Au cours des dernières années, plusieurs entreprises ont dû réagir rapidement face à l’accroissement de leurs coûts. La solution rapide ? Augmenter le prix de vente de leurs produits et services afin de transférer la facture à la clientèle. Mais est-ce réellement ce qu’il faut faire ?

Cooperatives, which have a dual mission that includes both business and social goals, are of particular interest for the study of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The aim of this study was to examine how cooperative directors influence the CSR strategies of their organization. We used a multi-level conceptual framework, consisting of micro, meso, and macro levels, to analyze qualitative data (20 interviews, observation of two board meetings and analysis of over 25 public documents) collected through a case study design that focused on the directors of three financial cooperatives operating under a large group of Canadian financial service cooperatives. Our study contributes first by building on prior studies that link CSR goals to the cooperatives’ dual mission and commitment to improving their community. We enrich prior findings by showing how directors play a crucial role in the enactment of the social dimension of CSR, but that conversely, cooperatives are vehicles for directors who want to contribute to the improvement of their community, thus creating a virtuous circle. Secondly, comparing bureaus operating in urban and rural areas allows us to show how the specificities of the community in which a cooperative evolves influence the approach of the directors towards the environmental dimension of CSR.

PurposeThis paper addresses the social value of commercial enterprises that are jointly owned by a government and private sector investors and where the shares are listed on a stock exchange: thus, “listed public–private enterprises” (LPPEs). The theoretical part of the paper addresses how differences in ownership patterns influence the behavior and performance of LPPEs.Design/methodology/approachWe develop a conceptual taxonomy, drawing on the empirical evidence on the behavior and performance of public–private hybrid enterprises and on the application of agency theory to that evidence. The taxonomy discussion predicts how different ownership patterns affect enterprise productive efficiency and the ability of governments to achieve social goals through LPPEs. We review the empirical literature on government enterprise ownership and on the concentration of private share ownership to deduce how these matter for owner and managerial behavior and productive efficiency. We review the literature that considers the informational content that listing of an enterprise's shares on a stock exchange can provide to enterprise owners, managers and other domestic audiences with a policy interest. We employ a social welfare perspective to derive policy implications as to when the LPPE governance structure is most appropriate.FindingsWe show how the monitoring and performance weaknesses of state ownership are offset by some private ownership, particularly when combined with listing on a stock exchange. We demonstrate the effects of different governance structures on enterprise productive efficiency. We find that the LPPE structure is particularly appropriate as an alternative to nationalization or to full privatization and regulation of natural monopoly public utilities, and as an alternative to full private ownership and taxation of non-renewable natural resource extractive enterprises.Originality/valueThis paper explicitly addresses the question of why and how the combination of government ownership, private investor ownership and listing on an exchange is socially valuable in providing information on productive efficiency to governments.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how and why the uses (enabling or controlling) of an activity-based costing system could cause difficulties in implementing such a cost system. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted a case study in a French insurance company. Three successive research periods were undertaken: from March to August 2005, between October 2008 and June 2009, and in 2012. In total, 51 interviews were conducted during these periods. Other useful information was also collected through conversations, observation, and through the consultation of internal documents. Findings The results show that designing a cost system aimed at being simultaneously used in controlling and enabling ways can generate important difficulties. Furthermore, the results show that attempting to get around these difficulties could result in investing significant amounts of resources with no guarantee of success. Research limitations/implications Beyond the difficulties of extending the scope of application of case studies, the study was conducted in an organization involved in the insurance industry which could further limit its general applicability. Practical implications Based on the experience at Rassura, the authors argue that managers should be aware that designing and implementing a cost system that can simultaneously be used in both controlling and enabling ways is a very difficult, if not an insurmountable challenge. Originality/value The results highlight that one important characteristic of a cost system, how it is used, could explain, at least partially, implementation difficulties related to technical challenges, resistance to change and lack of resources.

This article assesses the impact of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in the public sector from a cost consciousness perspective. Using an action-research methodology, we analyze the intensity of the external pressures that influence the institutional logic under which public sector organizations manage their costs. The field work shows that even after decentralization, public sector organizations appear unable to move their costing function from expense control to cost management unless external pressures motivate managers to complete the reform. We propose that the probability of success of reforms is increased when organizations are subject to strong pressures that could take the form of individual incentives or external threats.Sommaire Le present article evalue l'incidence des reformes de la NGP dans le secteur public selon une perspective centree sur les couts. l'aide d'une methodologie de recherche-action, nous analysons l'intensite des pressions externes qui influencent la logique institutionnelle selon laquelle les organisations du secteur public gerent leurs couts. Le travail sur le terrain indique que meme apres la decentralisation, les organisations du secteur public semblent incapables de faire en sorte que leur fonction d'etablissement des couts passe du controle des depenses a une gestion des couts, sauf si des pressions externes motivent les gestionnaires a mener la reforme a bien. Nous suggerons que la probabilite de succes des reformes est accrue lorsque les organisations font l'objet de fortes pressions qui pourraient prendre la forme de mesures incitatives individuelles ou de menaces externes.

Accounting PerspectivesVolume 14, Issue 3 p. 151-153 Introduction Introduction to Special Issue on IFRS Bruce McConomy, Bruce McConomy Guest Editor Accounting PerspectivesSearch for more papers by this authorClaude Laurin, Claude Laurin Editor-in-Chief Accounting PerspectivesSearch for more papers by this author Bruce McConomy, Bruce McConomy Guest Editor Accounting PerspectivesSearch for more papers by this authorClaude Laurin, Claude Laurin Editor-in-Chief Accounting PerspectivesSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 September 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3838.12050Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume14, Issue3Special Issue: IFRS Adoption and Related Topics / Numéro spécial consacré à l'adoption des IFRS et aux enjeux connexesSeptember 2015Pages 151-153 RelatedInformation

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between dominant shareholders, whose voting rights exceed cash flow rights (excess control), and firms’ cost of capital, including both equity capital and debt. Design/methodology/approach – This research is conducted in Canada over a four-year period from 2002 to 2005 and uses panel data of 155 S&P/TSX firms. The weighted average cost of capital is regressed on excess control using fixed-effect regressions in a two-stage least squares framework. Findings – The paper finds evidence that the cost of capital increases with excess control. The paper also confirms that for firms incorporated under the less protective Quebec incorporation law the excess control and, therefore, cost of capital is higher than for firms incorporated in the other provinces under the common law regime. Originality value – Prior work examined the relationship between excess control and firm value, mostly Tobin's Q. By using cost of capital, the study explores another channel through witch excess control may affect firm value.

Although governments worldwide are increasingly choosing to deliver services through organisations with greater autonomy than traditional bureaus, the implicit assumption that such agencification contributes to long-run efficiency remains largely untested. Agencification gives agency managers more autonomy and access to incentive mechanisms that lead to greater efficiency if they are not offset by inefficiencies resulting from managerial discretion. We test the hypothesis that agencification improves efficiency by examining the longer-run performance of 13 agencies in the province of Quebec, Canada over approximately 10 years. We find that these agencies experienced long-term productivity gains, but that these gains reached a plateau over the time period studied. In addition, we describe changes in several measures of performance. A survey of the managers of these agencies indicates that they perceive agencification as having a substantive impact, but worry about the sustainability of autonomy and their capacity to show continued gains in measured performance over time.

In this article we attempt to contribute to governance research in the nonprofit area by proposing a conceptual framework inspired by recent developments in the literature. First, we analyze the governance of nonprofit organizations (hereafter, NPOs) from different theoretical perspectives, inspired by for-profit, nonprofit and public sector theories on governance. After presenting a governance framework for NPOs, we explore empirically whether its various dimensions are being taken into account by NPOs in the arts and culture sector. Our findings suggest that, among NPOs in this sector, governance is still viewed as a narrow concept where board members are mainly passive, basically rubber-stamping decisions for the benefit of external funders.

PurposeThe objective of this study is to test whether financial flexibility has value. Using the current financial crisis, the authors investigate whether firms that built up financial flexibility over the years preceding the crisis yield superior performance during the financial crisis.Design/methodology/approachFinancial flexibility is measured along the following dimensions: cash and cash equivalents, debt (short‐term and total) and net debt. These proxies are measured as an average over the five years prior to the crisis, from September 2002 to August 2007. Firms are then sorted into ten portfolios and monthly stock returns for each portfolio are evaluated over the crisis period from September 2007 to March 2010.FindingsThe authors' results show that high pre‐crisis levels of cash do not seem to have a positive impact on firm value during the crisis. However, the results provide evidence that high pre‐crisis levels of debt had a negative impact on firm value during the latest financial crisis, supporting the hypothesis that financial flexibility has value.Originality/valueThe originality of the authors' approach is to evaluate the value of financial flexibility during a financial crisis. The recent financial crisis offers an ideal test case to evaluate whether financial flexibility has indeed value for the firm.

This article describes and analyzes the privatization of Canadian National Railway (CN), a large railroad privatization. First, it reviews the theory and evidence concerning railroad privatizations. Second, it presents a brief history of CN and the regulatory environment prior to and after CN's privatization. Third, it uses data from 1990 to 2011 to compare CN's post-privatization operating performance with its pre-privatization performance. Fourth, it uses cost–benefit analysis to estimate the social welfare gains from the privatization and the distribution of those gains. The overall results demonstrate that CN performed substantially better following privatization, both from an operational perspective and from a broader social welfare perspective. We find statistically significant increases over the long term (16years following privatization) in sales, capital investment, assets, profit, profitability, productivity, dividends and corporate taxes paid. There was little change in the capital structure of CN and a significant decrease in employment. Using Canadian Pacific Railway as a basis for the counterfactual, we estimate that CN's privatization generated social welfare gains of approximately $25billion in 2011 Canadian dollars. The Canadian government received almost half of these gains, while CN's shareholders (most of whom were non-Canadian) captured the rest.

In this article, we reexamine the law and finance theory in the Canadian context, characterized by a dichotomy in the legal traditions that govern incorporation law across provinces. We specifically examine the relation between incorporation law, corporate ownership structure, and firm value, taking into account the endogeneity of ownership structure. Using a sample of 181 Canadian firms between 2002 and 2005, we show that firms from Quebec mostly choose to incorporate under the federal law (CBCA), perceived as more protective of shareholder rights, rather than under the provincial law (QCA). Our 2SLS regressions show that Quebec firms incorporated under the QCA tend to have more concentrated ownership and that ownership concentration is negatively related to firm value (Tobin's Q). These results are in line with the previous literature, which, in different pieces, has identified the positive relationship between less stringent legal environment and ownership concentration, as well as the negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. In this study, we formalize these relationships while taking into consideration the fact that firm value could also influence ownership concentration, as shown by Cho (1998). These results take on a particular importance as many researchers and organizations dedicated to the protection of investors, in Europe and in many countries around the world, have criticized the existence of ownership concentration and excess voting rights (wedge). These results thus reinforce the need for better corporate governance regulations to minimize the risks of minority shareholders expropriation.

This article describes a reform to improve delivery of state-funded employment services in the province of Quebec. It is based on a six-year field study conducted during the reform process and presents the reform's objective, the way it was implemented, and some of the lessons learned during the reform process. This study focuses on three points: the key steps that led to the implementation of an output-based contracting system between the state and non-profit organizations; why the process of implementing private-sector practices was unexpectedly long and complex; and the side-effects associated with the reform.

Prior empirical work examined the relationship between dominant shareholders, whose voting rights exceed cash flow rights, and firm value. In this study, we adopt a different perspective and argue that because of the risk imposed on minority shareholders and debtors, such excess control likely increases firms’ weighted-average cost of capital. We further argue that in legal environments that provide weak investor protection, the firms’ cost of capital is likely to be higher. Using panel data of 155 Canadian firms over a four-year period from 2002 to 2005, we find supporting evidence.

This study examines the link between ownership structures and R&D activities in Canada. We hypothesize that highly concentrated ownership structures or the presence of controlling minority shareholders negatively affects R&D intensity of Canadian manufacturing firms. Our results show that the concentration of voting rights is negatively related to the level of R&D expenditure and R&D outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the level of separation between the voting and cash flow rights held by dominant shareholders of “Controlling Minority Structure” firms has a positive effect on R&D intensity but a negative effect on R&D outcomes. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.