Murayama and Jach argue that it is not clearly specified how motivation constructs produce behavior and that this black box should be unpacked. We argue that the authors overlook important classic theory and highlight recent research programs that already started unboxing. We feel that without relying on the mechanisms that such programs uncover, the proposed computational approach will be fruitless.

This study documents the potential influence of attention probes in experimental paradigms by addressing their unintended effects on response time measurements. Attention probes, which are commonly used to assess participant engagement, may introduce task-switch costs that can confound experimental results. We show how probe-induced biases inflated findings related to reinforcement from sensorimotor predictability and generate a fictitious behavioral response to sensory prediction error. We show that by excluding task trials immediately after attention probes, these biases can be corrected. We validate this approach in two new experiments devoid of probes. The results confirm that response reinforcement from predictable action effects only accumulates as long as predictions hold. These findings challenge traditional (reward-based) reinforcement models by suggesting a distinct mechanism for reinforcement from sensorimotor predictability. The validated corrective method provides a practical tool for mitigating similar confounds in past and future studies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Blunted motivation is a core symptom of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Although the empirical picture is mixed, cognitive processes that can be collectively referred to as reward processing have been found to be consistently muted in MDD; most notably, reward sensitivity and reinforcement learning. Works on the modulation of response vigor in individuals with MDD have examined various types of reward, but recent research has shown that in the general population, response vigor is not modulated by type of reward on tasks that are highly similar to those used in these experiments. The present study implemented a form of non-reward related reinforcement which has repeatedly been shown to modulate response vigor in the general population. It investigated whether modulation of response vigor by this type of reinforcement would be effective in individuals with MDD. Clinically depressed individuals (N = 121; 76 post-exclusion) engaged in a task in which their responses led to predictable and immediate sensorimotor effects, or no such effects. Response vigor increased when responses led to sensorimotor effects, which was comparable to the increase found in the general population. These findings support the utility of isolating the computations leading to different reinforcement types and suggest that motivational deficits in MDD may be specific to the type of reward (i.e., hedonically or otherwise explicitly desired stimuli). These results contribute to the literature by suggesting that the reinforcement from sensorimotor predictability stems from processes devolved to motor control, whereas reinforcement from rewards may depend on more general-purpose processes.

To what degree do people prefer to choose for themselves and what drives this preference? Is it memory-based and results from a life-long association between choices and better outcomes, or is the process of choice itself reinforcing? In a new paradigm, across 6 experiments, participants experienced both ’Own Choice’ and ’Computer Picks’ conditions with identical outcomes before selecting which condition to re-experience in the final part of the experiment. Consistent with previous work, an overwhelming majority ( 83%) preferred own-choice. Several variations of the paradigm reveal that (1) Preference For Choice (PFC) is reduced when thinking about the task without actually choosing in it, (2) PFC is substantially reduced by choice-unrelated cognitive load, and (3) Preference For Choice is further diminished when selection is based on criteria other than one’s preferences. Across experiments, participants’ self-rated enjoyment predicted a significant portion of their PFC, while their perceived gains had little to no predictive value. If PFC stems solely from past reinforcement learning (i.e., memory) then neither performing another few scores of choices nor adding cognitive load to that sequence of choices would be expected to dramatically affect it. Hence, our findings suggest that a significant part of this preference stems from the process of choice itself, and that the experience it confers can itself be reinforcing. We discuss the implications of the proposed mechanism for PFC, which leads us to the prediction that PFC may be muted or even reversed under specific conditions and what this means for when the ‘opposite’ effect – sticking with the default – will occur.

Humans and other animals live in dynamic environments. To reliably manipulate the environment and attain their goals they would benefit from a constant modification of motor-responding based on responses' current effect on the current environment. It is argued that this is exactly what is achieved by a mechanism that reinforces responses which have led to accurate sensorimotor predictions. We further show that evaluations of a response's effectiveness can occur simultaneously, driven by at least two different processes, each relying on different statistical properties of the feedback and affecting a different level of responding. Specifically, we show the continuous effect of (a) a sensorimotor process sensitive only to the conditional probability of effects given that the agent acted on the environment (i.e., action-effects) and of (b) a more abstract judgement or inference that is also sensitive to the conditional probabilities of occurrence of feedback given no action by the agent (i.e., inaction-effects). The latter process seems to guide action selection (e.g., should I act?) while the former the manner of the action's execution. This study is the first to show that different evaluation processes of a response's effectiveness influence different levels of responding.

Automatic imitation refers to the act of unintentionally mimicking observed actions. Inspired by a theoretical framework that allows for controlled yet unintentional processes, we tested whether automatic imitation depends on the task relevance of the to-be-imitated movements. Replicating previous results, we find that movements that are part of the participant's task set unintentionally influence response. Our key finding is that participants generally do not imitate similar and highly familiar movements that are not part of the task set and hence are task-irrelevant. Furthermore, the results of computational data modeling are consistent with the notion that task-relevance modulates the mental activation of information, as posited by the above theoretical framework. Our findings are not predicted and cannot be explained using current accounts of automatic imitation, such as Associative Sequence Learning or Theory of Event Coding. At a broader level, the key contribution of this study is in challenging the empirical basis for automatic imitation by showing that the effects interpreted as imitation occur only for task relevant responses. This pattern lends itself to a different interpretation which is not related to imitation, automatic or otherwise, but rather to the general phenomenon of response compatibility effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

While known reinforcers of behavior are outcomes that are valuable to the organism, recent research has demonstrated that the mere occurrence of an own-response effect can also reinforce responding. In this paper we begin investigating whether these two types of reinforcement occur via the same mechanism. To this end, we modified two different tasks, previously established to capture the influence of a response’s effectiveness on the speed of motor-responses (indexed here by participants’ reaction times). Specifically, in six experiments we manipulated both a response’s ‘pure’ effectiveness and its outcome value (e.g., substantial versus negligible monetary reward) and measured the influence of both on the speed of responding. The findings strongly suggest that post action selection, responding is influenced only by pure effectiveness, as assessed by the motor system; thus, at these stages responding is not sensitive to abstract representations of the value of a response (e.g., monetary value). We discuss the benefit of distinguishing between these two necessary aspects of adaptive behavior namely, fine-tuning of motor-control and striving for desired outcomes. Finally, we embed the findings in the recently proposed Control-based response selection (CBRS) framework and elaborate on its potential for understanding motor-learning processes in developing infants.

An important model for explaining humans' feeling of agency-the Comparator model-draws on ideas used to explain effective motor control. The model describes how our brain estimates the degree of control over the environment offered by a specific motor program (in short, an action's effectiveness). However, given its current level of specification, the model is at best vague on how (or even whether) the prediction of effectiveness of an action is dynamically updated. To test the issue empirically, our participants performed multiple experimental blocks of a task (reliably shown to measure reinforcement from effectiveness) in which blocks with and without action-effects (or with spatially unpredictable feedback) were interlaced. This design creates a sinusoidal-like objective increase or decrease in effectiveness (quantified as the n-trials back probability of receiving feedback), which participants were unable to report. As previously found, response speed indexed reinforcement from effectiveness. The results suggest that reinforcement from effectiveness is sensitive to both the degree and trend of effectiveness; that is, reinforcement is sensitive to whether it is increasing, decreasing, or is unchanged. Given the previous links made between reinforcement from effectiveness and the computation of effectiveness by the motor-system, the results are the first to show an online, dynamic and complex sensitivity to a motor-programs' effectiveness that is directly translated to its production. The importance of testing the so-called sense of agency in a dynamic environment and the implications of the current findings for a dominant model of the sense of agency are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

This study examined whether obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies are related to an impaired sense of agency (SoA). We examined agency using both indirect (“implicit”) and direct (“explicit”) measures, aiming to tap into different aspects of the sense of agency. We measured the SoA of participants with high vs. low scores on a measure of OC symptoms indirectly using a task that assesses the intentional binding effect, i.e., the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. We also measured participants' "illusory" SoA using a direct question about their SoA in conditions in which control was objectively absent. As predicted, high OC individuals’ levels of intentional binding were lower, whereas their levels of illusory control were higher than those of low OC individuals. We discuss the contributions of these findings to the understanding of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), stressing the importance of distinguishing between direct and indirect indices of the SoA when studying and/or treating OC individuals.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, the external events. Human behaviour has both explorative and goal-directed exploitative aspects. Here, we suggest that the sense of agency plays an important role in explorative and exploitative behaviours. When people do not feel they have a strong sense of agency, they may sense their control via exploratory behaviours. Once the sense of agency arises, it triggers and motivates exploitative actions, increasing the sense of confidence people have in their own actions and their ability to actively interact with the external world. In the present symposium, we will discuss the processes underlying the sense of agency, and its role in explorative and exploitative behaviours.

Ultimately, motivation enables survival through goal-directed behaviour and is evident through the direction and force of action. While a plethora of candidate responses are generated by the brain, response-selection mechanisms are responsible for evaluating and selecting the most adaptive course of action given the current context.Although motivation is known to be modulated by tangible rewards (such as food or monetary gain), substantial evidence has accumulated to suggest that both the direction and speed of responding can be modulated by feedback indicating mere influence over the environment or 'pure effectiveness' (e.g., Hemed et al., in press; Wen et al., 2018).In general, clinically depressed individuals are characterized as being less-motivated and less-active, both motorically and mentally (Sobin & Sackeim, 1997). The current study examines whether people diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) are similarly sensitive to (and are motivated by) effectiveness-feedback as healthy individuals are.Clinically depressed participants (N=75) performed a task in which their responses either led to action-effects or did not (i.e. effectiveness-feedback). The results show that effectiveness-feedback motivated individuals suffering from MDD, at least as strong as previously established in healthy individuals.These results suggest that the motivational system is fully activated by relevant effectiveness-feedback in MDD and imply that the motivational deficit in this condition is either limited to an outcome or goal-relevant feedback or other desired-outcome related processes. A more radical conclusion would be that a motivational deficit per-se is not a defining feature of this condition.

How is our strategy for forming memories shaped by experience with a task? Previous work using surprise questions (i.e., unexpected by the participant) has shown a remarkable inability to report attributes of an attended target in a search display. This representational poverty presumably reflects a form of information exploitation, in which control processes specialize the conversion of available information into memory representations. We hypothesize that such control is refined by repeated experience with a task, and as a result, memory representations will specialize as task experience accrues, such that report accuracy for an unexpected question will progressively worsen as the number of preceding trials increases. To test this, subjects were asked to report the location of a letter among three digits. The ability to respond correctly to a surprise question about the identity of that letter became worse as the experiment progressed. A follow-up study evaluated whether this incremental worsening of report accuracy could be explained as a buildup of proactive interference by varying the set of letters for the surprise test. The results were unchanged relative to the original experiment, which argues against a primary contribution of proactive interference in the worsening performance. The effect was replicated in a similar paradigm using color disks. These findings illustrate that repeated performance of a prescriptive task engages an adaptive modification of control processes that focus information processing on specific attributes of a stimulus that are expected to be necessary in the future, regardless of their immediate task relevance.

This study examined the role of advance expectations in generating relevance-based selection, using a version of cognitive "blindness" that is driven solely by task relevance. With this irrelevance-induced blindness, participants often fail to report a feature of an irrelevant stimulus, even though the levels of perceptual and cognitive load are minimal (i.e., capacity limitations are not met). Hence, with this phenomenon, selection is based solely on task relevance. In two experiments, we examined such relevance-based selection with a new paradigm in which the participants had to report the location of an object appearing on one of two rings. Critically, while in Experiment 1 the participants could form advance expectations regarding the (ir) relevant stimuli, because the location of the relevant ring and the shape and color of the relevant object were known in advance, in Experiment 2 no concrete advance expectations could be formed. This was established by varying randomly, from trial to trial, the shape, color, and location of relevant and irrelevant stimuli. We found strong irrelevance-induced blindness in both experiments, regardless of whether or not advance expectations were formed. These findings suggest that advance expectations, at least with regard to the task-relevant stimulus' location shape or color, are not necessary for irrelevance-induced blindness to occur; more generally, this implies that such expectations do not play a critical role in selection processes that are based solely on task relevance. We further discuss these findings in the context of Garnerian and Posnerian selection, and their relationship to visual awareness.

As our environment is frequently changing, it is common that our expectations are violated by unexpected stimuli or events, which leaves us uncertain about which pieces of information will be useful in the future. It is unclear how an expectation violation affects the subsequent control settings for processing of information. The current study directly addressed this issue by employing a double-surprise-trial paradigm based on the attribute amnesia task (Chen & Wyble, 2015a). In Experiment 1, participants were asked to report the location of a target letter presented among distractor digits on several trials and were then unexpectedly asked to report a different attribute (color or identity) of the target letter. In the next trial, participants were asked another unexpected question about the other attribute (identity or color respectively). The results show that, despite participants' poor performance in the first surprise trial, which replicated the attribute amnesia effect, their memory performance in the second surprise trial was dramatically improved, even when the probed attribute was different from that of the first surprise trial. This was also true in Experiment 2, where 15 trials were inserted between the two surprise trials. Experiment 3 further clarified that this effect is not triggered by the mere presence of a surprise test, but rather the violation of expectation about the nature of a surprise test. These results suggest the operation of an adaptive control mechanism that reduces the selectivity of processing in the face of unexpected events.

Many models of emotion assume that the emotional response is preceded by an assessment of a stimulus' relevance to the perceiver's goals. Although widely assumed, experimentally controlling and, hence, empirically testing the effect of a stimulus' relevance on the emotional response has proven challenging. In this study, we used stimuli with high ecological validity and manipulated their relevance while holding constant the perceptual features of the stimuli. In the experiment, participants were given the result of their Israeli Psychometric Entrance Test (PET). The PET score is highly relevant to most participants, as, at the time of the experiment, it is the only unknown about whether they shall be admitted to their major of choice at the university. Relevance of the information was experimentally controlled both binarily by manipulating whether the presented score is the participant's or belongs to another unfamiliar participant and parametrically by manipulating the probability that a presented score is their actual PET score. We found a substantial effect for manipulated relevance on self-report, electrodermal activity, and heart rate. The results provide evidence that information about a stimulus' relevance modulates the emotional response to it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Pain is an integral part of our lives. Although the effect of 'control' on sensed pain has been extensively studied and discussed, recent findings seem to be at odds with the substantial evidence for a robust motor-based sensory attenuation effect - an indirect marker for one's sense of agency. The goal of the current study was to re-examine whether there is evidence for such an effect in the context of pain. In three experiments, human participants were aversively stimulated and the sensitivity of self-reported pain to factors previously shown to modulate the sensory attenuation effect was tested (control over parameters of the stimulation; temporal contiguity and predictability, and stimulation intensity). Two of three experiments found some evidence that objective control attenuates pain, but only when the painful stimulation immediately follows the motor response. We discuss the complex relations between having objective control, feeling helpless, predictability and sensed pain.

A recently discovered phenomenon, termed Attribute Amnesia (AA), demonstrates an inability to report an attribute of an attended item, even when that attribute was used to successfully perform a task in the immediately preceding trial. For example, when asked to locate a letter among digits, participants could not remember the specific letter they were locating when asked to identify it in a surprise question. However, Chen & Wyble (2015b) demonstrated that location is strongly spared from this effect and may be automatically consolidated into memory regardless of its relevance. Yet, it is unknown whether the automatic encoding of location information extends to other aspects of the display, such as the spatial structure of a display itself or the items surrounding a target. In this study, participants underwent a standard AA paradigm, in which they located a letter among number distractors followed by a surprise question that asked for the letter's identity. Importantly, participants were also asked in the surprise trial to identify the structure of the target-distractor display itself, which randomly varied between two configurations: top-left/bottom-right or top-right/bottom-left in a notional rectangle. The structure of this display should not be task relevant, as the location of the distractor would not help participants find the target. Memory performance on the structure (73.33%) of the display was statistically higher than chance of 50% (30 participants, p < .01), indicating that participants remember not just the location of the target but also the configuration of the display. This work provides insight into the nature of representations that are constructed automatically as we perform a task. Meeting abstract presented at VSS 2018