Analyzing the Shanghai-Hong Kong and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSZ-HK Connect) programs as quasi-natural experiments, our study reveals that stock market liberalization increases labor investment efficiency. The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher foreign ownership, as liberalization enhances their information environment and reduces capital costs. However, the impact is weaker in regions with higher minimum wages, highlighting the importance of labor market conditions in shaping outcomes. Additionally, firms exposed to liberalization promote labor investment efficiency through human capital upgrading by recruiting high-skilled workers and enhancing employee training to improve labor productivity.

This study investigates the impact of geographic proximity to Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) on corporate environmental investments by firms in heavily polluting industries. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies in heavily polluting industries from 2000 to 2020, we find that geographic proximity to EPBs is positively associated with corporate environmental investment. Specifically, firms located closer to EPBs tend to invest more in environmental protection. This relationship remains robust even after addressing potential endogeneity concerns and holds consistently across alternative measures of regulatory distance and various city classifications. Mechanism analysis reveals that the increased environmental investment induced by geographic proximity to EPBs occurs through the strengthened local government environmental enforcement. Further analysis indicates that the negative impact of greater geographic distance on environmental investment is more pronounced for firms operating in opaque information environments and those facing higher transportation costs. Additionally, cross-sectional tests show that this negative effect is more pronounced when EPBs face greater environmental protection pressures and when firms are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or face fewer financial constraints. Overall, our study identifies geographic proximity to EPBs as a critical factor influencing corporate environmental investment.

In this article, we examine foreign corporate shareholders in China. We find that they play an active and effective corporate governance role that improves firm performance. The results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, selection bias, and direction-of-causality concerns. The methods for which foreign corporations exert effective oversight are identified: (1) they actively and effectively monitor firms (i.e., they are more likely to fire [reward] managers for poor [good] firm performance), (2) they invest more in innovation, (3) they are better at selecting investment projects, and (4) they help generate more foreign sales.

SynopsisThe research problemThis study analyzes the relationship between product market competition (PMC) and stock price crash risk in China, especially for firms with weak corporate governance and a lower-quality information environment.MotivationEmerging capital markets like China have less-developed financial systems and institutions compared to developed capital markets like Europe and the United States, making them more susceptible to stock price crash risk. The impact of product market competition (PMC) on corporate decision-making has attracted considerable attention from scholars, especially given the increasingly intense and complex strategic competition in global markets and uncertainty in the world today. However, the effect of PMC on a firm's stock price crash risk has not been thoroughly explored. Therefore, this study investigated how PMC affects managers' tendency to hoard bad news and how this behavior contributes to the risk of stock price crashes.The test hypothesesWe tested two competing hypotheses: PMC is negatively correlated with crash risk, and PMC is positively correlated with crash risk.Target populationThis study should be of interest to stakeholders, including firm managers, practitioners, regulatory authorities, policymakers, and investors.Adopted methodologyThis study employed ordinary least squares (OLS), difference-in-differences analysis (DID), and path analysis.AnalysisUsing a sample of Chinese A-share listed manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2021, this study found that competitive pressure from the product market encouraged managers to hide bad news, thereby increasing future stock price crash risk. Moreover, we performed additional tests to examine how PMC affected stock price crash risk.FindingsWe found robust evidence that PMC significantly increases stock price crash risk. Further tests showed that the effect of PMC on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and a lower-quality information environment. We also provide evidence that firms in highly competitive industries tend to disclose fewer negative words in the management discussion and analysis section of the annual report and fewer risk factors in the internal control report. Moreover, we show that operational risk is the underlying driver through which PMC affects crash risk.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact of a common ownership structure – multiple large shareholders (MLS) – on controlling shareholders’ related-party mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of 2,923 Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2018, we find that firms with MLS are less likely to initiate controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As and if they do, pay lower M&A premium. Further tests show that the impact of MLS on controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As is more prominent when the relative power of other blockholders is stronger, when MLS are of different identity, when corporate governance mechanism is weaker, and when the agency conflicts are more severe. We also find that the presence of MLS is associated with higher related-party M&A performance. Our results imply that MLS monitor the controlling shareholder and improve governance, and hence restrain related-party M&As.

Succession has been recognized as one key challenge to family firms. To manage succession risks, founders aiming for intrafamily succession might adopt risk-averse strategies in advance. Using a sample of A-share listed family firms in China, we find that family firms with apparent family successors are indeed more risk-averse than those without such successors: the former group has fewer investments in research and development (R&D), lower debt, more cash holdings, and less volatile earnings than the latter. These effects are weaker for firms in a more market-oriented environment, firms with stronger family control, or firms faced with more intense market competition. Further analyses show that the reduced risk-taking for intrafamily succession is stronger when successors have been involved in family businesses. Firms with male successors are also more risk-averse than those with female successors except in R&D investments. By illustrating that founders proactively curb firm risks to increase risk capacity for family successors, this paper not only contributes to the literature on family succession, but also extends the literature about determinants of corporate risk-taking decisions.

近年来并购业绩承诺制度引发的并购乱象凸显,尤其在承诺期满后,商誉减值和业绩"变脸"的现象频现,引起了学术界和实务界的广泛关注.业绩承诺需要并购双方的紧密配合,相对于现金支付,股票支付将并购双方的利益紧密联系在一起.本文将研究区间拓展到承诺期以外,以2008-2018年由非金融上市公司发起且业绩承诺期届满的并购事件为研究样本,探讨股票支付对业绩承诺兑现效果的影响.研究发现:相较现金支付,当并购交易中含有股票支付时,更有可能兑现业绩承诺,但一旦过了业绩承诺期,尤其是承诺期满后的第一年,其更可能发生商誉减值与公司业绩的大幅下滑.此外,本文发现这一现象更多发生在标的公司精准达标的并购交易中以及两权分离的上市公司中.拓展性研究发现,采用股票支付的上市公司更有可能在承诺期内进行盈余管理,并且其大股东在业绩承诺期和承诺期完成后的一年内,更有可能减持股票.由此可知,股票支付未能发挥正向的绑定作用,反而促使并购双方合谋进行市值管理.本文的研究结论在丰富并购支付和业绩承诺相关文献的同时,对于监管者、公司及投资者也具有一定的启示意义.

We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions, specifically regarding supply-chain information. Our results, based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016, show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information. The main results stand through several robustness tests. Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information. Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.

Share pledging by controlling shareholders is accompanied with a risk of control transfer when stock price decline triggers a margin call. This situation motivates controlling shareholders and firms to initiate value-enhancing activities to manage the pledging quagmire. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to implement mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than other firms. Their M&As also perform better, regardless of whether using short- or long-term stock returns or operating income as the performance measure. Furthermore, the positive effect of share pledging on M&As is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with individual controlling shareholders (especially families), firms with better governance, and firms with higher financial capabilities. Additional analyses on deal types also show that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to engage in diversified, non-affiliated, and cash-financed acquisitions. These results consistently suggest that M&As may effectively eliminate firms' pledging risks and that share pledging mitigates shareholders' conflict of interest regarding M&A decisions.

This paper investigates how stock market investors react to non-fraudulent firms that share the same investment bank with fraudulent companies. Using a Chinese sample from the period of 2003 to 2018, we find that firms penalized for IPO or M&A fraud induce stock price declines among non-fraudulent firms which share the same investment banks (non-fraudulent contagion firms). The results also show that stock price declines are more pronounced for low-quality investment banks, and investors impose larger penalties on stock prices when non-fraudulent client firms are of lower earnings quality, weaker corporate governance, and higher information asymmetry. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the non-fraudulent contagion firms are more likely to commit accounting fraud and exhibit inferior long-term post-IPO/post-M&A performance. Overall, the findings indicate an important stock price contagion effect occurring at the investment bank level.

本文基于会计稳健性的视角探讨了多个大股东的治理效应.以2007-2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,本文研究发现多个大股东的股权结构提高了会计稳健性,减少控股股东的私利行为是多个大股东影响会计稳健性的主要途径.进一步研究发现,多个大股东的数量、持股比例均提高了会计稳健性;在治理环境比较薄弱的情况下,多个大股东对会计稳健性的提升效应更加明显.通过分析多个大股东对会计稳健性的影响,本文为优化公司治理和改善公司信息环境提供了启示.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文以2000-2016年中国上市公司的并购事件为样本,基于2008年《劳动合同法》这一政策冲击在不同劳动密集型的目标方间的异质性,通过构建双重差分模型来检验《劳动合同法》对公司并购绩效的影响。研究发现,《劳动合同法》实施之后,当目标方的劳动密集度比较高时,公司的并购绩效显著降低。我们还发现《劳动合同法》颁布之后,公司并购高劳动密集型标的方的可能性下降。进一步分析表明,当并购方属于民营企业、当并购双方都处于同一行业和同一地区时、当并购双方均处于法律环境比较好的地区时,《劳动合同法》对公司并购绩效所产生的负面作用更强。本文还进行了一系列的稳健性检验。本文在丰富劳动保护和并购相关文献的同时,其研究结论对于政府和企业都有一定的启示意义。</span>

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">控股股东之外的其他大股东可以抑制控股股东隐藏坏消息的行为,从而降低未来股价崩盘风险。本文以2000-2015年的中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了多个大股东对股价崩盘风险的影响。本文的实证结果表明,当公司存在多个大股东时,其股价的崩盘风险更低。进一步的研究发现,其他大股东对控股股东的监督作用主要体现在其他大股东相对于控股股东的力量较大、控股股东隐藏坏消息的动机较强、以及公司治理机制较弱的公司中。本研究在丰富股权结构以及股价崩盘风险相关领域文献的同时,对上市公司、投资者和政府监管部门也具有重要的启示意义。</span>

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">多个大股东的股权结构安排可以降低经理人的代理问题,同时,也可以降低控股股东的私利行为。然而,多个大股东的存在可能导致监督过度,从而减少了那些从长远来说可以为公司创造价值的行为。基于此,本文以2000～2014年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了多个大股东对企业创新的影响及其作用机理。本文研究发现,多个大股东的存在会抑制企业创新。进一步地,当其他大股东的数量越多、相对于控股股东的持股比例越高时,对创新的负向作用越大;同时,我们还发现多个大股东会导致公司风险承担能力下降,对创新失败的容忍度降低,从而为多个大股东股权结构安排所导致的"过度监督"提供了较为充分的证据支持。此外,我们还排除了大股东的合谋假说,并发现独立董事这一机制安排可以在一定程度上缓解其他大股东的"过度监督"行为。本文的研究不仅丰富了企业创新影响因素及多个大股东经济后果领域的研究文献,对现实中如何改善公司治理、提高企业创新能力以及国家创新驱动发展战略的实施均具有较强的启示意义。</span>

Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we examine performance differences between firms with female and male chairs and the channels through which such differences arise. After controlling for the presence of female CEOs and non-chair female directors, we find that chairwoman firms perform better than chairman firms. Boards led by chairwomen also play not only a more effective supervisory role (as evidenced by a higher likelihood of director dissension, a lower likelihood of committing accounting fraud, and higher forced CEO turnover- and pay-performance sensitivity) but also a more active managerial role (as evidenced by more value-enhancing risky investment, more innovation activities, and more effective responses to industry-wide shocks). Moreover, the presence of women on boards as chairs is associated with better attendance behavior among independent directors. These results, which are robust to controlling for the self-selection biases and board gender diversity documented in prior literature, suggest that chairwomen play a more effective leadership role than chairmen in board decision making.

This study investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS hereafter) in firms' investment decisions. Using a sample of 1640 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, we compare the investment efficiency of firms having MLS with that of firms having a single large shareholder and find that the presence and power of MLS are associated with significantly higher investment efficiency. The results are robust after we address endogeneity and sample selection concerns. Further tests show that MLS exert governance mainly through "voice." MLS tend to lower potential overinvestment and increase future investment performance. The impact of MLS on investment efficiency does not vary with a firm's access to resources and is less prominent in firms with stronger governance and less information asymmetry. Our results imply that MLS play a governance role and alleviate a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in a firm's investment efficiency.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文以中国沪深两市2001²012年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察经理薪酬激励对资本结构调整速度的影响,并尝试探讨其作用机理。实证检验结果表明,当资本结构低于目标水平时,经理薪酬越高,公司向上调整资本结构的速度越快。在考虑目标资本结构的其他衡量方法、控制公司特征对调整速度的影响,并采用经理薪酬变化值后,上述研究结论都保持不变。进一步地,当债务对经理人的约束效应较强时,经理薪酬与资本结构调整速度之间的关系更加敏感。本文的研究发现证实了Morellec等（2012）等文献提出的股东经理人代理问题影响资本结构动态调整的债务约束效应机理,并丰富了动态资本结构、经理薪酬等相关领域的文献。</span>

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文通过手工搜集和整理2000-2014年间中国A股上市公司的媒体报道数据,实证研究了媒体报道对企业资本结构动态调整的影响。结果发现,媒体报道在企业的资本结构动态调整中发挥了正面影响,显著提高了企业的调整速度。具体的作用路径为:媒体报道水平越高,企业在低于目标水平时,增加负债的概率越大;而在高于目标水平时,偿还债务和发行股票的概率越大。进一步分情景检验,本文还发现:当企业经历负面事件时,媒体报道的正向影响有所减弱。相反,当企业的分析师关注程度越低或业务复杂程度越高时,媒体报道的影响越大。这些发现为媒体报道在企业资本结构动态调整中发挥积极的信息中介作用提供了直接证据。</span>

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">在人们的固有观念中,非国有企业更加利润导向,因此,非国有企业经理的薪酬激励和解职惩罚与企业绩效的关系要强于国有企业。然而,已有文献并没有为该观点提供有力的证据支持。本文认为,国有企业对经理人的显性业绩要求、受到更强的社会监督、更弱的掏空动机、加之诸多非国有企业经理人身份的特殊性,使得国有企业经理激励契约较非国有企业更为看重公司的绩效表现。本文实证检验发现,国有企业CEO的薪酬与会计绩效、解职与会计绩效的敏感性均高于非国有企业,从而表明国有企业的经理激励契约更加绩效导向。进一步的研究表明,国有企业承担的社会目标尽管增加了CEO的在职消费、提高了政治晋升的可能性,但是并没有改变CEO的薪酬绩效敏感性和变更绩效敏感性。同时,我们还发现CEO解职、CEO薪酬与公司市场绩效并不相关,且国有企业和非国有企业在市场绩效激励契约方面也并无显著差异。</span>

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文以中国沪深两市1998²009年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了法律环境对公司资本结构动态调整的影响,并探讨了这一影响的作用路径。实证检验结果表明,法律环境与资本结构调整速度显著正相关;在区分调整方向（向上调整和向下调整）后,这一关系仍旧显著成立;同时,法律环境显著提高了企业通过增加或减少债务的方式来调整资本结构的可能性,而对权益调整方式的影响并不显著,这说明法律环境影响资本结构调整速度的主要路径是债务融资方式。进一步地,基于投资者保护立法事件的研究表明,立法事件发生后,资本结构总体调整速度、向上调整速度和向下调整速度都显著提高,通过债务融资方式调整资本结构的可能性也显著增大,这表明法律环境与资本结构动态调整之间具有较强的因果关系。</span>