There is a vast body of literature dedicated to identifying the major drivers that explain human impacts on the environment. In this study, we utilize the STIRPAT framework to assess whether two controversial factors should be considered when examining how humans affect the environment. Specifically, we investigate whether the quality of the democratic regime and the size of the informal economy play significant roles in determining human impacts on the environment. To address this question, we employ the extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to characterize these drivers as either robust or fragile. Based on the findings of this paper, both variables are classified as fragile, suggesting that they may not fully explain human impacts on the environment. We have taken great care in interpreting the results.

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.

Building around the Goal-Framing Theory, this article explores farmer's adoption choices of organic farming practices under the presence of land subsidies and price premiums. The main results are: (i) even though land subsidies induce organic production, they reduce the fraction of organic farming practices been adopted; (ii) price premiums can induce both organic farming and the adoption of a higher fraction of organic farming practices, provided that they are high enough; (iii) land subsidies and price premiums are likely to induce over-compliance if the adoption target is relatively low; (iv) it is more likely to observe over-compliance among farmers who in the absence of financial incentives exhibit normative goal preferences; (v) land subsidies should be accompanied by additional interventions that foster normative behaviour (e.g., educational programs, environmental campaigns, etc.). Such a necessity is reduced once price premiums coexist. Finally, a payment scheme is proposed, as well.

Whether and how new members can join international fisheries agreements, which are in charge of managing the global commons, is a complex issue and remains unresolved in the scholarly literature. This paper presents a simple, participatory and fair procedure, which utilizes the concepts of minimum rights and the nondiscrimination principle to propose “compromise” share of fishing rights to a new member. In the specific case of tuna management in the Atlantic regulated by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, our proposal was tested using a number of fairness indices, namely the Gini Coefficient, the Duclos, Esteban and Ray Index and the Decile Ratio. Then the Reference Point Method, an interactive multi-criteria framework, was used to aggregate the fairness indices in order to balance the allocation principles, namely the equal sharing and the minimum rights. The compromise solution gives priority to the nondiscrimination principle as captured by the ‘equal share’ rationale.

This paper examines the links between globalisation and environmental policy stringency with the environmental terms of trade. The existence of dynamic links among the variables were explored using cross-correlations and Granger Causality tests. According to the results, the de jure and the de facto globalisation measures have different environmental impacts. Also, despite the fact that all V4 countries have introduced strict environmental policies, especially since 2000, the relative strength of these policies lag behind the maximum OECD stringency. As a result, the pollution heaven hypothesis cannot be excluded. The policy implications of the results are briefly discussed.

This paper uses the most appropriate measures and data sources to map the likely growth delinking of Polish economy for the period 1990-2016. Evidences of green growth exist and were assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. This paper also examines the likely policy implications by means of cross-correlation analysis. The results indicate that Poland can be conceptualized as a successful paradigm prescribed by the ecological modernization theory since growth is not associated with human pressure on natural resources and does not produce detrimental environmental impacts.

The concept of economic complexity and the relevant economic complexity index (ECI) have been introduced in the theory and empirics of economic growth. As a consequence, the literature on economic complexity covers its relationship with several factors related to growth including environmental implications. Using traditional non-parametric statistics methods, the study investigates again the relationship between economic complexity and per capita incomes, and the relationship between economic complexity and the environment. Environmental variables used are the environmental performance index (EPI), the per capita ecological footprint of consumption, EFcpc and the per capita ecological footprint of production, EFppc. The relationships are studied for a large set of economies as a whole, and for countries of two different levels of development, as measured by the human development index (HDI). Results confirm the positive relationship between per capita incomes and economic complexity while those with regards to environmental implications depend on the environmental index chosen and the level of development. Economic complexity is positively associated with the strain on the environment shown by the ecological footprints, but positively associated also with the environmental performance of policies given by the EPI.

This article explores farmer’s decisions regarding the expansion of organic farming through intensive input use and the degree of in-house organic fertilizer production. Using a theoretical synthesis of two strands of the scholarly literature, namely pro-environmental norms and the goal-framing theory, the contribution of this article to the current literature is: (i) it redefines the concept of the crowding effects, which encompasses both changes in environmental preferences and in normative objectives; (ii) it points that the impact of a green payment on vertical integration depends on both the relative (i.e. the direction) and the absolute (i.e. the magnitude) size of the crowding effect being expected; (iii) it states that a trade-off between input use and vertical integration does always exist once a land subsidy is implemented, but not necessarily if a price premium is offered instead.

This paper seeks to contribute to existing debates on the relationship between democracy and environmental quality. More specifically, we aim to provide nuance and insight into the question as to whether democratic regimes are better equipped to protect the environment. After critically reviewing theoretical arguments and providing an overview of existing empirical studies, the paper proposes an approach which consists of the use of non-parametric correlations between democracy and environmental quality, and a consideration of the interactions between democracy, government effectiveness, economic prosperity, and perceptions of corruption. Crucially, we show that, although a positive correlation can be found between levels of democracy and environmental quality, the picture is somewhat blurred if data are stratified using criteria such as government effectiveness and corruption perceptions. Consequently, the main argument the paper pursues is that, to assess the relationship between democracy and environmental quality, intervening factors and their effects need to be acknowledged and taken into account.

The last CAP reform provides Member States the option to apply the Basic Payment Scheme in finer scale than the national level, termed hereafter as regionalization. We use a farm model that represents almost 90% of the Greek commercial farms for evaluating a wide range of regionalization scenarios. Exploratory Data Analysis is used to get insights from the model results. More specifically we compare the general features of four different types of regionalization schemes, namely a single region, an agronomic based, an administrative based and a hybrid administrative-agronomic regionalization. We also perform a trade-off analysis of selected pairs of policy objectives, e.g. the uniform basic payment unit value vs. the political acceptability, etc.

The aim of this paper is to compare the supply-side and demand-side approaches for assessing the scarcity rents of irrigation water. The results obtained from the case study confirm the expectation that the demand-side rationale provides the lower bound estimate of water scarcity rents. Specifically, a hypothetical elimination of water scarcity brings extra benefits to the local farmers, but these benefits cannot compensate the costs of the backstop technology which provide such extra water. Therefore, the lost opportunities, in terms of income forgone due to water scarcity, cannot legitimize supply-side approaches alone. A “soft” sensitivity analysis was included to examine the robustness of such a cost-effective property, while the policy implications of the results are also examined.

This paper examines second-best pollution taxation within a unified framework, which simultaneously takes into account society’s preferences towards producer profits and environmental costs, the possibility of raising public revenue through pollution taxes and the costly administration of pollution taxes. Several new results were derived concerning the discrepancy between second-best taxes and the Pigouvian rule. In addition, this paper shows that previous results identified in the relevant literature are special cases of our results. It should be stressed, however, that the comparison between first-best and second-best taxation is an empirical issue. Finally, the policy implications of the results are also discussed.

This paper examines the allocation of entitlement rights for the management of common property resources. In particular, the case of allocating a Total Allowable Catch quota for the Mediterranean swordfish is examined as a case study. The proposed approach comprises three steps. First, there is a bargaining procedure between the European Union (EU) and the rest of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) countries. As soon as an initial agreement is possible, the EU considers various equitable rationing methods to allocate its share to the European Member States. These rationing methods draw upon two different streams of the literature, bankruptcy and ‘burden sharing’. Finally, the European Member States reach a fair agreement through minimising an envy-free index. The allocation rule which is defined as the weighted average of equal proportion and equal share rationales represents the best compromise solution.

This paper examines the allocation of entitlement rights for the management of common property resources. In particular, the case of allocating a Total Allowable Catch quota for the Mediterranean swordfish is examined as a case study. The proposed approach comprises three steps. First, there is a bargaining procedure between the European Union (EU) and the rest of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) countries. As soon as an initial agreement is possible, the EU considers various equitable rationing methods to allocate its share to the European Member States. These rationing methods draw upon two different streams of the literature, bankruptcy and burden sharing'. Finally, the European Member States reach a fair agreement through minimising an envy-free index. The allocation rule which is defined as the weighted average of equal proportion and equal share rationales represents the best compromise solution.

The paper examines the issue of allocating fishing rights for the management of East Atlantic and Mediterranean tuna. Although it is well-known that fairness plays a crucial role for the acceptability of international environmental agreements, usually there is a trade-off between fairness and stability. Our results confirm such a trade-off between fairness and stability that prevails over international agreements and this paper examines a way to reconcile it. The proposed approach comprises three stages. First, various equitable sharing rules (originated from the “bankruptcy” literature) are used to allocate the fishing rights. Second, fairness and stability criteria are used to assess the eligibility of the examined allocation rules. The final choice is facilitated by using a social choice rule. The chosen rationing rule, namely the A-min, represents a specific weighted average of the two focal rationales in the sharing problems, namely the equal shares and the proportional ones. Setting aside the institutional inertia, the A-min rule dominates, in terms of stability and fairness, the existing rule used by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Furthermore, it is a transparent and easy to justify allocation rule so, it may be proved to be a strong candidate for future policy changes concerning the allocation of fishing rights.

The paper presents a rapid assessment of the irrigation full cost of the Pinios Local Organization for Land Reclamation. The individual cost components (financial, environmental and resource) were estimated using the best available data and sound methodological choices. On the basis of our estimates it seems that water scarcity and its corresponding resource cost are quite important issues to be ignored. The resource costs fall within a range from 21% to 39% of the water full cost while the environmental cost is about 8%. The policy implications of these results are also discussed.

The paper examines the issue of designing and implementing policy measures to control complex agricultural externalities. Complex externalities refer to the situation where a production (firm on firm) externality coexists with a detrimental (firm on society) externality. The paper identifies the optimal solution for complex externalities, which is a combination of spatially differentiated taxes. However, severe information requirements render the first-best policy infeasible. Finally, a likely voluntary scheme based on firm self-report is examined which may enforce firm compliance with the optimal policy.