Abstract This article introduces a new interpretation of Spinoza's metaethics: namely, that we can understand him as a fictionalist about morality. The article is conceived primarily as a “proof of concept.” That is, it does not seek to prove Spinoza is best understood as a fictionalist. Rather, it only seeks to prove that such a reading is possible and that it is a possibility worth taking seriously. It is left for later papers to develop the fictionalist reading further and defend its merits against rival interpretations.
Abstract On the assumption that Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments aims to defend some normative perspective, it is asked how best such a perspective can be characterized. After rejecting possible consequentialist interpretations, and showing the limits of virtue-ethical ones, reasons are offered in favor of interpreting Smith's account as a peculiar form of deontology: in particular, the impartial spectator's insistence on natural equality, the priority of justice over beneficence, and the central role played by the general rules. Moreover, it is noted that Smith's account bears some analogies with prominent ancestors of contemporary deontology, such as the natural lawyers and the rational intuitionists, although rejecting their metaethical rationalism. It is suggested that a sentimentalist deontology is a theoretical option that may deserve exploration.
Abstract At Theaetetus 185a-186e, Plato has Socrates describe being (οὐσία) as a common (κοινόν) feature in all things. This is among the Western canon's earliest references to being as such and scholars debate its meaning. Recent commentators understand “being” as existence, the condition for veridical correspondence, or other notions popular in contemporary philosophy. The meaning of “being” in the passage, however, is more Platonic and hence far stranger, concerning spatiotemporal things’ derivation from causally prior determinate sources (i.e., forms). Further uses of οὐσία in the Theaetetus (207b4-c4) show that being is a singular, formal principle of determinate unity in all beings.
Abstract This paper expounds A. G. Baumgarten's innovative account of contingent existents. It will be shown that Baumgarten's contribution consists in accounting for the difference between merely possible and actual beings in terms of determinacy. The resulting account is attractive: it does not require a distinct property that sets actual beings apart, and it provides a promising metaphysical backdrop for explaining thought about possibilia.
Abstract This paper explores the technical and philosophical contributions of Kant's sole essay on formal logic, reconstructing the subjects that it treats, the arguments that it advances in their relations to their near and more distant precedents, and the unexpected direction toward which it tends. Although in appearance little more than a Scholastic exercise in the art of thinking, Kant's essay, with a final turn, brings into focus what will become a crucial question in his mature work: that of the “mysterious power . . . which makes judging possible.”
