Under finite horizon planning, households and firms evaluate a full set of state-contingent paths along which the economy might evolve out to a finite horizon but have limited ability to process events beyond that horizon. We show--analytically and empirically--that such a model accounts for an initial underreaction and subsequent overreaction of inflation forecasts. A planning horizon of four quarters can account for the evidence on the predictability of inflation forecast errors and macroeconomic data. Our identification and estimation strategies combine full-information methods based on aggregate data with regression-based estimates that directly use inflation expectations data.

We model private-sector expectations in a finite-horizon-planning framework: households and firms have limited foresight when making spending, saving, and pricing decisions. In this setting, contrary to standard New Keynesian (NK) models, we show that an "inflation scare" problem can arise in which agents' longer-run inflation expectations deviate persistently from a central bank's inflation target. We characterize optimal time-consistent monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the planning horizons of private sector agents and a risk of inflation scares. We show how risk-management considerations modify the optimal "leaning-against-the-wind" principle in the NK literature with a novel, additional preemptive motive to avert inflation scares.

We study the relationship between government debt and interest rates in an environment where financial market participants have limited foresight about the future path of government debt. We show that limited foresight substantially attenuates estimates of the effect of government debt on longer-term yields relative to the benchmark of rational expectations often used in empirical analysis.

We propose a parsimonious framework to understand how the issuance of central bank digital currency (CBDC) might affect the financial system, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and the implementation of monetary policy. We show that there is a wide range of outcomes on the financial system and the Federal Reserve's balance sheet that could reasonably occur following CBDC issuance. Our analysis highlights that the potential effects on the financial sector depend critically on how the Fed manages its balance sheet. In particular, CBDC could in principle put substantial upward pressure on the spread of the federal funds rate and other wholesale funding rates over the interest rate on reserves unless the Fed expanded its balance sheet to accommodate CBDC issuance.

We estimate a behavioral New Keynesian (NK) model in which households and firms plan over a finite horizon. The finite-horizon planning (FHP) model outperforms rational expectations versions of the NK model as well as other behavioral NK models. In the FHP model, households and firms are forward-looking in thinking about events over their planning horizon but are backward-looking regarding events beyond that point. This gives rise to substantial aggregate persistence without resorting to additional features such as habit persistence and price contracts indexed to lagged infla-tion. (JELE12, E23, E31, E32, E52)

Considerable attention has been devoted to evaluating the macroeconomic effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's communications about future policy rates (forward guidance) in light of the U.S. economy's long spell at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In this paper, we study whether forward guidance represented a shift in the systematic description of monetary policy by estimating a New Keynesian model using Bayesian techniques. In doing so, we take into account the uncertainty that agents have about policy regimes using an incomplete information setup in which they update their beliefs using Bayes rule (Bayesian learning). We document a systematic change in U.S. policymakers' reaction function during the ZLB episode (2009-2016) that called for a persistently lower policy rate than in other regimes (we call this the forward guidance regime). Our estimates suggest that private sector agents were slow to learn about this change in real time, which limited the effectiveness of t he forward guidance regime in stimulating economic activity and curbing disinflationary pressure. We also show that the incomplete information specification of the model fits economic outcomes over the economy's long spell at the ZLB better than the full information specification.

Using Bayesian methods, we estimate a nonlinear DSGE model in which the interest-rate lower bound is occasionally binding. We quantify the size and nature of disturbances that pushed the U.S. economy to the lower bound in late 2008 as well as the contribution of the lower bound constraint to the resulting economic slump. We find that the interest-rate lower bound was a significant constraint on monetary policy that exacerbated the recession and inhibited the recovery, as our mean estimates imply that the zero lower bound (ZLB) accounted for about 30 percent of the sharp contraction in U.S. GDP that occurred in 2009 and an even larger fraction of the slow recovery that followed.

In the context of a stylized New Keynesian model, we explore the interaction between imperfect knowledge about the state of the economy and the zero lower bound. We show that optimal policy under discretion near the zero lower bound responds to signals about an increase in the equilibrium real interest rate by less than it would when far from the zero lower bound. In addition, we show that Taylor-type rules that either include a time-varying intercept that moves with perceived changes in the equilibrium real rate or respond aggressively to deviations of inflation and output from their target levels perform similarly to optimal discretionary policy. Our analysis of first-difference rules highlights that rules with interest rate smoothing terms carry forward current and past misperceptions about the state of the economy and can lead to suboptimal performance.

We use the canonical New Keynesian model to study optimal discretionary policy when the nominal interest rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). We show that policymakers who seek to minimize a (symmetric) quadratic loss function involving deviations of inflation and output from targets will achieve an average inflation rate below target due to the contractionary effects associated with hitting the ELB. We also characterize optimal discretionary policy for policymakers who view output losses as asymmetric: they place weight on the output gap when output is below potential but place little or no weight on the gap when output is above potential. In comparison to optimal policy using the symmetric loss function, the average inflation rate is higher and closer to the central banks target. Moreover, in response to contractionary demand shocks that push the nominal interest rate to the effective lower bound, policymakers with an asymmetric loss function adopt a policy rate path that remains at the ELB longer but eventually rises more quickly than the path adopted by a policymaker with a symmetric loss function.

This paper examines the interactions between monetary policy and the formation of expectations to explain U.S. business cycle fluctuations in the post-war period. I estimate a conventional medium-scale New-Keynesian model, in which I relax the assumption that the central bank pursued an ‘active’ monetary policy — i.e. that stabilizes inflation and output growth — over this entire period. I find that between 1955 and 1979 monetary policy was ‘passive’, and structural shocks de-anchored inflation expectations from the central bank’s long-run target. Fundamental productivity and cost shocks were the primary cause of volatility and propagated via persistent self-fulfilling inflationary expectations. By contrast, non-fundamental ‘sunspot’ shocks, caused by unexpected changes in inflation expectations, were insignificant sources of uncertainty. JEL: C11, C52, C54, E31, E32, E52. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System. I am grateful to Roger E.A. Farmer, Francesco Bianchi, Aaron Tornell and Vincenzo Quadrini for invaluable support and advice. I also thank Andrea Ajello, Andy Atkeson, Martin Bodenstein, Matteo Crosignani, Pablo A. Cuba-Borda, Pablo Fajgelbaum, Francesco Ferrante, Etienne Gagnon, Ana Galvao, Francois Geerolf, Michela Giorcelli, Christopher J. Gust, Jinyong Hahn, Edward P. Herbst, Matteo Iacoviello, Cosmin Ilut, Benjamin K. Johannsen, Robert J. Kurtzman, Edward Nelson, Lee E. Ohanian, Anna Orlik, Matthias O. Paustian, Andrea Prestipino, Andrea Raffo, John Rogers, Robert J. Tetlow, Pierre-Olivier Weill, Fabian Winkler, seminar participants at UCLA, the Monetary Affairs Workshop of the Federal Reserve Board, and conference participants at the Applications of Behavioral Economics and Multiple Equilibrium Models to Macroeconomic Policy Conference, the 2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society and the 2017 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society for valuable comments. Federal Reserve Board, giovanni.nicolo@frb.gov.

We use a DSGE model that generates endogenous movements in risk premia to examine the positive and normative implications of alternative monetary policy rules. As emphasized by the micro-finance literature, variation in risk arises because households face fixed costs of transferring cash across financial accounts, implying that some households re-balance their portfolios infrequently. We show that the model can account for the mean returns on equity and the risk-free rate, and in line with empirical evidence generates a decline in the equity premium following an unanticipated easing of monetary policy. An important result that emerges from our analysis is that counter-cyclical monetary policy generates higher average welfare than constant money growth or zero inflation policies.

Beginning in 2009, in many advanced economies, policy rates reached their zero lower bound (ZLB). Almost at the same time, oil prices started rising again. We analyze how the ZLB affects the propagation of oil shocks. As these shocks move inflation and output in opposite directions, their effects on economic activity are cushioned when monetary policy is constrained. The burst of inflation from an oil price increase lowers real interest rates at the ZLB and stimulates the interest-sensitive component of GDP, offsetting the usual contractionary effects. In fact, if the increase in oil prices is gradual, the persistent rise in inflation can cause a GDP expansion.

Using Bayesian methods, we estimate a nonlinear DSGE model in which the interest-rate lower bound is occasionally binding. We quantify the size and nature of disturbances that pushed the U.S. economy to the lower bound in late 2008 as well as the contribution of the lower bound constraint to the resulting economic slump. Compared with the hypothetical situation in which monetary policy can act in an unconstrained fashion, our estimates imply that U.S. output was more than 1 percent lower, on average, over the 2009–2011 period. Moreover, around 20 percent of the drop in U.S. GDP during the recession of 2008-2009 was due to the interest-rate lower bound. We show that the estimated model generates lower bound episodes that resemble salient characteristics of the observed U.S. episode, including its expected duration.

Over the past twenty years, U.S. import prices have become less responsive to the exchange rate. We propose that a significant portion of this decline is a result of increased trade integration. To illustrate this effect, we develop an open economy DGE model in which trade occurs along both the intensive and extensive margins. The key element we introduce into this environment is strategic complementarity in price setting. As a result, a firm's pricing decision depends on the prices set by its competitors. This feature implies that a foreign exporter finds it optimal to vary its markup in response to shocks that change the exchange rate, insulating import prices from exchange rate movements. With increased trade integration, exporters have become more responsive to the prices of their competitors and this change in pricing behavior accounts for a significant portion of the observed decline in the sensitivity of U.S import prices to the exchange rate.

We develop and estimate an open economy New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in which variable demand elasticities give rise to changes in desired markups in response to changes in competitive pressure from abroad. A parametric restriction on our specification yields the standard NKPC, in which the elasticity is constant, and there is no role for foreign competition to influence domestic inflation. By comparing the unrestricted and restricted specifications, we provide evidence that foreign competition plays an important role in accounting for the behavior of inflation in the traded goods sector. Our estimates suggest that foreign competition has lowered domestic goods inflation about 1 percentage point over the 2000-2006 period. Our results also provide evidence against demand curves with a constant elasticity in the context of models of monopolistic competition.

The degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is low. An average pass-through estimate for the 1980s would be roughly 50 percent for the United States implying that, following a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar, a foreign exporter selling to the U.S. market would raise its price in the United States by 5 percent. Moreover, substantial evidence indicates that the degree of pass-through has since declined to about 30 percent. Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010) demonstrate that, in the presence of pricing complementarity, trade integration spurred by lower costs for importers can account for a significant portion of the decline in pass-through. In our framework, pass-through declines solely because of markup adjustments along the intensive margin. In this paper, we model how the entry and exit decisions of exporting firms affect pass-through. This is particularly important since the decline in pass-through has occurred as a greater concentration of foreign firms are exporting to the United States. We find that the effect of entry on pass-through is quantitatively small and is more than offset by the adjustment of markups that arise only along the intensive margin. Even though entry has a relatively small impact on pass-through, it nevertheless plays an important role in accounting for the secular rise in imports relative to GDP. In particular, our model suggests that over 3/4 of the rise in the U.S. import share since the early 1980s is due to trade in new goods. Thus, a key insight of this paper is that adjustment of markups that occur along the intensive margin are quantitatively more important in accounting for secular changes in pass-through than adjustments that occur along the extensive margin.

We show that a fruitful way to account for prominent business cycle and asset pricing facts consists of introducing segmented markets into an otherwise standard business-cycle model with isoelastic preferences and elastic capital and labor supply. The key feature of our model is that households rebalance their financial portfolio allocations infrequently, as they face a fixed cost of transferring cash across accounts. The model generates reasonable business cycle properties and is consistent with the mean and volatility of the equity premium and risk-free rate, a nominal yield curve that is upward sloping on average, and the high volatility and predictability of excess returns on equity and bonds. In this framework, long-term nominal debt is riskier than short-term debt, because the systematic response of monetary policy to current inflation induces long-run inflation risk, contributing to high and volatile term premia. ∗The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. †Corresponding Author: Christopher Gust. Email: christopher.gust@frb.gov, david.lopez-salido@frb.gov.

The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to International Finance Discussion Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) Abstract The degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is low. An average pass-through estimate for the 1980s would be roughly 50 percent for the United States implying that, following a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar, a foreign exporter selling to the U.S. market would raise its price in the United States by 5 percent. Moreover, substantial evidence indicates that the degree of pass-through has since declined to about 30 percent. Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010) demonstrate that, in the presence of pricing com-plementarity, trade integration spurred by lower costs for importers can account for a significant portion of the decline in pass-through. In our framework, pass-through declines solely because of markup adjustments along the intensive margin. In this paper, we model how the entry and exit decisions of exporting firms affect pass-through. This is particularly important since the decline in pass-through has occurred as a greater concentration of foreign firms are exporting to the United States. We find that the effect of entry on pass-through is quantitatively small and is more than offset by the adjustment of markups that arise only along the intensive margin. Even though entry has a relatively small impact on pass-through, it nevertheless plays an important role in accounting for the secular rise in imports relative to GDP. In particular, our model suggests that over 3/4 of the rise in the U.S. import share since the early 1980s is due to trade in new goods Thus, a key insight of this paper is that adjustment of markups that occur along the intensive margin are quantitatively more important in accounting for secular changes in pass-through than adjustments that occur along the extensive margin. * The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or of any other person associated with …

This paper assesses whether partial exchange rate pass-through to trade prices has important implications for the prospective adjustment of global external imbalances. To address this question, we develop an open-economy DGE model in which firms set their prices with an eye toward maintaining their competitiveness against other producers; this feature of the model generates a variable desired markup and, hence, pass-through that is less than complete. With trade price elasticities of unity or greater, we find that for a given move in the exchange rate the nominal trade balance adjusts more when pass-through is high. However, an ofsetting consideration is that the exchange rate tends to be more sensitive to shocks in a low pass-through environment. We show that the relative importance of these considerations depends on the structural features of the economy, including the magnitude of the trade price elasticities and the sensitivity of private spending to shocks.

Are structural vector autoregressions (VARs) useful for discriminating between macro models? Recent assessments of VARs have shown that these statistical methods have adequate size properties. In other words, in simulation exercises, VARs will only infrequently reject the true data generating process. However, in assessing a statistical test, we often also care about power: the ability of the test to reject a false hypothesis. Much less is known about the power of structural VARs. This paper attempts to fill in this gap by exploring the power of long-run structural VARs against a set of DSGE models that vary in degree from the true data generating process. We report results for two tests: the standard test of checking the sign on impact and a test of the shape of the response. For the models studied here, testing the shape is a more powerful test than simply looking at the sign of the response. In addition, relative to an alternative statistical test based on sample correlations, we find that the shape-based tests have greater power. Given the results on the power and size properties of long-run VARs, we conclude that these VARs are useful for discriminating between macro models.