Many pragmatist and non-representational approaches to cognition, such as the enactivist, have focused on the relations between actions, affectivity, and habits from an intersubjective perspective. For those adopting such approaches, all these aspects are inextricably connected; however, many questions remain open regarding the dynamics by which they unfold and shape each other over time. This paper addresses a specific topic that has not received much attention: the impact on future behavior of not fulfilling possibilities for social interaction even though their fulfillment is desirable within a given context. Inspired by Gibson’s theory of affordances and Dewey’s account of habits, these situations will be characterized as events where an agent does not act upon an inviting affordance for social interaction due to a conflict which he or she experiences between given concerns, needs, and social norms. This conflict leads to a sense of unfulfillment that may eventually bring about a crisis and revision of habits. Through specific examples, this work presents the potential impact of the connection between affordances, habits, and affectivity on everyday situations. It therefore represents an exploration of the common ground between pragmatism and enactivism and an attempt to contribute to a process-based approach to social interaction.

This article integrates John Dewey’s Art as Experience, Mikel Dufrenne’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, and phenomenological interviews with museum visitors to answer what it means to be ‘moved by art’. The interviews point to intense affective and existential experiences, in which encounters with art can be genuinely transformative. We focus on Dufrenne’s notion of ‘adherent reflection’ and Dewey’s notions of ‘doing and undergoing’ to understand the intentional structure and dynamics of such experiences, concluding that being moved contains two merged forms of intentionality: one overt aspect of perceptual intentionality directed at the work, and a covert affective intentionality directed back at oneself in one’s situated existence. These are operational simultaneously but can work in loops, one leading to an intensification of the other and vice versa. As such, these analyses emphasize the value of phenomenological interviews and advance the integration of phenomenological and pragmatist thinking in the context of aesthetic experience.

This paper explores various notions of aesthetic affordance recently developed through embodied, situated and enactive approaches to aesthetic experience by Maria Brincker and Shaun Gallagher, and the similarities and differences between them and the idea of affective affordance put forward by Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti. This discussion is a way to try to offer some answers to the question of what aesthetic affordances particularly afford compared to affective affordances. I will focus on the affordances that we perceive during various aesthetic experiences in which we find ourselves more moved by the object, event or person(s) causing the experience than we had anticipated. I will argue that these experiences emerge as opportunities to carry out an active exploration of aspects of the narrative self that we feel is related to features of the experience; and that one particular brain network likely to be involved in these experiences – i.e. the default network – might help us to understand how these experiences meaningfully change our relationship with ourselves and with the social context of which we are a part.

One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory. The model focuses on dynamically relevant nodes at the pre-reflective and the reflective side of experience that would work as nested rhythmic constraints at different cognitive timescales with the potential to shunt experiences toward the aesthetic in everyday situations. My proposal constitutes a way to explore aesthetic experiences from an enactive perspective that regards them as transformative events in which cognitive processes entrain and are entrained by changes taking place in the environment, the brain, and the body.

The influence of pragmatism in 4E approaches to cognition is still undervalued. Only certain contemporary researchers from these fields venture beyond William James’s insights and pay attention to philosophers such as John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, or Charles Peirce. Although several from the embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted ranks acknowledge that these frameworks have roots in phenomenology and pragmatism, only a few actually go deep into Mead’s or Peirce’s texts looking for conti...

There is increasing evidence that the rhythmic interactions between intrinsic oscillators both in the body and in the brain play a constitutive role in cognition. However, the mechanisms and extent of these interactions are yet to be fully understood. In this article, I will contend that a notion of rhythm as an open entrainment can be useful for enactive approaches to different aspects of cognition. It allows us to think of the different oscillators that we find in the body, the brain, and the environment as nested dynamic constraints that through neuronal and non-neuronal interactions tie together the different domains while retaining their specific functions.

The aim of this paper is to present a process-based ontology of art following John Dewey’s concepts of experience and rhythm. I will adopt a pragmatist and embodied point of view within an adverbialist framework. I will defend the idea of an artistic way of experiencing – a subtype of aesthetic experience – as something which allows us to assign the ontological category of art to an object or event. The adverbial features of this artistic way of experiencing will be characterized as being rhythmic in nature. This goal will be achieved in three steps. First, I will explain and elaborate on the concept of adverbialism. Second, the importance of rhythm in experience will be taken into account through a close reading of Dewey’s philosophy and by incorporating the nuances of the Pre-Socratic idea of rhuthmos, as well as some recent findings about brain and bodily oscillations from cognitive science. Third, to conclude I will propose four necessary but not sufficient features of the rhythmic engagement enacted while an artistic way of experiencing takes place: a necessary degree of object or event awareness, a positive feedback dynamic, a loosening of the sense of agency, and being attentionally demanding.

On many occasions we are unwittingly constrained by aesthetic circumstances. Not only in those rare instances in which we have so-called aesthetic experiences, but much more frequently in ordinary but potentially relevant aspects of everyday life. Any aesthetic theory committed to this idea should be able to establish a continuity between both types of experience. To fulfill this aim, in this paper I propose an enactive model of an aesthetic component of experience based on a notion of rhythm as open entrainment that follows John Dewey’s aesthetic theory and recent research on aesthetics and dynamic aspects of cognition from the perspective both of philosophy and of the neurosciences. I will define some critical points of this aesthetic component: an unrealized impulsion able to trigger an aesthetic asymmetry, an aesthetic affordance, and an oscillatory regime of aesthetic metastability. I suggest that these raw elements present differential dynamics regarding the mobilization of narrative and attentional resources and that these two cognitive aspects, reciprocally coupled with bodily and environmental oscillations, enact a cognitive rhythm that shapes the interaction that give rise to it through entrainment. not dwell on the nature of aesthetic experiences. I will not try to make a case either for their distinct existence or against it. Rather, I will argue that we experience objects and events aesthetically owing to a set of cognitive processes and their interactions that is referred to as the aesthetic component of experience (ACE). That is, the ACE is not the contents of experience, but the dynamic form – i.e., the rhythm – that shapes the ongoing interaction of different cognitive processes that give rise to it. This paper is framed within the non-representational tenets shared by enactivists and ecological psychologists. Yet, my emphasis on the cognitive role of emerging interactions between oscillatory components at the intersection of body, brain, and environment definitively places me within the enactivist camp. For that reason, I believe that the model I present in this paper might be helpful in developing an enactive approach to aesthetics that goes beyond paradigmatic and controversial aesthetic experiences by presenting a continuous component rooted in pre-reflective processes, while also entering into a fruitful dialogue with ecological approaches such as Vicente

The aim of this paper is to advance, within the framework of enactivism, towards a more radically embodied and situated theory of emotions and, in general, of affectivity. Its starting point is that of discussing the well-established notion of bodily resonance (Fuchs 2013, Fuchs & Koch 2014, Fuchs 2018) and the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014). I will incorporate John Dewey's theory of emotions, and recent models and empirical finding from cognitive science on the relation between perception and bodily activity (Azzalini, Rebollo & Tallon-Baudry 2019; Allen et al. 2019). The novel element proposed in this paper is taking into consideration the role of bodily oscillatory activity in the perceptual side of cognition through phenomena of relative coordination. This concept from dynamical systems theory allows for an enactivist view of emotions as temporal episodes triggered by a tension that affects the rhythmic interaction between brain, body, and environment. By defending the importance of this enacted rhythm, the body emerges as a truly active agent, gating and modulating affectivity during all the stages of the sensorimotor circuit from perception to action.

In this text we intend to analyze Bill Viola’s video installation Nantes Triptych (1992) as an example of the richness which lies in the liminal spaces between arts. We defend the thesis that the utilization of the traditional pictorial structure of the triptych in this particular work, along with the powerful audiovisual material, renders a kairological event available to the viewer. This temporal experience makes possible an existential experience when in front of this video installation. To discuss this assumption we will use classical art theory texts about the triptychs, as well as, among others, Deleuze’s texts about time image and the triptych structure, Agamben’s concept of kairos, the concept of kairological artwork coined by David Chan and the philosophy of temporality developed by Merleau-Ponty.