Previous research finds that children are surprisingly closed to the possibility of unlikely events. Two studies with 5-to-8-year-old children (N = 240; 68% female; mixed ethnicities) and adults (N = 550; 42% female; mixed ethnicities) collected between July 2020 and December 2020, found that children are more open to the possibility of all event types in the future than in the past, and that all age groups were less likely to categorize all event types as impossible when they had the option of categorizing them as "possible, but unlikely" than when they only had the option of calling them "possible." However, many children still frequently categorized unlikely events as impossible. These findings shed light on conditions that influence children's possibility judgments while underscoring their robust tendency to conflate improbability with impossibility.

The "end of history" illusion in adults (Quoidbach et al., 2013) is an asymmetrical pattern in which people accept that they've changed in the past but don't believe they will change in the future. We explore here whether the same psychological forces that cause the illusion in adults exist in the minds of children. Two studies with 4- to 11-year-olds (N = 256) suggest that they do, even in a within-subject design where the same child is asked questions about the past and the future. A third study (N = 83) finds that this illusion does not persist when children are asked about other people. These studies suggest that even young children believe that although they used to be different in the past, from this point on, they will remain forever young.

Why can't we own people? Boyer proposes that the key consideration concerns inclusion in the moral circle. I propose an alternative, which is that specific mental capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, play a key role in determining judgments about human and animal ownership. Autonomous beings are viewed as owning themselves, which precludes them from being owned by others.

I propose that young children may be a useful test case for Fitouchi et al.'s theory that certain seemingly harmless acts are moralized because they are seen as risk factors for future poor cooperation. The theory predicts that prior to the development of certain folk-psychological beliefs about self-control, children should be untroubled by violations of puritanical morality, and that an adult-like folk psychology of self-control should develop in tandem with disapproval of such violations.

Owners decide what happens to their property, and so adults typically view autonomous beings as non-owned. If children likewise consider autonomy when judging what is owned, this may have implications for how they view themselves. If children believe that parents have power over them, that they themselves lack autonomy, and that only the autonomous cannot be owned, this may lead them to believe that they are owned by their parents. Across three experiments, we found that 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 206) consistently affirm that children are owned by their parents. In Experiment 1, children judged that children and domesticated animals are owned, but denied this for adults and wild animals. In Experiment 2, children were more likely to see children as owned by their parents than by their teachers, and also denied that children own either kind of adult. Finally, in Experiment 3, children were less likely to view a child who makes decisions against parental authority as owned. These judgments are unlikely to mirror what children have been told. Instead, they likely result from children spontaneously using autonomy principles, and possibly other principles of ownership, in reasoning about the ownership of living entities.

Philosophers and theologians have long distinguished between acts a good person is obliged to do, and those that are supererogatory-going above and beyond what is required. Across three studies (N = 796), we discovered a striking developmental difference in intuitions about such acts: while adults view supererogatory actions as morally better than obligatory actions, children view fulfilling obligations as morally better. This difference did not stem from differing views of what is obligatory-children agreed that supererogatory acts were not required. And this difference remained even when the very same actions were framed as either supererogatory or oblig-atory. These findings suggest that the intuition that supererogatory acts are especially morally good might be late-emerging and culturally specific.

What makes someone the same person over time? There are (at least) two ways of understanding this question: A person can be the same in the sense of being very similar to how they used to be (similarity), or they can be the same in the sense of being the same individual (numerical identity). In recent years, several papers have claimed to explore the commonsense notion of numerical identity. However, we suggest here that these researchers have instead been studying similarity. We develop a novel method that uses simple intuitions about objects to illustrate these two notions of "same person", and then asks which concept applies to instances of personal change. Across 4 studies (N = 2446), we find that these previously documented intuitions are best understood as reflecting judgments about similarity, not identity (Experiments 1 and 2). We then use this method to explore the situations in which participants do perceive a change in numerical identity. We find that when a person's entire brain (Experiments 3 and 4) or soul (Experiment 4) has been replaced with that of another person, the majority of participants judge that numerical identity has changed. However, we also note that a substantial minority of participants denied that identity had changed, opening new questions about the role of the body in intuitive judgments of personal identity.

The central claim in the target article is that representations of knowledge are more basic than representations of beliefs. However, the authors are blending together two distinct concepts of knowledge: "awareness" and "propositional knowledge." Distinguishing these two concepts of knowledge clarifies how the developmental and comparative data fit within the philosophical literature.

One of the hallmarks of ownership is the right to control one's property. Living beings thus pose an interesting puzzle for ownership, since they have some capacity to decide what happens to themselves—they can direct their own motion, pursue their own goals, and make their own decisions. Recent work has shown that adults consider this autonomy to be the key factor in determining whether a human (or human-like) being can be owned. However, little is known about how children reason about the ownership of living beings. Across three experiments we show that children (ages 4–7) use principles of control and autonomy to reason about the ownership of familiar and novel animals. At all ages tested, children were more likely to say that a typically wild animal (e.g., a bear) was owned if a homeowner had controlled its movements by putting it in a cage, rather than simply standing near it in their yard (Experiment 1). Children also used this cue of control to predict whether novel animals were owned (Experiment 2)—and for these unfamiliar animals, the effect of control was even larger. Finally, Experiment 3 found that children's judgments were not specifically driven by the use of a cage to control the animal, but also extended to animals that inherently had the ability to escape (e.g., fly or jump). These autonomous animals were judged as non-owned, while those that could not escape were judged as owned. The use of these principles was evident at all ages, but became stronger with age, particularly when considering novel animals. These are the first studies, to our knowledge, to investigate the development of reasoning about the ownership of animals, and they suggest that, like adults, children consider autonomy an essential factor in the ownership of living things.

Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N = 1,581) and compare these judgments to those of philosophers (N = 204) and laypeople (N = 336). We find that academics and laypeople share a similar concept of knowledge, while philosophers have a substantially different concept. These experiments show that (a) in contrast to philosophers, other academics and laypeople attribute knowledge to others in some "Gettier" situations; (b) academics and laypeople are much less likely to attribute knowledge when reminded of the possibility of error, but philosophers are not affected by this reminder; and (c) non-philosophy academics are overall more skeptical about knowledge than laypeople or philosophers. These findings suggest that academics across a wide range of disciplines share a similar concept of knowledge, and that this concept aligns closely with the intuitions held by laypeople, and differs considerably from the concept of knowledge described in the philosophical literature, as well as the epistemic intuitions of philosophers themselves.

De Freitas et al. [ 1 De Freitas J. et al. Moral goodness is the essence of personal identity. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2018; 22: 739-740 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (16) Google Scholar ] agree with us about the importance of distinguishing between personal identity and similarity. We agree with them that individuals can be obliterated through severe neurodegeneration and the like: as we put it in our original article [ 2 Starmans C. Bloom P. Nothing personal: what psychologists get wrong about identity. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2018; 22: 566-568 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (16) Google Scholar ], 'There are cases … where it may be thought that a person ceases to exist while their body survives, as in severe dementia.' [ 3 Strohminger N. Nichols S. Neurodegeneration and identity. Psychol. Sci. 2015; 26: 1469-1479 Crossref PubMed Scopus (107) Google Scholar ]. Finally, we share an appreciation of research on the notion of a morally good true self (indeed, one of us is a coauthor on the first paper on the topic).

What makes someone the same person over time? There is a growing body of research exploring how people ordinarily think about personal identity. We argue here that many of the experiments in this domain fail to properly distinguish similarity from personal identity, and therefore certain conclusions regarding commonsense intuitions about identity are not supported.

This article provides a theoretical review of the developmental origins of children's "folk theories" about the nature of the self, linking theoretical developments in philosophy with empirical discoveries from developmental psychology. The article first reviews children's views about the material nature of the self, outlining evidence that children naturally think about the self as distinct from the body. It then discusses children's understanding of the persistence of the self over time and, finally, explores children's views about conflict within the self. Together, these findings suggest that preschoolers possess stable, coherent, and predictive theories about the nature of the self that are stable across individuals, early emerging, and in some cases undergo interesting developmental change.

There is immense concern about economic inequality, both among the scholarly community and in the general public, and many insist that equality is an important social goal. However, when people are asked about the ideal distribution of wealth in their country, they actually prefer unequal societies. We suggest that these two phenomena can be reconciled by noticing that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no evidence that people are bothered by economic inequality itself. Rather, they are bothered by something that is often confounded with inequality: economic unfairness. Drawing upon laboratory studies, cross-cultural research, and experiments with babies and young children, we argue that humans naturally favour fair distributions, not equal ones, and that when fairness and equality clash, people prefer fair inequality over unfair equality. Both psychological research and decisions by policymakers would benefit from more clearly distinguishing inequality from unfairness.

Sometimes it is easy to do the right thing. But often, people act morally only after overcoming competing immoral desires. How does learning about someone's inner moral conflict influence children's and adults' moral judgments about that person? Across four studies, we discovered a striking developmental difference: When the outcome is held constant, 3- to 8-year-old children judge someone who does the right thing without experiencing immoral desires to be morally superior to someone who does the right thing through overcoming conflicting desires-but adults have the opposite intuition. This developmental difference also occurs for judgments of immoral actors: Three- to 5-year-olds again prefer the person who is not conflicted, whereas older children and adults judge that someone who struggles with the decision is morally superior. Our findings suggest that children may begin with the view that inner moral conflict is inherently negative, but, with development, come to value the exercise of willpower and self-control.

We investigated whether the personal importance of objects influences utilitarian decision-making in which damaging property is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome. In Experiment 1, participants judged saving five objects by destroying a sixth object to be less acceptable when the action required destroying the sixth object directly (rather than as a side-effect) and the objects were personally important (rather than unimportant). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that utilitarian judgments were not influenced by the objects' monetary worth. Together these findings suggest that personal importance underlies people's sensitivity to damaging property as a means for utilitarian gains.

Although people own myriad objects, land, and even ideas, it is currently illegal to own other humans. This reluctance to view people as property raises interesting questions about our conceptions of people and about our conceptions of ownership. We suggest that one factor contributing to this reluctance is that humans are normally considered to be autonomous, and autonomy is incompatible with being owned by someone else. To investigate whether autonomy impacts judgments of ownership, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk read vignettes where a person paid for an entity (Experiments 1 and 3) or created it (Experiment 2). Participants were less likely to judge that the entity was owned when it was described as autonomous compared with when it was described as non-autonomous, and this pattern held regardless of whether the entity was a human or an alien (Experiments 1 and 3), a robot (Experiments 2 and 3), or a human-like biological creation (Experiment 2). The effect of autonomy was specific to judgments of whether entities were owned, and it did not influence judgments of the moral acceptability of paying for and keeping entities (Experiment 3). These experiments also found that judgments of ownership were separately impacted by ontological type, with participants less likely to judge that humans are owned compared with other kinds of entities. A fourth experiment tested a further prediction of the autonomy account, and showed that participants are more likely to view a person as owned if he willingly sells himself. Together these findings show that attributions of autonomy constrain judgments of what can be owned.