Corporate online sales data are embedded with high informational value. Focusing on auditors who are concerned about information quality, this paper systematically tests the governance effect of releasing third-party online sales data on audit quality. Using the first aggregate release of online sales data in 2018 as an exogenous shock, we use the difference-in-differences model and empirically demonstrate that the audit quality of firms with released online sales data improves significantly after 2018. Subsequent analyses demonstrate that releasing online sales data has a governance effect by improving internal control quality, audit efficiency and audit prudence. The findings demonstrate that the aggregate release of third-party online sales data could have positive economic consequences. (c) 2024 Sun Yat-sen University. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Different from existing evidence that analyst coverage is shaped by various financial and nonfinancial factors, we fill the gap in the literature by shedding light on how analysts react to value-relevant alternative data, which confirms the governance effect of alternative data disclosure from a new perspective. We utilize the commercial availability of third-party online sales data from WTF after 2018 as an exogenous information shock. In 2018, WTF launched a dataset that included online sales data for nearly 200 listed firms collected from China’s leading third-party e-commerce platforms, such as Taobao, T-mall, JD.com, etc. The launch of this dataset has made previously private online sales data public, greatly reducing such information’s acquisition costs. This shock enables our use of a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. The treatment firms are those included in the online sales dataset WTF launched in 2018, and the others are the control firms. We then compare the changes in firm-specific analyst following for the treatment firms before and after 2018, relative to the control firms. We find that treatment firms attract more analysts following the pre-2018 to post-2018 periods than the control firms. This suggests that the third-party online sales disclosure significantly increased affected firms’ analyst following. The result remains robust after controlling online sales percent, utilizing the propensity score matching (PSM) method, implementing the Heckman two-stage model, conducting falsification tests and examining parallel trend assumptions. Channel tests suggest that efficient information processing, an improved internal information environment, accurate forecast and more social attention are the underlying mechanisms through which the aggregate release of third-party online sales data helps attract analyst following. Moreover, the main result is more pronounced among firms with higher online sales percent, CEO and chairman duality and less individual investor interactions. First is the contribution to the literature on alternative data and online sales data. There is extensive evidence on how various alternative data affect different market participant behaviors. Yet, little research focuses on the unique online sales data from China. This paper fills the gap by studying how the aggregate release of online sales data influences analyst following from the perspective of the supply of and demand for analyst services. The second contribution relates to the factors that affect analyst following decisions. There is a wealth of literature providing evidence from firm characteristics, individual analyst attributes and other institutional factors, whereas the research focusing on alternative data is still limited even with the fact that this novel alternative data source is embedded with high information value and outperforms traditional financial information in many ways. This paper underscores that alternative data disclosure can affect analyst following through the benefit-cost tradeoff.
Using dual signature audit opinions, we investigate whether audit quality differs between staggered and simultaneous audit partner rotations. Compared to audits without partner rotations, we find partial support that staggered rotations are positively associated with audit quality and strong support that simultaneous rotations are negatively associated with audit quality. When directly comparing these rotation types, staggered rotations are consistently associated with higher audit quality than simultaneous rotations. The effects on audit quality are concentrated in the first year after rotations occur. The negative impact of simultaneous rotations is mitigated when an incoming partner has industry expertise. We perform exploratory tests on various staggered rotation types and examine a determinants model to understand the driving forces of staggered versus simultaneous rotations.
This paper explores the positive governance effects of the Procuratorate’s Public Interest Litigation System in China, which combines the powers of litigation and administrative supervision, on the quality of information disclosure by listed state-owned enterprises. We report several findings. (1) The likelihood that listed state-owned enterprises would issue financial restatements and participate in financial fraud decreased significantly in areas selected for pilot implementation. (2) The governance effect is stronger in regulated industries than in unregulated industries. After the pilot implementation, the agency costs decreased, and the increase in legal litigation risks related to false statements faced by enterprises played a deterrent effect. (3) The significance of the above results is stronger when a company’s external and internal governance are weaker. This study provides both new evidence of the effectiveness of the integrated governance mechanism and inspiration for future efforts to widely implement this mechanism in the capital market.
This paper considers stock halts to study the impact of stock liquidity loss on the managerial learning effect based on stock prices. We examine stock halts’ impact on corporate innovation and find that discretionary halts hinder innovation. We also find that discretionary halts reduce information quality and increase financial constraints and agent costs. Cross-sectional tests show that this negative impact is more pronounced in samples with high shareholding ratios by large shareholders, institutional investors and private firms. The results indicate that the loss of non-institutional stock trading rights, represented by discretionary stock halts, affects revelatory price efficiency in the secondary market, hinders managers’ learning effect and affects enterprises’ production and operation decisions. These findings have policy implications for stock circulation-right protection and Chinese capital-market reform.
Using Chinese data, we find that analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate and less biased when analysts are socially connected with the company's signatory auditor. We also find that forecast performance improves following mandatory auditor rotations that result in new analyst-auditor connections and declines following mandatory rotations that terminate existing connections. We further find that our results become stronger when the information that auditors possess is likely to be more useful to analysts, that connected analysts have better career outcomes than unconnected analysts, and that investors and other analysts are more responsive to forecast revisions issued by connected analysts. Finally, we find that connected auditors provide higher quality audits to their connected clients and are more likely to retain those clients. Overall, our findings are consistent with connected analysts benefitting from private information obtained from their social connections with auditors by providing better earnings forecasts, and in turn, with auditors benefitting from information they receive from connected analysts by delivering higher quality audits that improve client retention.
We examine how US mutual funds that invest domestically make portfolio adjustments by incorporating US-listed foreign stocks (cross-listed stocks) when faced with US market economic policy uncertainty. We document a positive association between US economic policy uncertainty and US mutual funds' weight of cross-listed stocks, and find that the effect is concentrated in funds that mainly invest in the US domestic market. The findings are not sensitive to the instrumental variable approach, model specification, sampling, variable definition, and controlling for macro characteristics. Funds with higher weight of cross-listed foreign stocks when US economic policy uncertainty increases outperform other funds, indicating the rationality of such an investment strategy. A long-short portfolio generates 3.4% annualized abnormal return in the immediate following quarter. Our study shields light not only on the international diversification benefit of US-listed foreign stocks but also on the importance of capital market openness for domestic investors.
In this paper, we investigate whether audit firms take measures to improve their audit quality subsequent to government sanctions in imperfect institutional settings. Using data from the emerging markets of China, we find that audit firms with damaged or shredded reputations have lower audit quality prior to the publicized accounting scandals and related disciplinary actions than non-sanctioned audit firms. The lower audit quality is particularly prevalent in less developed regions and smaller audit firms. Audit firms with shredded reputations significantly increased their audit quality after the disciplinary actions regardless of whether they are bigten or small audit firms. Such an improvement is more significant in state owned client firms, less developed regions, and firms sanctioned only once. These results suggest that institutional factors do play a significant role in encouraging audit firms to do high quality work. Finally, audit firms with shredded reputations experience more client turnover, although they do not earn audit fees lower than other firms. Among audit firms with shredded reputations, audit firms taking actions to improve are less likely to be dismissed by their clients and more likely to charge higher audit fees. These results have strategic implications for the regulators in emerging markets.
ABSTRACTBanking plays a crucial role as the most significant financial intermediary, and the effectiveness of its diversification strategy aimed at reducing individual bank systemic risk is a significant topic in both theory and practice. In this study, we investigate the impact of cross-industry loan diversification on bank systemic risk using data from listed banks, and reveal a significant positive correlation, indicating a clear‘diversification systemic risk’ effect. This effect remains robust across a series of robustness tests. Further research reveals the influence of cross-industry loan diversification on bank systemic risk operates primarily through the channel of interbank asset similarity. Additionally, we find the‘diversification systemic risk’ effect is particularly prominent among joint-stock banks, those with high interbank deposits,and those with high real estate loans. These findings hold important reference value for the ongoing reforms and practices in China aimed at preventing bank systemic risk.
董事会秘书(下文简称为董秘)作为连接上市公司与外部利益相关者的沟通桥梁,信息披露和投资者关系管理是董秘重要的职能,根据高阶理论,董秘职责的履行会受到其背景特征的影响.鉴于财务重述作为公司修正前期财务报告的过程,具有严重的负面经济后果,本文考察了拥有媒体从业背景的董秘是否可以减少企业的财务重述行为.研究发现,当公司的董秘拥有媒体从业背景时,公司的财务重述行为显著更少.在一系列稳健检验和考虑内生性的影响之后,上述发现仍然成立.进一步研究发现,媒体背景董秘增加新闻媒体对公司的报道及提高管理层自愿性信息披露准确性是两个可能的影响渠道.最后,资本市场利益相关者对此做出了积极的反应,具体地,媒体背景的董秘其所属公司的估值更高,股权和债权融资成本更低.研究表明,媒体行业所特有的职业特点会促使媒体人在担任公司董秘时依然遵从独立公正的操守,在信息披露中发挥重要作用.
作为信息披露中连接公司与信息使用者的纽带,董秘对公司信息披露质量的影响引起了业界和学者的关注,本文考察了媒体背景董秘对股价崩盘风险的影响.研究发现,具有媒体从业背景的董秘,其所在公司的股价崩盘风险更低.经过一系列稳健性检验之后,上述发现依然成立.分组检验显示,媒体背景董秘的这种缓解作用在民营企业和外部治理效果较好的公司中表现更为明显.进一步研究发现,更好的信息披露、吸引更多的证券分析师跟踪和减少坏消息囤积是三个可能的影响渠道.最后,本文还发现,资本市场利益相关者对此作出了积极的反应,媒体背景董秘所在公司的估值更高、股权融资成本和债权融资成本更低.
ABSTRACT This study examines how engagement signing auditors’ career concerns affect audit fees and audit quality. Based on a sample of listed companies in China, we find that audit fees and audit quality are lower for firms audited by auditors in their early years of being signing auditors. Moreover, we find that the results are more pronounced for signing auditors in local Chinese audit firms than those in Big 4. These results may be attributed to differential quality control mechanism and incentive systems. Our results have implications for regulators and audit firms in formulating standards and guidelines on monitoring newly promoted signing auditors.
The selection and weighting of performance indicators are of vital importance for an effective compensation contract.We examine the effect of the reclassification of income statement items,caused by China's new Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises(ASBE)in 2007 on the weight adjustment of compensation performance indicators.The results show that the sensitivity of executive pay and investment income increases signifi-cantly after ASBE moves investment income in the income statement from below-the-line of operating income to above-the-line,which indicates that the presentation of income statement items is directly related to the weight of compensation performance indicators.We also find that the earnings persistence of investment income increases significantly after ASBE,which implies that the reclassification of investment income conforms to business practice and al-so performs well.However,the increased sensitivity of executive pay and investment income may induce management's opportunistic investment in finan-cial assets.
The increasing number of discretionary stock halts, has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities and scholars. They have also become a significant obstacle to the internationalization of China's capital market. This article systematically examines the impact of discretionary halts on the information environment from the perspective of analysts. The study finds that discretionary halts lead to a decrease in the number of analysts following, a decline in analysts' forecast accuracy, and an increase in analysts' forecast dispersion. Further research finds that reducing the amount and the decline of the quality of information disclosure are two crucial channels for discretionary stock halts deteriorating the information environment. Cross-sectional tests show that the impact of discretionary stock halts is more pronounced in samples with lower investor protection and higher agency costs. Above results indicate that the discretionary halt deteriorates the company's information environment, which provides important policy implications for China's capital market reform.
近年来,证券交易所推行的问询函监管逐渐成为保障和改善上市公司信息披露质量的重要机制,其实施效果自然成为监管者和学者关注的焦点.本文从银行的角度研究问询函监管对外部利益相关者的溢出效应,具体考察问询函监管对银行信贷决策的影响.研究发现,在公司被出具问询函后,银行的贷款利率显著更高,贷款期限显著更短,银行贷款要求提供担保的可能性和比例更高.进一步研究发现,当公司处于信息风险和信用风险相对较高的情境中,或银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下,银行贷款利率上升幅度更加显著,不过,贷款期限、担保要求等非价格条款并没有显著差异.同时,问询函对银行信贷决策的影响在银企之间存在较强的信息不对称时更加显著.最后,本文发现公司收到问询函以后,分析师预测分歧度显著提高,这表明信息风险是问询函监管影响银行信贷决策的一个可能渠道.
The tax credit rating mechanism was formally implemented in 2014. As an important tax collection and management innovation, it has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities and scholars. Different from the literature that directly examines corporate tax compliance, we focus on the impact of tax credit rating implementation on corporate research and development (R&D) investment decisions. Using listed companies' data from 2014 to 2019, we find that companies with higher tax credit ratings invest more in innovation, because the system helps managers identify R&D opportunities, alleviates corporate financing constraints and reduces agency costs. We confirm that tax credit ratings have manifold impacts on corporate information environments and business decisions, with better ratings positively affecting firms' business decisions. This discovery can inform tax policy reform, encourage corporate innovation and construct social credit systems.
高铁持续开通带来的交通基础设施改善是当今中国社会的典型事实,大量文献研究了高铁开通的经济效应,我们关注的是高铁开通对公司至关重要的资本结构动态调整的影响.研究表明,高铁开通之后,所在城市公司的资本结构调整速度显著提高,并且当资本结构向上偏离目标时,这一影响的经济意义更明显.上述关系在信息环境较差企业、民营企业、货币紧缩年份、交通水平较低和企业数量较少的城市中更为明显.对调整方式的研究发现,对于向下偏离目标的企业,高铁开通使其增加债务融资或减少股权融资,但是后者的调整幅度更大;对于向上偏离目标的公司,高铁开通对其增加股权融资、减少债权融资均有促进作用.此外,周边城市高铁开通对于本地企业资本结构调整速度也具有正向的溢出效应.本文不仅丰富了资本结构动态调整的影响因素文献,而且补充了高铁开通的经济后果研究.
伴随着"天价薪酬"现象的出现,业绩型薪酬契约的弊端日益受到监管部门和学者的关注,经理人市场作为业绩型薪酬契约的替代机制再次引起了研究者的兴趣,本文以地方政府人才引进政策为契机考察经理人市场对微观企业高管薪酬契约的影响.研究发现,在地方政府发布和实施人才引进政策后,所在辖区企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性随之明显下降.上述发现在一系列稳健检验中依然存在,包括改变业绩衡量指标、加入公司固定效应、调整政策发布时间、考虑时间趋势因素、加入城市宏观经济控制变量和删除一线城市样本.进一步分析发现,人才政策的实施使得企业更多地采取代理权变更的方式对高管进行激励约束,具体表现为高管变更业绩敏感性的提高.分组检验显示,以上结果在独董比例低、由非四大审计、分析师跟踪数少的样本中更为显著.上述研究表明,人才引进政策可以通过经理人市场机制对企业的业绩型薪酬契约制度产生替代作用,这不仅拓展了企业高管薪酬契约的影响因素文献,也有助于政策制定者更好地评价人才引进政策的经济后果.
随着经济政策不确定性 日益成为常态,其对经济增长以及市场主体可能产生的负面影响逐渐引起学者的关注,本文考察证券分析师在盈余预测过程中是否会考虑经济政策不确定性对企业的影响,进而调整其对企业历史会计信息的利用.研究发现,经济政策不确定性的升高显著降低了企业的盈余持续性,证券分析师在预测盈余时的确会减少对企业历史会计盈余信息的倚重;进一步研究发现,证券分析师所做的调整并不充分.分组检验结果显示,在标的公司由"非八大"会计师事务所审计时,证券分析师会对经济政策不确定性进行充分调整;对于无形资产比重高、所在地市场化程度高的企业,证券分析师虽然同样会减少对历史盈余信息的倚重,但调整程度并不充分.本文从证券分析师的角度,揭示了经济政策不确定性可能带来的负面影响.