Abstract Kant's account of polemical engagement in the Discipline of Pure Reason has thus far received relatively little scholarly attention. Existing interpretations maintain that the Discipline prohibits polemical engagement in favor of the juridical model of justification and resolution that Kant calls the court of reason, since metaphysical polemics are epistemically unproductive and ethically objectionable. This article challenges that view. I argue that the Discipline develops three distinct polemical strategies: hypotheses as an offensive strategy in emergency cases, allowing one to counterattack an opponent who threatens the interests of practical reason; rules governing proof as a strategy of caution under conditions of incomplete knowledge; and the skeptical method as a preparatory strategy that opens the way to the court of reason by exposing the futility of polemical argumentation. The Discipline thus articulates a legitimate role for polemical engagement within the methodological framework of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Abstract This article presents a systematic reexamination of key tenets of Kant’s philosophy of history, with particular focus on their implications for future generations in the context of anthropogenic climate change. I argue for the continuing relevance of Kant’s philosophy by showing that its account of history not only sheds light on current debates but also resonates with and, at times, is tacitly presupposed by contemporary discussions in political philosophy and climate ethics. The argument unfolds along two lines. The first examines what may be described as dogmatic attitudes toward the future, whereas the second highlights the interconnected roles of temporal cosmopolitanism and rational hope in responding to the challenges posed by the climate crisis.
Abstract I pursue two chief objectives in this article. The first is to assess whether Kant’s moral philosophy can be said to be inherently racist, that is, whether Kant’s moral philosophy can be said to be racist in itself, as opposed to being racist by association with his explicit writings on race. I distinguish between Kant’s ethics and his philosophy of right as distinct branches within his moral philosophy. I argue that while Kant’s ethics might be said to contain strands of cultural particularism, it is much harder to show it to be inherently racist. In relation to his philosophy of right, the situation is more complex, though the mature Kant performs a surprising about-turn in the final pages of the Doctrine of Right. My second objective is to ask whether contemporary Kantianism might be said to be racist. Here I argue that, at least on a more expansive conception of ‘racism’ that is not narrowly focused on skin colour, contemporary Kantian moral theory could do more to counteract plausible charges of racism.
Abstract Until recently, scholars of Kant’s racial theory entirely overlooked the implications of his account of radical evil in the Religion. We argue that this account suggests a significant turning point in his racial theory. It indicates that Kant no longer adhered to the view to which he was committed in his previous work, wherein people not belonging to the white race are by nature incapable of actualizing their moral powers. Our argument supports the position that Kant had “second thoughts” about some aspects of his racial theory by the time he wrote Part 1 of the Religion.
Abstract This paper assesses the systematic foundations and contemporary relevance of Kant’s philosophy of history. Against the widespread view that Kant’s historical writings constitute an unsystematic appendix to his critical philosophy, it argues that the assumption of a purposive historical development is grounded in fundamental principles of reason itself. The argument draws on neglected passages from the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” in the Critique of Pure Reason and demonstrates that Kant’s conception of history is connected to his account of scientific systematicity and the human vocation. The first part considers Kant’s reasons for positing an endpoint in history. The second part examines the nature of this endpoint and argues that Kant advances an integrated conception of progress that entails the development of human capacities, legal institutions, and moral dispositions. The third part analyzes the mechanism through which such progress is realized, focusing on the role of unsociable sociability and commercial exchange. The article concludes by assessing the strengths and limitations of Kant's model in light of contemporary challenges.
