Against the backdrop of the “Rural Revitalization” strategy, contract farming has emerged as a new mechanism and a growing research focus. This study employs differential game theory to systematically analyze the dynamic decision-making and operational performance differences among supply chain members by comparing scenarios with and without research institution participation, as well as different government subsidy policies. The innovative contribution lies in introducing a dual-effect index to capture consumers’ quality utility from agricultural products and psychological utility derived from supporting farmers. Furthermore, we explore the synergistic effects of research institutions’ technological empowerment and government subsidy strategies on supply chain efficiency. Through the above research and analysis, the study draws the following conclusions: (1) The collaborative agricultural supporting model significantly enhances both farmer yields and overall supply chain profits through technology diffusion and brand premium effects. However, revenue distribution conflicts may lead enterprises to limit their cooperation depth. (2) Government subsidies can alleviate benefit allocation conflicts. Subsidizing a research institution proves more effective at stimulating long-term technological dividends, while subsidizing an enterprise primarily ensures short-term market stability. (3) Brand advantage, technological leadership, and consumer preferences exhibit nonlinear driving effects on supply chain efficiency. Specifically, the positive impact progressively strengthens with wider brand advantages, greater technological leadership, and more intense consumer preferences. The study provides a theoretical foundation for tripartite collaboration, revealing the pivotal role of policy precision and dynamic benefit allocation equilibrium in agricultural supply chain upgrading.

Literature on supplier encroachment primarily considered direct selling via agency or supplier-owned channels. However, dual-channel encroachment simultaneously exists, where agency, supplier-owned, and reselling channels differentially serve consumer preferences. We model a supply chain using price competition demand functions with channel-differentiated pricing. An inverse induction method derives demand functions for single-and dual-channel scenarios. Results indicate: Suppliers may choose owned-channel encroachment despite TPP profit loss, unless facing high fixed costs. If the commission rate of agency products is sufficiently large, the TPP can provide an agency channel for supplier encroachment, and the supplier can choose dual-channel encroachment when consumer shopping preferences show significant differences between the supplier-owned and agency channels. Otherwise, the supplier could abandon agency encroachment to ensure profits from the owned channel. Under single- and dual-channel encroachments, setting direct sales prices first is beneficial for the supplier, after which the TPP can ascertain the reselling price.

The integration of passenger and freight transport by urban–rural buses is an effective approach to address two critical issues: the inefficiency of parcel delivery services and the financial struggles of public transport operators. This paper studies the county–township–village station location-routing problem for the integration of passenger and freight transport by urban–rural buses, aiming to develop an efficient transport network by establishing rational stations and designing optimal operation routes. A three-level county–township–village station network is proposed for the integration of passenger and freight transport, and a mixed-integer linear programming model is developed, including the constraints of location, allocation, capacity, and routing. A comprehensive series of numerical experiments is conducted on a randomly generated dataset to evaluate the feasibility and advantages of the proposed model. Lastly, key managerial insights are discussed.

The pallet pooling center is responsible for the leasing and recycling of shared pallets, which is the key node of the pallet pooling system and plays an important role in improving the efficiency of logistics and promoting the recycling of resources. The location and allocation optimization of pallet pooling centers has important theoretical and practical significance. In this paper, a linear mathematical programming model for the location-allocation optimization problem of pallet pooling centers with multiple allocation is proposed, aiming to minimize the total cost including the transportation cost and the construction cost. A number of numerical experiments are conducted, where the location-allocation results are analyzed and sensitivity analysis on the number of pallet pooling centers are performed.

In order to improve the accuracy of product risk assessment and reduce time costs, a cross-border e-commerce product risk assessment method based on social network analysis is proposed. Firstly, based on the structural model of cross-border e-commerce systems, social network analysis is used to construct user product trust and calculate user ratings for the products. Secondly, based on the scoring calculation results, a risk assessment index system is constructed for cross-border e-commerce products. Finally, the entropy weight method is used to calculate the weights of evaluation indicators, and the product risk membership degree is calculated based on the weight results to complete the grading evaluation of product risks. The experimental results indicate that compared to existing risk assessment methods, this method can improve the accuracy of product risk assessment while reducing time costs.

Currently, manufacturers can collaborate with online platforms to better sell green products and also finance from platforms to relieve financial pressure. To cater to this trend, we establish a platform supply chain model by considering a manufacturer with capital constraints that invests in a green production program. Then, it can sell green products via the reselling or the agency channel on a platform and finance from a bank, the platform, or both. In this context, we examine the choices of financial strategies and selling channels from the perspectives of both parties, as well as the corresponding environmental benefit and social welfare. Our findings show that the manufacturer prefers bank financing in most cases when the bank's interest rate is smaller than that offered by the platform. However, in the reselling channel, the manufacturer may choose platform financing even if its interest rate is higher. The platform tends to provide the agency channel when the commission rate is within a reasonable range. It is possible to realize the highest environmental benefit and social welfare in specific regions where both parties agree on the financing and selling modes to maximize their profits. When the manufacturer has only partial access to bank financing, it can choose mixed financing. However, the manufacturer cannot always treat mixed financing as a complete replacement of bank financing.

Low-carb on development is a global trend and a requirement from governments and industries. Many companies produce green products based on brown products to implement green product segmentation strategies, and the platform economy can help them achieve green development. Considering a manufacturer who can choose a pure brown, green low-price segmentation or green high-price segmentation strategy, we construct three corresponding platform supply chain models. By comparing the optimal results of the three models, we observe how the manufacturer performs in terms of economic and ecological benefits, as well as social welfare. Our results show that the pro-portion of green consumers and the green preference of green consumers have a positive impact on the manufacturer's profit. The manufacturer can make the most profit when it produces both brown and green products and sets a higher price for the green products. The green product segmentation improves social welfare, and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation in terms of economic and social benefits.

Government subsidies have played an important role in the development of green agriculture. In addition, the Internet platform is becoming a new channel to realize green traceability and promote the sale of agricultural products. In this context, we consider a two-level green agricultural products supply chain (GAPSC) consisting of one supplier and one Internet platform. The supplier makes green R&D investments to produce green agricultural products along with conventional agricultural products, and the platform implements green traceability and data-driven marketing. The differential game models are established under four government subsidy scenarios: no subsidy (NS), consumer subsidy (CS), supplier subsidy (SS), and supplier subsidy with green traceability cost-sharing (TSS). Then, the optimal feedback strategies under each subsidy scenario are derived using Bellman's continuous dynamic programming theory. The comparative static analyses of key parameters are given, and the comparisons among different subsidy scenarios are conducted. Numerical examples are employed to obtain more management insights. The results show that the CS strategy is effective only if the competition intensity between two types of products is below a certain threshold. Compared to the NS scenario, the SS strategy can always improve the supplier's green R&D level, the greenness level, market demand for green agricultural products, and the system's utility. The TSS strategy can build on the SS strategy to further enhance the green traceability level of the platform and the greenness level and demand for green agricultural products due to the advantage of the cost-sharing mechanism. Accordingly, a win-win situation for both parties can be realized under the TSS strategy. However, the positive effect of the cost-sharing mechanism will be weakened as the supplier subsidy increases. Moreover, compared to three other scenarios, the increase in the environmental concern of the platform has a more significant negative impact on the TSS strategy.

Platform enterprises can improve green R&D efficiency by data-driven marketing (DDM) activities and can also provide financing assistance to manufacturers. In this context, for a platform supply chain consisting of one manufacturer facing a shortage of green R&D funds and a one third-party platform, this paper develops four game models under two financing channels (bank financing channel and platform financing channel) and two selling modes (agency selling mode and reselling mode). The equilibrium results of different models are derived and compared, and then the choices of selling mode and financing channel from the perspectives of both the manufacturer and the platform are analyzed. The conclusions show that the consumers' sensitivities to green R&D and DDM activities, as well as service commission fee, are major factors influencing green R&D level and both parties' choice of selling mode and financing channel. In most cases, a platform financing channel can promote the green R&D level better and is more beneficial to the manufacturer and the platform. Only in a few cases, the two parties prefer the reselling mode and bank financing channel. However, agent selling with bank financing will never be their optimal strategy. There exists four situations in which the manufacturer and the platform can agree on a same strategy on selling mode and financing channel.

The potential broad market of green consumption has encouraged an increasing number of enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. This paper examines a two-stage supply chain of e-commerce sales channels under different cooperative models. We find that consumers’ green preferences are the main factor that affects green product market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer can raise the levels of green technology innovation and extend green promotional services to expand product market demand in online and offline channels. However, consumers’ e-commerce preferences and online free-riding behaviors affect the manufacturer’s sales channel choice. The retailer can improve the level of green promotional services to hold offline channel market demand, while promotional behaviors have a positive/negative spillover effect on online market demand if the level of free riding falls above/below consumers’ e-commerce preferences. The higher the cooperative level is, the later the manufacturer will open the online channel and close the offline channel to ensure a high level of green promotional service from the cooperative retailer. The results show that the stronger the level of cooperation among all members is, the better the economic, ecological, and social benefits will be. Therefore, we design a revenue-cost sharing contract that can effectively motivate green technology innovation and green promotional services and afford all members win-win profits.

随着经济全球化的推进,同行业竞争已逐渐由企业间的竞争转化为供应链间的竞争.在此背景下,本文围绕MR、MT和RT三种相异的回收模式组合,构建了两条零售商主导型闭环供应链的竞争博弈模型,运用逆向归纳法得到三种回收模式组合下各条链的均衡价格、回收率、渠道成员利润、单条链利润与双链总利润,然后结合链间竞争强度将不同回收模式组合的结果进行比较,研究表明:(1)在三种回收模式组合下,链间竞争强度的增加将使批发价、零售价与回收率均提高,市场需求量增大,各渠道成员的收益均得到改善,但却损害了消费者利益;(2)MR与MT组合下四条链的产品售价、单链回收率、制造商利润、零售商利润与单链总利润排序均与链间竞争强度无关,而RT组合两条链的变量均衡解、利润与MR、MT组合的数量关系与链间竞争强度密切相关;(3)对于两条竞争性闭环供应链的任一条链,若其竞争链是制造商回收链(零售商回收链),则在选择相异回收模式时,从整条链利润视角其应形成零售商回收链(制造商回收链);若其竞争链是第三方回收链,当双链竞争不是极为剧烈时,其应形成制造商回收链,否则应形成零售商回收链;(4)当链间竞争较平稳时,MR组合的双链总利润优于MT组合和RT组合;随着双链竞争强度的增加,RT组合的双链总利润将依次超过MT组合与MR组合;当链间竞争特别激烈时,MR组合甚至低于MT组合.故链间竞争强度的增加对RT组合两条链具有最显著的积极影响,而对MR组合的影响则较为有限.本文研究不仅拓展了闭环供应链竞争理论,而且能够为现实中处于链与链竞争环境下的企业选择合理的回收模式提供理论支持.

The rigid frame-continuous beam composite system bridge has many spans, and the pier layout is different, and the demolition of temporary anchorage of pier and beam needs to undergo system transformation. Therefore, different closure sequence and the demolition time of temporary anchorage of pier and beam will have certain influence on the internal force and alignment of the main girder after completion of the bridge. Based on the practical engineering of the rigid frame-continuous beam composite system bridge constructed by asymmetric closure, four closure schemes were designed from two aspects: asymmetric closure sequence and temporary anchorage and demolition sequence. Based on the finite element model, the internal force and alignment of the main girder of the four closure schemes were compared and analyzed, and the general rules of closure of this type of bridge construction were summarized. The analysis and comparison results showed that the internal forces of the main girders are basically the same with different closure schemes, and the final linear shape of the main girders is different with different closure sequence. The results of this study can provide technical reference for sunhao2006@foxmail.com similar bridge construction decision-making and closure scheme determination.

针对制造商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统,探究了三周期环境下基于参考价格效应的成员动态定价决策.作为渠道主导方的制造商生产成本具有规模不经济性,其可能采用均一化或差异化两种批发价格策略.结合双方的定价时期,给出并比较了4种决策模式下的均衡价格和利润,分析了参考价格因子和规模不经济系数的影响.研究表明,零售商利用参考价格效应的行为在不同模式下将对制造商的批发价决策产生不同影响,规模不经济系数对各种模式的均衡价格及成员利润的影响程度也存在差异;制造商利润的最优模式依赖的不是自身决策目标,而是零售商的决策目标;绝大部分情况下,零售商以其三期总利润为目标比逐期优化的收益更高;双方逐期决策和以各期利润最大化的模式反而能够产出最高的系统总利润.

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints.

针对零售商主导第三方回收的闭环供应链系统,考虑零售商在自身履行企业社会责任(CSR)的同时引导制造商履行CSR,基于此建模求解分散式和集中式两种模式下的均衡定价、回收率、各成员利润(效用)及其总效用,验证出分散式闭环供应链存在效率损失,进而利用二部定价契约对其实现完美协调,同时分析出双方CSR履行程度所产生的影响.研究结论表明,在分散式决策中,制造商CSR履行程度的提高对系统决策和成员利润(效用)的积极影响大于同等程度的零售商CSR履行程度的提高;在契约协调状态下,双方CSR履行程度的提高均将增加成员间固定转移金额的上下限,零售商CSR履行程度的提高将使批发价增加,而制造商CSR履行程度对批发价的影响同时取决于零售商的CSR履行程度.

在碳税机制下,考虑政府补贴和消费者低碳偏好,分别构造制造商层、零售商层、需求市场层的利润最大化表达式,进而得到在碳税和产品绿色度约束下的双渠道供应链网络均衡模型,利用变分不等式的改进投影收缩算法得到网络均衡解.结合算例对模型进行求解及灵敏度分析.研究结果表明:双渠道下政府提高补贴力度能为制造商网络直销渠道创造很大的利润空间,但补贴程度应适当;在供应链网络中实行碳税机制可以促使企业主动采用低碳生产技术来调节自身,从而使得其利润不受太大影响;政府应主动提高最低绿色度标准,同时注意对各企业利润的影响;制造商开设直销渠道时要准确把握消费者电子商务渠道的偏好程度,慎重考虑对供应链各成员的影响.

In s closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with collection and remanufacturing of old products,how to deal with the competitive threat from the external remanufacturer is an important issue for the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).For a two-period CLSC system comprised of an OEM and an independent remanufacturer,the optimal game strategies of both parties are discussed under three different decision structures:two types of competitive mode (competition with remanufacturing patent licensing and competition without remanufacturing patent licensing) and cooperative mode.In all three modes,the OEM produces and sells the new products in the first period.For the competitive mode with patent licensing,the remanufacturer collects and remanufactures the EOL products after the OEM's patent authorization in the second period,and then sells them in the market competing with the OEM.Otherwise,under the competitive mode without patent licensing,the remanufacturer can engage in these activities without the OEM's authorization.For the cooperative mode,the remanufacturer transfers the remanufactured products to the OEM,and then the OEM sells the two kinds of products simultaneously.Backward deduction method is used to derive and compare the optimal prices under the above three modes.The condition under which the remanufacturer engages in collection and remanufacturing is given.The impact of consumer preference for the remanufactured products on the equilibrium solutions and the profits of channel members are analyzed combined with numerical examples.The results show that:(1) From the perspective of environmental performance,the collection rate under the competitive mode without patent licensing is the highest,and then is the cooperative mode,the lowest is the competitive mode with patent licensing.The collection rates under all three modes increase in the consumer preference.(2) From the perspective of channel efficiency,the cooperative mode yields the highest system profit,and then is the competitive mode with patent licensing,the worst is the competitive mode without patent licensing.The total system profit under the competitive mode without patent licensing decreases in the consumer preference,whereas increases in the consumer preference in two other modes.(3) From the perspective of the OEM,he has no motive to cooperate with the remanufacturer if he can take advantage of the patent licensing mechanism to guarantee his own interest.On the contrary,he prefers to cooperate with the remanufacturer without patent licensing,but which meanwhile leads to the profit loss of the remanufacturer.So the reasonable contact should be provided to ensure the operations the cooperative mode.The conclusion of this paper can provide theoretical supports for the OEM to select reasonable competitive strategies or cooperative strategies with the remanufacturer in reality.

为分析消费者的价格参考效应对闭环供应链动态定价策略的影响,探讨了集中式决策和三种分散式回收模式(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收)下考虑价格参考效应的两期闭环供应链定价策略与利润分配问题.首先运用逆向归纳法推导和比较了四种情形下的决策变量均衡解、成员利润以及渠道总利润,然后分析了其随价格参考效应的变化趋势.研究结果表明:除集中式决策最优外,第三方回收模式下的回收率最低、系统效益最低,制造商回收和零售商回收的绩效高低取决于再制造成本节约水平与回收补贴等参数的设置.在集中式决策下,随着价格参考效应的提高,两期价格降低、回收率提高;当参考效应大于0.632 1时,渠道总利润随参考效应的增加而减少;当参考效应小于0.632 1时,渠道总利润与参考效应的变化关系取决于参数设置,若回收规模参数低于其阈值,则渠道总利润减少,反之增加.在三种分散式回收模式下,价格参考效应的提升将使第一期价格提高、第二期价格降低且回收率降低,但渠道成员利润及系统总利润均有所改善.

Although the multi-depot vehicle routing problem with simultaneous deliveries and pickups (MDVRPSDP) is often encountered in real-life scenarios of transportation logistics, it has received little attention so far. Particularly, no papers have ever used metaheuristics to solve it. In this paper a metaheuristic based on iterated local search is developed for MDVRPSDP. In order to strengthen the search, an adaptive neighborhood selection mechanism is embedded into the improvement steps and the perturbation steps of iterated local search, respectively. To diversify the search, new perturbation operators are proposed. Computational results indicate that the proposed approach outperforms the previous methods for MDVRPSDP. Moreover, when applied to VRPSDP benchmarks, the results are better than those obtained by large neighborhood search, particle swarm optimization, and ant colony optimization approach, respectively. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

One effective method to reduce industry's environmental footprint is the use of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Based on the traditional forward supply chain, the CLSC incorporates collection and remanufacturing to reduce waste and satisfy environmental goals. In this study, we consider the CLSC network equilibrium, comprising manufacturers, retailers, demand markets and recyclers, in a multi-period planning horizon. In the scenario considered, all of the manufacturers make homogeneous products and have two types of mandatory carbon emission constraints during manufacturing/remanufacturing; one of which can be called a periodic carbon emission constraint, and the other, a global carbon emission constraint. Based on variational inequality and complement theory, the optimal behaviors and the equilibrium conditions of various players in the CLSC network are formulated, and the governing network equilibrium model is established. A modified projection and contraction algorithm is used to solve the model. The validity of the proposed model and the impact of the two types of carbon emission constraints on network equilibrium are demonstrated with numerical examples. The managerial insights obtained in this paper lead to areas of future research into CLSC networks.