) proliferate in disadvantaged areas of New South Wales (‘NSW’), leading to unacceptable levels of harm. Achieving meaningful reform is hampered by both government and industry prioritising their own financial interests at the expense of vulnerable people. Drawing on the recent state trial into cashless gaming, this article investigates the shortfalls of NSW’s current regulatory framework and considers what reforms are needed to better protect communities from gambling harm. Through a critical analysis of the Gaming Machines Act 2001 (NSW), we argue that current EGM regulations are inadequate and that the cashless gaming trial was misguided. We suggest pragmatic reforms are needed, adapting innovations pursued in other jurisdictions. Reforms recommended include a state-wide mandatory digital pre-commitment system, a statewide self-exclusion register, increased accessibility limits, community opt-out schemes, and adaptations of communitycontrolled income management from Cape York. Some combination of these reforms may improve outcomes for struggling communities.
Allegations of insider trading by Members of Congress receive significant attention in the United States, yet in Australia, such allegations involving Members of Parliament are much less frequently made. In this article, we aim to understand this phenomenon by comparing the laws prohibiting insider trading and their application to lawmakers in both jurisdictions. Through this comparison, we conclude that the regulatory regimes in both countries may be theoretically adequate to prohibit lawmaker insider trading, but it appears that lawmakers may still engage in insider trading. We identify obstacles that prevent effective detection and enforcement of insider trading in both the United States and Australia, namely, lawmaker immunities and inadequate financial disclosure rules. To better prevent lawmaker insider trading and maintain trust and integrity in both securities markets and political probity, we propose reforms to financial disclosure obligations and the establishment of Parliamentary Privileges and Congressional Ethics Committees.