Why can contact with nature be psychologically restorative? For more than four decades, research on nature's restorative effects has sought to answer this question through two influential theoretical frameworks: Attention Restoration Theory (ART) and Stress Reduction Theory (SRT). These theories have been central in shaping the field, yet they have also attracted criticism. Although their limitations may appear resolvable through theoretical refinement or additional empirical work, we adopt a meta-theoretical perspective and argue that ART and SRT fall short of basic standards of theory construction. First, key constructs thought to predict restorative experiences are often vague, circular, or insufficiently specified. Second, both theories exhibit explanatory fragility: ART's resource-based account does not clarify how attentional depletion and recovery are meant to operate, whereas SRT's evolutionary explanation relies on adaptationist claims whose added explanatory value remains unclear. Third, the weak specification of their predictors and mechanisms makes both theories conceptually elastic and at risk of being insulated from disconfirmation. We conclude by calling for greater epistemic restraint when constructing explanatory frameworks in this research domain.

For more than four decades, research on restorative environments has been guided by two influential theoretical frameworks: Attention Restoration Theory (ART) and Stress Reduction Theory (SRT). While these theories have been instrumental in shaping the field, they have also faced criticism. Although it might appear that the limitations of both theories could be resolved through adjustments and further research, we adopt a meta-theoretical perspective to assess ART and SRT against general standards of theory construction. We argue that neither framework meets core standards for predictive utility or explanatory power. We focus on two issues. On the one hand, critical constructs assumed to predict restorative nature experiences are often vague, circular (e.g., “soft fascination”) or underdetermined in terms of their level of specificity. On the other hand, both theories exhibit explanatory fragility: ART’s resource-based account of restoration does not clarify how depletion and replenishment actually occur, whereas SRT’s evolutionary explanation posits what appears to be an unnecessary and unfalsifiable adaptive mechanism. We conclude by challenging the assumption that the psychologically beneficial effects of nature are in some way “special” and instead advocate for greater epistemic restraint in building nature-specific theories around beneficial nature effects.

The biophilia hypothesis has been influential in explaining humans' attraction to nature. Here, we critically evaluate recent research on biophilia, focusing on automatic and instinct-like responses to nature. We explore how biophilia-based interventions may contribute to inequality and propose cultural evolution as a parsimonious alternative to biophilia.

Research funding systems fundamentally influence how science operates. This paper aims to analyze the allocation of competitive research funding from different perspectives: How reliable are decision processes for funding? What are the economic costs of competitive funding? How does competition for funds affect doing risky research? How do competitive funding environments affect scientists themselves, and which ethical issues must be considered? We attempt to identify gaps in our knowledge of research funding systems; we propose recommendations for policymakers and funding agencies, including empirical experiments of decision processes and the collection of data on these processes. With our recommendations, we hope to contribute to developing improved ways of organizing research funding.

Despite numerous public health organizations supporting the pathologization of obesity and considering recent obesity rates a health crisis, many researchers in the humanities, social sciences, and even in the health sciences remain unconvinced. In this paper, we address a set of arguments coming from these academic fields that criticize medical models of obesity for their supposedly flawed diagnostic categories that shift focus onto individuals and support moralizing judgements. Clarifying some key claims in these models and explicating the view of obesity in terms of energy dysregulation, we aim to tease apart misunderstandings and argue that not only do these models not say what they are often accused of saying, but their apparent vices may actually be virtues in helping to combat stigma. Building on the social psychology of stigma and disease labeling, we then suggest that current medical models are largely supportive of many moral and political aims promoted by critics of these models.

Are attention issues disorders or not? Philosophers of medicine have tried to address this question by looking for properties that distinguish disorders from non-disorders. Such properties include deviation of a statistical norm, a loss of function or experienced suffering. However, attempts at such conceptual analysis have not led to a consensus on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of disorder. Recently, philosophers have proposed an experimental approach to investigate in which circumstances people think a specific concept is applicable. Here we present a quantitative vignette study investigating whether disorder attribution depends on the perceived cause and the perceived type of treatment for an attention problem. The results of our study indicate that the attribution of a disorder decreased when the attention problem was understood as caused by bullying (social environmental cause) or by an accident (non-social environmental cause) rather than a genetic cause. When prescribed a pill, attention problems were considered a disorder to a larger extent than when the child was prescribed an environmental treatment. Our study also suggests that whereas successful environmental treatments will not necessarily decrease the disorder attribution, successful pharmacological treatments will decrease the likelihood that a person is thought to still suffer from a disorder after receiving the treatment.

When producing species classifications, taxonomists are often confronted with gray-area cases. For example, because of incipient or shallow divergence, it can be scientifically valid both to split groups of organisms into separate species and to lump them together into one species. It has been claimed that, in such cases, the ranking decision is, in part, subjective and may differ between taxonomists because of differences in their conceptions of species or even in conservation values. In the present article, we use a vignette study to empirically test this claim and to explore the drivers of taxonomic decision-making in gray-area cases. For three fictional taxonomic scenarios, we asked the opinion of a sample of taxonomists on one of slightly different versions of an abstract containing a decision on species status. The cases were explicitly designed to represent gray-area cases, and the differences between versions related to potential drivers of decisions, such as information on conservation status, different kinds of additional evidence, and information on the presence or absence of gene flow. In general, our results suggest that taxonomists tend to disagree at least moderately about species-ranking decisions in gray-area cases even when they are presented with the same data. We did not find evidence that species concepts or conservation values are strong drivers of taxonomic disagreement. Instead, operational concerns, such as the presence or absence of different kinds of data, seemed to be more important.

There has been a surge of interest in research integrity over the last decade, with a wide range of studies investigating the prevalence of questionable research practices (QRPs). However, nearly all these studies focus on research design, data collection and analysis, and hardly any empirical research has been done on the occurrence of QRPs in the context of research funding. To fill this gap, we conducted a cross-sectional pre-registered survey of applicants, reviewers and panel members from the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO), one of the main funding agencies in Belgium. We developed a bespoke survey and further refined it through feedback from experienced researchers and a pilot study. We asked how often respondents had engaged in a series of QRPs over the last ten years. A total of 1748 emails were sent, inviting recipients to participate in the survey, complemented by featuring the survey in the FWO newsletter. This resulted in 704 complete responses. Our results indicate that such QRPs are remarkably prevalent. Of the 496 participants who answered both the applicant and reviewer track, more than 60% responded that they engaged regularly in at least one of such practices, and around 40% indicated that they engaged at least occasionally in half of the QRPs queried. Only 12% reported not to have engaged in any of the QRPs. Contrary to our hypotheses, male respondents did not self-report to engage in the QRPs more often than female respondents, nor was there an association between the prevalence of QRPs and self-reported success rate in grant funding. Furthermore, half of the respondents indicated that they doubted the reliability of the grant peer review process more often than not. These results suggest that preventive action is needed, and provide new reasons to reconsider the practice of allocating research money through grant peer review.

Scientific activities strongly depend on concepts and classifications to represent the world in an orderly and workable manner. This creates a trade-off. On the one hand, it is important to leave space for conceptual and classificatory criticism. On the other hand, agreement on which concepts and classifications to use, is often crucial for communication and the integration of research and ideas. In this paper, we show that this trade-off can sometimes best be resolved through conceptual governance, in which scientific institutions set a collective conceptual standard, and that voting can be a reasonable way to implement that governance. Voting is a means to aggregate among conflicting values, preferences and priorities that often underpin conceptual or classificatory debates, all while signaling ongoing disagreement. We also discuss how the legitimacy of the voting process and its outcome can be ensured.

Dataset for a vignette study to explore whether, and for what reasons, taxonomists disagree about ranking decisions.

OF MAYBUGS AND MEN: A History of Philosophy of the Sciences of Homosexuality by Pieter R. Adriaens and Andreas De Block. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2022. 246 pages. Hardcover; $105.00. ISBN: 9780226822426. Paperback; $32.50. ISBN: 9780226822440. Electronic; $31.99. ISBN: 9780226822433. *Pieter Adriaens and Andreas De Block offer a substantive analysis of the science of sexual orientation as it relates to male homosexuality. As a psychologist who has been involved in research1 in the areas of sexual orientation and sexual identity, I found the concepts in the book helpful in thinking through the evidence for what I believe and why. For example, although I have critiqued animal models as inadequate to explain the complexities of human sexual orientation and behavior, Adriaens and De Block challenge the reader to think more deeply about such a response and how it matches up with existing theories and the scientific support for each theory. They are even handed and largely dispassionate in their accounting of both theories and evidence to support various theories. *The authors note in the introduction that the book will be about male homosexuality rather than homosexuality in general; that is, they purposefully exclude female homosexuality as it has been far less attended to in the scientific literature and what is known suggests female homosexuality appears to be different than male homosexuality in important ways.2 The introduction also frames the goals of the authors: speaking of homosexuality, to "increase its familiarity" and, by so doing, "reduce homonegativity" (p. 15). Interestingly, the word "homonegativity" is frequently used by the authors throughout the book although, surprisingly, not as carefully defined as many other terms. The authors prefer the term to "homophobia," which they view as too clinical or psychiatric. Homonegativity captures other negative emotions apart from fear, "such as disgust and anger" (p. 196). This is perhaps a small point, but I find the term too imprecise and frequently wielded against any formed judgment about what is morally impermissible behavior. *Chapter one, "Not by Genes and Hormones Alone," addresses the question of innateness. Psychologists such as myself tend to be rather casual in their use of terms like "innate" and the authors help all of us here by defining terms and examining key findings related to the etiology of homosexual orientation. They are measured and judicious in their treatment of twin studies, direct genetic evidence, the maternal immune hypothesis, and prenatal hormonal exposure. They conclude that male "homosexuality is at least somewhat heritable and somewhat canalized" (p. 41). Indeed, the complexity of the research here leads the authors to conclude that no one theory will account for the variety of experiences even among male homosexuals that exist today, let alone expressions noted throughout history and across cultures. I could not agree more with this conclusion. *Christians may wonder about other theories of etiology that are popular mostly in conventionally religious communities, such as traumatic experiences (e.g., childhood sexual abuse) or the sexualization of emotional deprivations due to a failure to identify with one's same-sex parent. These theories are not directly engaged and, while Freud is discussed, the emphasis in this chapter is on the biological bases of homosexuality, which is where so much of science is today and with good reason; there is insufficient scientific support for these other theories and little interest in psychopathology-based accounts of homosexuality. The authors are more interested in examining the broader essentialist versus constructivist debate and whether or to what extent biological data inform that debate. *Chapter two, "Sham Matings and Other Shenanigans," addresses research on animal homosexual behavior. This chapter content speaks to the title of the book, as the sexual behavior of maybugs, dolphins, sheep, and many other animals is discussed. As I mentioned above, I have been rather dismissive of animal research, but the authors present a more comprehensive and compelling case for animal models that at least has to be engaged and cannot be simply dismissed as irrelevant. I think ultimately the Christian does not look at animal behaviors as being sufficiently complex to be analogous to human sexuality, orientation, identity, and behavior, but there is more research and more thought behind the research; it is important to be familiar with this research for those who work in this area. *Chapter three, "Beyond the Paradox," looks at evolutionary theory and homosexuality. Evolutionary theory is another topic that many Christians might not find particularly compelling when it comes to thinking about sexual orientation. They might be more likely to simply disregard modern homosexuality as largely incompatible with evolutionary theory. This chapter challenges such a maneuver and, again, invites the reader to consider how evolutionary theory may provide a reasonable account of modern male homosexuality. *Chapter four, "Values, Facts, and Disorders," considers the relationship between homosexuality and psychiatric nosology. This was a helpful chapter that provides the reader with more of the history and cultural context out of which homosexuality was viewed as a disorder and how it was viewed prior to that--from crime to disorder, from behavior to instinct--and how views of heredity and other important concepts initially played into early and developing conceptualizations. This chapter also briefly addresses the question of reorientation or conversion therapy. *There is also an epilogue that raises the question of whether there are risks associated with future research on the etiology of sexual orientation. Such questions are tied to prevention and to some extent conversion or reorientation. Interestingly, the mainstream LGBTQ+ community and more conservative Christian communities might actually have a superordinate goal, to not screen or select in utero for sexual orientation preferences because of the contemporary Christian commitment to valuing the imago Dei in all persons from conception. The epilogue surprised me the most because it came across as outside of the scope of what the authors had been addressing in the history and philosophy of science. But, again, it was well considered and thoughtful. The authors concluded that the risks should be managed in a way that protects the LGBTQ+ community but also does not preclude such research from taking place. The authors are more concerned with the "morally questionable biases" (p. 191) behind the research. Again, such a statement does not make an argument for ethical conclusions about homosexual behavior, nor does it engage formed judgments that reach conclusions other than those of the authors. *Christians interested in the history and philosophy of science related to male homosexuality will not be disappointed by this book. It is in depth and even handed in its treatment of research and competing theories. I would not describe it as anti-religious in its presentation of ideas and historical context. In fact, the authors do not really engage religion as such; rather, they engage some of the ideas derived from or contemporaneous with religious thought at the time, particularly if those thoughts were evident in science, but, again, they do so in a measured way. They primarily engage arguments and the conclusions derived within science (e.g., genetics, zoology, psychiatry) itself. *Notes *1M. A. Yarhouse and D. C. Haldeman, "Introduction to Special Section on Current Advances in the Intersection of Religiousness/Spirituality and LGBTQ+ Studies," [Editorial], Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13, no. 3 (2021): 255-56, https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000438; and M. A. Yarhouse et al., Listening to Sexual Minorities: A Study of Faith and Sexuality on Christian College Campuses (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2018). *2See W. H. James, "Biological and Psychosocial Determinants of Male and Female Human Sexual Orientation," Journal of Biosocial Science 37, no. 5 (2005): 555-67, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932004007059. *Reviewed by Mark A. Yarhouse, Dr. Arthur P. Rech & Mrs. Jean May Rech Professor of Psychology; and Director, Sexual & Gender Identity Institute, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187.

A recent controversy about neural networks allegedly capable of detecting a person's sexual orientation raises the question of whether all research on homosexuality should be permitted. This paper considers two arguments for limits to such research, and concludes that there are good reasons to limit at least the dissemination of applied research on the etiology of homosexuality. The paper then briefly sketches how this could work, and looks at three objections against these limitations.

In September 2020, the surgeon Paulo Macchiarini, who used stem cell technology to enable the transplants of artificial and donor trachea, was charged with aggravated assault in Sweden. In this comment, we argue that the Ethics Council of the Karolinska Institute should have considered issues from philosophy of science when they were brought to their attention, rather than dismiss them as irrelevant to research ethics. We demonstrate how conceptual issues of a philosophy-of-science-kind about clinical research and medical practice should be integral to research ethics.