Més d’un terç de les constitucions actuals estableixen un parlament bicameral. Tanmateix, la institució d’una segona cambra té una història força més llarga que el constitucionalisme modern: arrelades en antigues assemblees elitistes, les segones cambres deuen el seu disseny predominant al concepte de federalisme. Gairebé totes les constitucions federals preveuen, doncs, una segona cambra concebuda com un vincle institucionalitzat entre les unitats constituents i el nivell federal. Però malgrat la seva associació clàssica amb el govern compartit, les segones cambres federals rarament compleixen aquesta promesa. Això es deu principalment a competències deficients o a una representació política ineficient, tot i que la seva legitimitat democràtica les distingeix d’altres segones cambres que són objecte de crítiques més generals a les estructures bicamerals. Mentre que alguns proposen mecanismes alternatius de representació territorial, d’altres neguen completament la necessitat de les segones cambres per al federalisme. Tot i això, la necessitat que les unitats constituents participin formalment en la presa de decisions federals no es pot substituir fàcilment. Atès que les segones cambres federals varien considerablement pel que fa a la seva composició, el nomenament dels seus membres i les seves funcions, l’article n’examinarà el potencial i els límits des d’una perspectiva comparada. Si bé tradicionalment s’ha centrat l’atenció en el paper extern de les segones cambres federals respecte d’altres institucions, no es pot oblidar la dimensió horitzontal dins d’aquestes cambres; és a dir, la manera com les unitats constituents estan representades i com es duu a terme la presa de decisions interna.

Targeted at students and university teachers concerned with the study of federalism from various disciplines, this chapter explains second chambers in federal systems. It gives a short introduction on the genesis of federal second chambers, which are rooted in the US Senate, and their development across the globe. The chapter also examines the main types regarding organisation and functions of federal second chambers as well as the concept of perfect and imperfect bicameralism. It points out legal and political challenges for federal second chambers and discusses if and how dysfunctionalities could be overcome by alternative mechanisms. The chapter also includes information on how to structure and teach federal second chambers for students and how this topic fits into the field of federalism research and study. It also suggests possible questions for class discussion and essays, test and examination questions, readings and points for evaluation.

Recalling Alexander Hamilton’s famous statement according to which the judiciary is the “least dangerous branch”, the article examines both dangers to specialised constitutional courts and dangers stemming from them. Hamilton already perceived these contrasting dangers as either a “usurpation” of courts by the other branches or as an arbitrary interpretation of the constitution by the courts themselves. Both dangers can be mitigated by applying various organisational and functional designs, but they cannot be totally excluded. A constitutionally positive “dangerousness” of constitutional courts which serves the effective protection of the constitution results from the number and strength of their functions, but also from the relevance of the time factor for their decisions, as the corona crisis shows. Constitutional courts, however, do not just face the other branches, but – from the view of an internal separation of powers – also other courts. The relationship between constitutional courts and other courts or bodies belonging to the other branches is complex and must not be reduced to the notion of a separation of monolithic powers.

In recent years, theoretical research on federalism has experienced a kind of renaissance that seems to be the logical consequence of sundry comparative books and articles that demonstrate an ever-growing realm of federalisms, as federalism became the magic word for describing all kinds of combinations between self-rule and shared rule, for mature and emerging, full-fledged and quasi, symmetric and asymmetric multi-tiered systems, including even “hybrids” such as the European Union. A common narrative of these works was not to consider “just” classical federal states or to waste time reflecting on the term federalism itself which, deriving from the Latin word for compact or agreement, seems to have lost all its meaning when being generously applied to multi-tiered systems without any discernible traces of a foedus either at their foundation or afterwards. Obviously, the plethora of comparative literature provoked novel theoretical perspectives that range from questioning the very need of defining federalism (Palermo and Kössler 2017, 64–66) to the elaboration of a “federal idea” (Lev 2017). An original addition to these newer theories on federalism is the concept of “dynamic federalism,” which is also the title of a pioneering book recently published by Patricia Popelier.

Von Government zu Governance , Seite 13 - 38

Vor kurzem hob der VfGH jene Wortfolge in § 78 StGB auf, die die Beihilfe zum Selbstmord unter Strafe stellte. Abweichend von seiner bisherigen Judikatur hielt er das ausnahmslose Verbot der Beihilfe zum Selbstmord für eine Verletzung eines aus dem „Recht auf freie Selbstbestimmung“ abgeleiteten „Rechts auf ein menschenwürdiges Sterben“. Der Beitrag setzt sich aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht kritisch mit der Begründung des Erkenntnisses auseinander.

Federalism and equality are often described as principles with opposed purposes: while the one seeks to ensure diversity management, the other is invoked to establish homogeneity. At closer glance, however, both principles have a common narrative in the ancient formula of suum cuique tribuere. In federal systems, it is inherent to give each level its own distinctive powers. This can be done in strict accordance with formal equality when the federated units are treated without distinction. But even in symmetric systems, these units may be treated differently in certain contexts, such as, e.g., representation in second chambers or fiscal arrangements. Drawing from factual differences regarding territorial size, number of inhabitants or other, this reflects the idea of substantive equality. But are these factors a sufficient justification in all cases? And how can federalism legitimize the unequal treatment of persons living in different regions? Finally, who decides on the suum cuique?

Liberal constitutions should not and do not want democracies to die. Constitutional interpretation is an inexhaustible topic that has been explored under innumerable aspects. A large part of the recent literature on constitutional interpretation takes a court perspective, e.g. which kind of interpretation methods and style of reasoning courts use, whether they lead an interpretive dialogue with other courts or even governments and legislatures, whether they exercise strong- or weak-form review, etc. In liberal and illiberal democracies, instead, the constitution as such will be heeded since in both types of democracies the commitment to popular sovereignty as the source of the constituent power vests the constitution with a status that cannot be overthrown easily. The rules considered to be relevant in this context are rules that guide the interpretive organs with regard to method and yardstick of constitutional interpretation.

In the context of the Corona crisis, Sec 1 C-HG authorizes the Federal Minister of Education, Science and Research to deviate from many teaching-related provisions of the UG 2002 and HG 2005. The empowerment neither obliges the Minister to enact a deviating regulation nor determines what direction the regulation should take. Apparently, the provision transgresses the borders of the “differentiated legality principle” and limits itself to an unconstitutional, “formal-law” delegation. Furthermore, Sec 1 C-HG permits the Minister to enact a regulation outside the traditional empowerment framework that Art 81c B-VG implies according to the prevailing doctrine, which undermines the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the universities. Finally, it is questioned why the delegation was needed and why the law-maker itself has so far not enacted the contents of the Minister’s delegated regulation (C-UHV), in particular as that regulation itself further delegates much of its contents to the rectorates.

Research on federalism existed even before the first federal state emerged. It is an epic tale about leagues and unions, covenants and constitutions, loyalty and subsidiarity. But federalism is also about peace-making, vertical separation of powers, compound democracy, multi-layered governance and minority protection. It is not by chance, therefore, that almost all federal states are liberal democracies. Although a plethora of academic literature has been written on federalism, including many classical works of leading academics in the fields of constitutional law and social sciences, the research has never been exhaustive...