OBJECTIVES:The interpersonal-psychological theory of suicide identifies three risk factors for suicidal behaviours: perceived burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability. We sought to clarify relationships between the interpersonal-psychological risk factors and two individual difference factors, emotion-related impulsivity (ERI) and intolerance of uncertainty (IU). METHODS:In the current study, we analysed self-report scales from a large community sample (N = 169) that was oversampled for individuals with elevated suicidality. We considered two separate factors of ERI: Pervasive Influence of Feelings, which measures how much a person's emotions shape their worldview, and Feelings Trigger Action, which measures impulsive behavioural reactivity to emotions. We tested unique effects of ERI and IU and the interactions of ERI × IU on the three interpersonal-psychological risk factors using linear regression models. RESULTS:Pervasive Influence of Feelings correlated with higher perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, whereas Feelings Trigger Action correlated with higher perceived burdensomeness and acquired capability. Within the regression models, IU correlated significantly with lower acquired capability but not perceived burdensomeness or thwarted belongingness. Interactions of ERI × IU were not significant. CONCLUSIONS:These results demonstrate the importance of considering both factors of ERI in understanding the risk for suicide. Our results also provide novel evidence that while IU may not impact risk factors such as perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, higher levels of IU may serve as some protection against individuals' acquired capability for suicidal action. Limitations and implications of findings are discussed.

OBJECTIVES:As the threat of climate change continues to grow, bolstering individual-level support for climate change initiatives is crucial. More research is needed to better understand how individual difference factors, such as climate change anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty (IU), may shape how people perceive climate change and respond to climate change messaging. To date, the majority of published studies have not taken these individual difference factors into consideration, and IU has been particularly neglected in the climate change literature. This study examined the independent effects of climate change anxiety and IU on three climate change-related outcomes: climate-related distress, support for climate change policies, and behavioural engagement.METHODS:Participants were Florida residents (N = 441) who completed an online survey, including measures of climate change anxiety and IU. Participants then watched a video describing climate change consequences and completed three outcome measures: post-video distress, climate change policy support, and behavioural engagement.RESULTS:Controlling for demographic covariates, both climate change anxiety (β = .43, p < .001) and IU (β = .27, p < .001) were associated with greater post-video distress, but only IU independently predicted greater policy support (β = .10, p = .034) and behavioural engagement (β = .12, p = .017).CONCLUSIONS:Our findings suggest that IU may be an important factor in promoting pro-environmental behaviour and policy support, but climate change anxiety may increase emotional distress without boosting meaningful behaviours or support. Our findings highlight the potential influence of cognitive factors on climate change engagement and suggest that invoking uncertainty rather than anxiety may be more effective in catalysing effective environmental engagement.

Background: Existing work proposes that people with higher social anxiety symptoms and sociability alcohol expectancies believe alcohol can lower their anxiety. However, studies have primarily analyzed retrospective reports, not anticipatory motives. Since predictions of future emotion (i.e., affective forecasts) strongly influence behavior, it is critical to understand how people predict alcohol will influence their anxiety. Additionally, intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is related to the use of alcohol as a coping tool, but there is a dearth of work testing whether IU influences alcohol-related forecasts. Objectives: Utilizing a novel affective forecasting task, we tested the prediction that social anxiety symptoms, sociability alcohol expectancies, and IU would relate to predictions about alcohol use. In an initial study and preregistered replication, participants imagined themselves in stressful social scenarios and forecasted how anxious they would feel when drinking and when sober. In the replication, participants also forecasted whether they would drink in the imagined scenarios. Results: Contrary to hypotheses, social anxiety symptoms and IU did not significantly predict higher forecasted anxiety across studies, nor did they predict forecasted drinking. Exploratory analyses showed that participants with higher sociability alcohol expectancies forecasted being more likely to drink, and forecasted feeling less anxious when drinking (versus being sober). Even after statistically controlling for social anxiety, the effect of sociability expectancies remained significant in predicting forecasted anxiety and forecasted drinking. Conclusions: Clinicians could consider specifically targeting sociability expectancies for alcohol use difficulties, and future research should continue utilizing affective forecasting paradigms to test links between social anxiety, alcohol expectancies, and alcohol-use problems.

Foundational cognitive models propose that people with anxiety and depression show risk estimation bias, but most literature does not compute true risk estimation bias by comparing people's subjective risk estimates to their individualized reality (i.e., person-level objective risk). In a diverse community sample (N = 319), we calculated risk estimation bias by comparing people's subjective risk estimates for contracting COVID-19 to their individualized objective risk. Person-level objective risk was consistently low and did not differ across symptom levels, suggesting that for low probability negative events, people with greater symptoms show risk estimation bias that is driven by subjective risk estimates. Greater levels of anxiety, depression, and COVID-specific perseverative cognition separately predicted higher subjective risk estimates. In a model including COVID-specific perseverative cognition alongside anxiety and depression scores, the only significant predictor of subjective risk estimates was COVID-specific perseverative cognition, indicating that symptoms more closely tied to feared outcomes may more strongly influence risk estimation. Finally, subjective risk estimates predicted information-seeking behavior and eating when anxious, but did not significantly predict alcohol or marijuana use, drinking to cope, or information avoidance. Implications for clinical practitioners and future research are discussed.

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic, a high-uncertainty situation, presents an ideal opportunity to examine how trait intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and situation-specific IU relate to each other and to mental health outcomes. The current longitudinal study examined the unique associations of trait and COVID-specific IU with general distress (anxiety and depression) and pandemic-specific concerns (pandemic stress and vaccine worry). Methods: A community sample of Florida adults (N = 2152) was surveyed online at three timepoints. They completed measures of trait IU at Wave 1 (April-May 2020) and COVID-specific IU at Wave 2 (May-June 2020). At Wave 3 (December-February 2021), they reported symptoms of depression, anxiety, pandemic stress, and vaccine worry. Results: We used structural equation modeling to test our overall model. Trait IU significantly predicted later COVID-specific IU, however there was no significant effect of trait IU on any outcome measure after accounting for COVID-specific IU. Notably, COVID-specific IU fully mediated the relationship between trait IU and all four symptom measures. Limitations: There were several limitations of the current study, including the use of a community sample and high participant attrition. Conclusions: Results suggest that COVID-specific IU predicts mental health outcomes over and above trait IU, extending the existing literature. These findings indicate that uncertainty may be more aversive when it is related to specific distressing situations, providing guidance for developing more specific and individualized interventions. Idiographic treatments which target situation-specific IU may be more efficacious in reducing affective symptoms and related stress during the COVID-19 pandemic or other similar events.

As alcohol use continues to be a leading contributor of death and disability, the need to better understand motivations for drinking remains critical. Influential Stress Response Dampening (SRD) and related theories suggest alcohol is negatively reinforcing due to its ability to lower the magnitude of responses to stressors. SRD effects, however, remain inconsistently observed in the laboratory despite over three decades of research. Building on animal models, a translational program of research suggests alcohol reliably and robustly produces more SRD during the presentation of uncertain relative to certain stressors, but the generalizability of this research remains unclear. In this brief communication, we test if previous research on alcohol SRD and stressor certainty generalizes beyond the acute effects of a dose of alcohol on reactions to uncommonly encountered laboratory stressors to imagined real-life scenarios. We use a novel experimental affective forecasting task to gauge drinkers’ expectations about alcohol and anxiety in relatively uncertain and certain social situations. Participants reported expecting a greater dampening effect of alcohol on their anxiety when imagining being in a social situation with relatively uncertain compared to relatively certain stressors. We discuss this result in terms of the broader alcohol SRD literature and review its implications for potential future directions in alcohol SRD research, as well as potential for the treatment of disordered alcohol use.

Background and objectives: Affective forecasting (AF) is the prediction of future emotional states. Negatively biased affective forecasts (i.e., overestimating negative affect) have been associated with trait anxiety, social anxiety, and depression symptoms, but few studies have tested these relationships while covarying commonly co-occurring symptoms.Methods: In this study, participants (N = 114) completed a computer game in dyads. Participants were ran-domized into one of two conditions: a condition in which they were led to believe they were at-fault for losing their dyad money (n = 24 dyads) or a condition in which they were told no one was at fault (n = 34 dyads). Prior to the computer game, participants forecasted their affect for each potential game outcome.Results: More severe social anxiety, trait-level anxiety, and depressive symptoms were all associated with more negative AF bias in the at-fault relative to the no-fault condition, and this effect persisted when controlling for other symptoms. Cognitive and social anxiety sensitivity was also associated with more negative AF bias. Limitations: The generalizability of our findings is innately limited by our non-clinical, undergraduate sample. Future work should replicate and extend our research in more diverse populations and clinical samples.Conclusions: Overall, our results support that AF biases are observed across a range of psychopathology symptoms and associated with transdiagnostic cognitive risk factors. Future work should continue investigating the etio-logical role of AF bias in psychopathology.

The COVID-19 pandemic, a high-uncertainty situation, presents an ideal opportunity to examine how trait intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and situation-specific IU relate to each other and to mental health outcomes. The current longitudinal study examined the measurement of trait and COVID-specific IU, and their unique associations with general distress (anxiety and depression) and pandemic-specific concerns (pandemic stress and vaccine worry). A community sample of Florida adults (N=2152) were surveyed online at three timepoints. They completed measures of trait IU at Wave 1 (April-May 2020) and COVID-specific IU at Wave 2 (May-June 2020). At Wave 3 (December-February 2021), they reported symptoms of depression, anxiety, pandemic stress, and vaccine worry. Confirmatory factor analyses revealed a two-factor structure of trait IU but a one-factor structure for COVID-specific IU. COVID-specific IU fully mediated the relation between trait IU and all symptom measures. Results suggest that COVID-specific IU predicts mental health outcomes over and above trait IU. These findings indicate that uncertainty may be more aversive when it is related to specific distressing situations, providing guidance for developing more specific and individualized interventions.

INTRODUCTION:Emotion-related impulsivity, defined by poor constraint in the face of emotion, is related to internalizing symptoms, cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Internalizing symptoms, though, are profoundly tied to stress reactivity, and little is known about how emotion-related impulsivity relates to stress reactivity. METHOD:Taking advantage of a sample that had completed measures of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and two forms of emotion-related impulsivity before the pandemic, we asked participants to complete three weekly follow-up internalizing assessments early in the pandemic. RESULTS:Among the 150 participants, pre-pandemic emotion-related impulsivity scores predicted higher depression, anxiety, general distress, and suicidal ideation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Controlling for pre-pandemic scores, one form of emotion-related impulsivity (Feelings Trigger Action) predicted increased anxiety and general distress. We also examined how pre-pandemic emotion-related impulsivity was moderated by weekly COVID-related stress. One form of emotion-related impulsivity (Pervasive Influence of Feelings) predicted internalizing symptoms at low stress levels, and a different form (Feelings Trigger Action) predicted internalizing symptoms at higher stress levels. LIMITATIONS:Limitations include the small sample size, the absence of repeat measures of impulsivity, the attrition of individuals with more internalizing symptoms, and the reliance on self-rated measures. CONCLUSIONS:Forms of emotion-related impulsivity predict increases in anxiety and distress over time, but the interactions with stress levels appear to vary. Emotion-related impulsivity can be addressed with accessible intervention tools, suggesting the promise of broader screening for those at risk for internalizing symptoms during periods of high stress.

The theory of depressive realism holds that depressed individuals are less prone to optimistic bias, and are thus more realistic, in assessing their control or performance. Since the theory was proposed 40 years ago, many innovations have been validated for testing cognitive accuracy, including improved measures of bias in perceived control and performance. We incorporate several of those innovations in a well-powered, pre-registered study designed to identify depressive realism. Amazon MTurk workers (N = 246) and undergraduate students (N = 134) completed a classic contingency task, an overconfidence task, and measures of mental health constructs, including depression and anxiety. We measured perceived control throughout the contingency task, allowing us to compare control estimates at the trial-level to estimates assessed at task conclusion. We found no evidence that depressive symptoms relate to illusory control or to overconfidence. Our results suggest that despite its popular acceptance, depressive realism is not replicable.

Introduction: The dominance behavioral system (DBS) is a biologically-based multi-faceted system guiding motivation, behavior, self-perceptions, and responsivity to social experiences related to dominance. Evidence has indicated that DBS facets differentially relate to specific psychopathologies. In the present research, we attempt to replicate Tang-Smith et al. (2015) and extended findings by including antisocial behavior, social anxiety, and psychopathy. Methods: Participants (N = 712) completed measures assessing antisocial, socially anxious, depressive, manic, and psychopathic tendencies, along with dominance-relevant dimensions. Results: Using multi-group structural equation modelling, antisocial behavior, social anxiety, and depression overlapped with lower Influence/Power and Authentic Pride. Social Anxiety was uniquely related to lower Comfort with Leadership. Antisocial behavior, mania, and psychopathy overlapped with greater Comfort with Leadership and Ruthlessness, and antisocial behavior and mania with greater Hubris. Antisocial behavior was uniquely related to lower Cooperation. These findings were consistent across genders. Discussion: The present research replicates and extends findings that internalizing and externalizing psychopathologies have unique DBS profiles. Implications and limitations are discussed.

Empirical audit and review is an approach to assessing the evidentiary value of a research area. It involves identifying a topic and selecting a cross-section of studies for replication. We apply the method to research on the psychological consequences of scarcity. Starting with the papers citing a seminal publication in the field, we conducted replications of 20 studies that evaluate the role of scarcity priming in pain sensitivity, resource allocation, materialism, and many other domains. There was considerable variability in the replicability, with some strong successes and other undeniable failures. Empirical audit and review does not attempt to assign an overall replication rate for a heterogeneous field, but rather facilitates researchers seeking to incorporate strength of evidence as they refine theories and plan new investigations in the research area. This method allows for an integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to review and enables the growth of a cumulative science.

Background. Burgeoning evidence suggests that loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic is tied to high levels of depression and anxiety. The current study is unique, though, in examining which facets of social behavior and perceived social quality are most tied to internalizing symptoms using longitudinal data, including a prepandemic baseline, collected from a community sample of adults with pre-existing mental health concerns (analyzed n = 144). Methods. Participants completed measures of depressive and anxious symptoms prepandemic, followed by three weekly surveys during the pandemic. We distinguished four social variables: inperson social engagement, remote social engagement, social disruption, and social distress. OLS and mixedeffects regression models examined 1) pre-pandemic baseline symptoms as predictors of social functioning during the pandemic and 2) time-lagged associations between symptoms and social functioning during the pandemic. Results. Social behavior and social perceptions were dissociable. Baseline depressive, but not anxious, symptoms predicted greater social distress during the pandemic. Both anxious and depressive symptoms were predicted by social variables, but the specific associations differed: depressive symptoms were related to perceived social quality, whereas anxious symptoms were more tied to reported social behavior. Limitations. We relied on self-report indices, and causality should not be inferred directly from these correlational data. Conclusions. Overall, our results indicate that it is possible to follow social guidelines and even to spend relatively few hours socializing with close others, while still feeling connected and rewarded; however, people who struggle with depression and anhedonia were particularly vulnerable to distressing feelings of social disconnection amid the pandemic.

Overconfidence is a robust cognitive bias with far-reaching implications, but prior research on cultural differences in overconfidence has been conflicting. We present two studies that measure the three forms of overconfidence across cultures, allowing us to paint a more complete picture of cross-cultural overconfidence than previous studies. In Study 1, we compare overconfidence among participants from cultures traditionally considered individualistic (the US and UK) with participants from cultures traditionally conceptualized as collectivistic (India and China). In Study 2, we employ a new task to compare overconfidence in participants from the US and India. Our first key result is the successful cross-cultural replication, in both studies, of the effect of task difficulty on overestimation and overplacement, which bolsters our faith that our measures operate similarly across cultures. Our second key finding is that, while we find evidence of higher overestimation in our Indian participants, neither overplacement nor overprecision show consistent cross-cultural differences. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that previous findings of increased overconfidence in participants from collectivistic cultures may not be as robust as previously reported.

Overconfidence could be adaptive if it bolstered motivation, self-efficacy, and/or persistence. This study attempted to experimentally manipulate overconfidence via positive feedback to search for a relationship between overconfidence and performance or persistence on a Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) task. We sought potential mediators of these relationships by measuring participants’ self-reported levels of self-efficacy, anxiety, and self-esteem prior to completing the RPM task. We found that positive feedback significantly enhanced performance, but that it did not induce overconfidence or affect self-efficacy, self-esteem, or anxiety. Our findings indicate that the benefits of positive feedback are not mediated by overconfidence. We also explored the accuracy of participants’ predictions of how positive feedback would impact performance, self-efficacy, anxiety, and self-esteem. Participants accurately predicted that positive feedback could increase performance. Although our manipulation had weak effects on these measures, participants also predicted that positive feedback would increase self-efficacy and self-esteem and decrease anxiety.

Overconfidence is a robust cognitive bias with far-reaching implications, but prior research on cultural differences in overconfidence has been conflicting. We present two studies that measure the three forms of overconfidence across cultures, allowing us to paint a more complete picture of cross-cultural overconfidence than previous studies. In Study 1, we compare overconfidence among participants from cultures traditionally considered individualistic (the US and UK) with participants from cultures traditionally conceptualized as collectivistic (India and China). In Study 2, we employ a new task to compare overconfidence in participants from the US and India. Our first key result is the successful crosscultural replication, in both studies, of the effect of task difficulty on overestimation and overplacement, which bolsters our faith that our measures operate similarly across cultures. Our second key finding is that, while we find evidence of higher overestimation in our Indian participants, neither overplacement nor overprecision show consistent cross-cultural differences. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that previous findings of increased overconfidence in participants from collectivistic cultures may not be as robust as previously reported.