Abstract This paper offers a reconstruction and critical development of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on modality, with the aim of rethinking the relationship between logical possibility, physical possibility, and necessity. In contemporary modal metaphysics, it is commonly assumed that logical possibility constitutes the widest modal domain, setting the ultimate limits on what can occur, while physical and metaphysical possibilities are treated as more restrictive subclasses. Against this hierarchical model, the paper argues that Wittgenstein’s investigations invite a revision of this ordering: logical possibility does not straightforwardly constrain physical reality; rather, what counts as logically possible is, in certain respects, conditioned by empirical reality and by the practical functioning of our systems of representation.
Abstract Two recent publications take opposed views of the scope of Tractarian logic. According to Mauro Luiz Engelmann it is empty of any content, only containing what we already know a priori. Jaap van der Does and Martin Stokhof, on the other hand, want to establish its status as applied logic , intrinsically intertwined with reality. This point of contention between the authors revolves around the coherence of the entire system of the book. “Application of logic” is easy to say, but indicates the highly complex issue of the interface between logic as self-contained, systematic prerequisite of vis-à-vis creative intervention into the world. At this point, several central theoretical assumptions of the TLP must be coordinated with one another. Logic provides the framework for every meaningful linguistic utterance once and for all – namely for propositions whose content it cannot anticipate. The guiding formula TLP 6 claims to provide a bridge between the unforeseeable factual forms of elementary propositions and their unalterable general predetermination. The article argues that this solution cannot succeed according to Wittgenstein's own premises. This unsuccessful bridge-building marks the systematic denouement of the TLP as far as arguments are concerned. The subsequent speculations about meaning and silence are an aftertaste.
Abstract To understand the general form of the Tractatus , it helps to be acquainted with the algebra of the corresponding propositional calculus. Since the pioneering work of Tarski and others, this has been described as an atomless Boolean algebra in which each proposition is finitely generated. But this approach, as valuable as it might be on other grounds, renders a correct reading of Tractatus 6 virtually impossible, precisely because of the absence of least elements (atoms). So, an atomic algebra in which each proposition is infinitely generated is offered as an alternative. This algebra is generated by its elementary propositions, as one might expect, but elementary propositions are not its least elements. Instead, each atom “constructs a world” to “describe reality completely,” something an elementary proposition could never do. On this basis, an exact account of general form and logical space is possible, but we must first consider the role played by certain very general logico-scientific principles in delimiting the propositional architecture of the Tractatus. We will come to see what might be meant by Wittgenstein’s extraordinary claim that “there is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened.” And we will understand (on Tractarian grounds) how it is that science can predict even what it cannot explain.
Abstract Taking as their starting point the four images which Wittgenstein uses in On Certainty to formulate his position vis-à-vis the sceptic, the Cartesian fundamentalist and G.E. Moore, the author proceeds to assess the philosophical value of that very position. As a result of this assessment, a revision of Wittgenstein’s position is suggested. Namely, it is proposed that we should accept Wittgenstein’s idea of the axis around which our form of life rotates (the axis being defined as immovable by the very movements within our language games) but that we should locate the axis in a very different way than Wittgenstein himself. For the author – inspired by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan on the one hand, and by Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault on the other – the true axis is composed of the difficult truths that our form of life rests upon, but which need to be hidden from our view and passed over in silence. Finally, the director Luis Buñuel is presented as someone who is capable of showing this traumatic core of our form of life in his films.
Abstract The attempt to obtain certainty plays a central role in connection with knowledge: according to leading philosophers such as Plato and René Descartes, for instance, true knowledge must always be certain. This paper critically reconsiders this view from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s method in his later writings. To this end, it follows Gregory Vlastos’ suggestion that fallible knowledge is possible and that Socrates and Wittgenstein adopted this view (cf. Vlastos 1994: 63). To clarify these points, this study first examines an example from Wittgenstein’s Blue Book: it is the case of a diviner who is searching for water. This example serves to explore the distinction between knowledge and true belief, before addressing the evolution of these themes in his subsequent writings, published as On Certainty. The tentative conclusion of this paper is the following: Wittgenstein’s analysis of infallible knowledge suggests that this idea results from a confusion between two different language-games, giving rise to “chimeras” (PI 2009: 94). Accordingly, his later method can arguably be described as a therapeutic one, designed to dissolve this kind of illusion.
